In Memoriam: Peter Lyons

I was very sad to learn that Peter B. Lyons passed away on April 29.  He began his long and distinguished career at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and then spent many years in Washington, first as a Science Advisor to U.S. Senator Pete Domenici and the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and later, as a Commissioner at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and finally as the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy at the Department of Energy (DOE).  During the course of his career, he made numerous contributions to nuclear science and nuclear policy, some of which are described in the DOE's bio on Pete and in the American Nuclear Society's (ANS) newswire article on his passing.  

 

In addition to being a person of so many accomplishments, he was also an extraordinary human being, and I would like to focus on some of his personal characteristics that I observed in my many interactions with him over the years.  

 

I first got to know Pete Lyons well when I was the Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy in DOE.  He was one of the Capitol Hill staffers I met with periodically to discuss the work of my office.  Although Hill staffers are notoriously busy and overworked, and in other offices, I was often kept waiting or given only a brief, rushed audience, Pete was invariably respectful of the time of anyone visiting his office, and very thoughtful and knowledgeable in discussions.   His focus was always on the science and on the national good.

 

When I left DOE, I continued to see him occasionally at various conferences and other events, and to follow his career.  I have a special memory from 2013, when I served as the Faculty Member in Residence (FMR) for the Washington Internships for Students of Engineering (WISE), a program supported by the ANS and several other engineering societies to bring students to Washington for a summer to expose them to technology policy.  One part of the program was for the FMR to arrange for the students to meet leaders working in the science and technology policy area from the government and other organizations.  

 

Pete was the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy at that time, and I had arranged for the students to come as a group to meet him.  While I have been impressed by the fact that many very high level, very busy people, such as NRC Commissioners, Assistant Secretaries, and others, do make time to meet with the WISE students, Pete did much more than give them a briefing.  I had the students briefly introduce themselves and the topics they were studying that summer, and instead of just nodding his head and waiting for the introductions to finish, he engaged each of the students, asking them questions about their projects and offering them suggestions, or commenting on the schools or on other things they had mentioned.  I even saw him taking notes on their names, schools, and professional societies.  That showed a level of interest and engagement that went well above and beyond the norm.

 

After Pete retired from DOE, he remained engaged professionally.  I was delighted to see him be recognized last year with ANS’s Dwight D. Eisenhower Award for his influential leadership in nuclear technology policy and for the vital role he played in the nuclear renaissance of the early 21st century.  And I was pleased to see an article authored by him in the February issue of Nuclear News.  After I read that article, I sent him a message about it.  In his typical fashion, he responded promptly and graciously, even though I was aware that he was very ill.

 

In one of our last conversations in person, I noted to Pete that he and I both had served in NRC, DOE, and on the Hill--although I hasten to say that he served in a higher position than I did in each of these organizations!  There are probably relatively few people with such backgrounds, and maybe it is one bond we shared.  But my observation was that he treated everyone with courtesy and respect.  

He will truly be missed, not only for his many contributions to nuclear policy in his various positions, but for his outstanding personal characteristics as well. 

***

 

 

Coronavirus and Nuclear--Take 2:

A Second Cancellation

It may seem somewhat parochial to write about the coronavirus from the perspective of meetings for the nuclear community, but when you think that, just a few weeks ago, the news seemed very far from most of us, thinking in terms of personal impact drives home just how quickly and aggressively this brand new phenomenon is changing all of our lives.

In the beginning, most of what we heard was about things that were happening in Wuhan, China, where a new disease, quickly dubbed COVID-19, was causing illnesses and deaths.  At first, the numbers seemed relatively small, but the concern quickly grew, and quarantines and cancellations began to be announced.  But again, they were initially remote from most of us.  However, slowly, the disease seemed to be spreading--to more people and more countries--and the announcements hit closer to home.

The first announcement that affected my personal plans was the postponement of the Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference (PBNC) originally scheduled for April in Cancun, Mexico, that I wrote about in my last blog only a week ago.

I could not have guessed when I wrote that blog that I would see another cancellation of a nuclear event only a week later.  On Thursday, March 5, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a notice that they were cancelling the annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC), originally scheduled for next week. 

NRC's official notice states that, "In recent days, a number of organizations and presenters have changed their attendance plans, with indications that others would reach similar decisions in coming days."

Once again, this is an understandable, but disappointing turn of events.  The NRC's RIC has become one of the most important nuclear conferences.  It always draws a wide attendance from all over the U.S. and from a number of other countries, and it provides an excellent overview of a variety of nuclear regulatory and related issues.

While the PBNC announced a postponement of their meeting (until October), the NRC has cancelled the meeting outright.  The next RIC will be held in March 2021.

Of course, these 2 meetings are very small events compared to some of the large and well-known meetings and events that announced cancellations in the last couple of weeks, so I am not trying to imply that there is something special or different going on with regard to nuclear meetings.  And of course, many people around the world are enduring far more serious consequences of this disease than the cancellation of a meeting--deaths, illness, quarantines, worry, economic impacts, school closures, and so much more.  It is just that, as I said, the news always seems more real when it starts affecting our individual lives and our plans. 

So, for all the more serious reasons, I hope that a way is found to beat back this modern-day plague.  But I still can't help but miss this spring's RIC and PBNC. 

*** 

Whither Nuclear Power:

Status and Prospects

The New Year is always a time for reflection on the past and the future.  And a new decade (if you count 2020 as the start of a decade) doubles the incentive to try to look at where things are headed for nuclear power. 

As always the picture for nuclear power is very mixed, and depending on which report you read which day, you can conclude either that nuclear power is on its way out, or that nuclear power is poised for great things ahead.  I try to stay away from making predictions--there always seem to be too many moving parts--but I thought it might be interesting to summarize a few facts--things that are happening now in the nuclear power industry around the world--and to try to put them in perspective.

For inspiration, I turned first to 2 recent articles on the World Nuclear Association (WNA) website, Plans for New Reactors Worldwide, and Reactor Shutdowns Outweigh Start-ups in 2019.  Taken together, these might appear to be confusing--2019 saw a decrease in the number of reactors, but on the other hand, nuclear power capacity worldwide is anticipated to increase in the coming years. 

When you peel back the layers, you begin to see that there are a number of elements involved in what is happening.  While there were more shutdowns than startups in 2019, it is important to note that there were still a number of startups.  Furthermore, most of the shutdowns had been planned for some time and were based on the ages of the plants, government subsidies for competing sources and wholesale market economics (at least in the U.S.), or on national plans to reduce the use of nuclear power in some countries.  Most of the startups in the past year were not surprises either.  They were largely in Russia and China, both of which have aggressive nuclear power programs. 

Likewise, many of the plants listed as being under construction are in Russia and China, as well as elsewhere in Asia.  The WNA article on future plans identifies about 50 reactors under construction.  It also notes that, in the past, nuclear power plant shutdowns have roughly been balanced by new units starting operation:  in the last 20 years, from 1998-2018, they indicate that 89 reactors were shut down and 98 new reactors started operation; and looking ahead, one prediction is that 154 existing reactors will close in the next 20 years (by 2040), while 289 may come online by 2040.  The WNA article on plans for new reactors also cites the extensions of reactor operating lifetimes in the U.S. and other countries as a positive development in sustaining the nuclear contribution to electricity supply, and both articles mention power uprates in several countries.  I would also particularly highlight the recent approval by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the first applications for license extensions from 60 to 80 years.

Of course, predictions are always subject to a lot of change--changes in governments and national (and sometimes, local) policies, changes in public opinion, a major nuclear accident, shutdowns of fossil fuel plants, decreasing costs of renewable energy options, technological developments in nuclear technology, and much more, can all alter these projections.  And the changes can be positive or negative.  Recently, concerns about climate change are causing some countries to revisit past anti-nuclear policies.  But historically, a number of active construction projects have failed to be completed, especially in the United States, but also elsewhere; and sometimes, plants have been shut down even after license renewals were granted.  Therefore, it is too soon to tell whether the current trends will be sustained over a 20-year period.

Other factors that neither of these articles cite is the potential role of some of the advanced nuclear technology under development.  Current R&D is focusing a lot on small modular reactors (SMRs) and even micro-reactors, and there are also a number of projects focused on alternatives to the current light water reactor technology.  In the U.S., some specific causes for optimism include the recent Congressional budget appropriation for fiscal year 2020 that provides a 12.5% increase in funding for nuclear projects and an early site permit for SMRs at TVA's Clinch River site issued by the NRC. 

This work is focused mostly on the longer term, and some of it, especially the micro-reactors, is focused on applications other than power to the electricity grid.  Therefore, this work quite rightly has not been incorporated into the 20-year prediction offered by WNA.  However, in the longer term, some of this work could result in a new generation of reactors that would be appropriate for providing power to the grid, and that might address some of the concerns, such as the high cost of constructing a large reactor, and the impact of an accident, that have hampered nuclear power deployment in recent years.  In fact, SMRs might also be attractive for areas that are not suitable for large reactors, and thus, have the potential to lead to an expansion of the use of nuclear power.

To summarize, in recent years, nuclear power seems to have regained some of the momentum that was lost after the Fukushima accident in Japan.  In fact, some countries, such as Poland, that had previously had an anti-nuclear stance, are now looking seriously at incorporating nuclear power in the future.  Thus, there is some reason to believe that the WNA projections are realistic.  Nevertheless, experience has shown that unanticipated developments have sometimes drastically altered the short-term trends.  Looking further ahead, there is considerable potential for the new technologies under development to have a significant impact in the longer term, but further effort is needed to confirm that these newer designs meet expectations about cost and safety. 

I know that some will be disappointed that my projections are not more definitive.  Alas, I lack a crystal ball!  But I remain cautiously optimistic that the WNA projections will be realized, and that current R&D will pave the way for a new generation of nuclear power in the future.

***

Lessons of the 737 Max 8 Crashes:

The Role of Regulation

Regulation has never been easy.  Most of the time, it seems superfluous at best.  Most of the time, most of the systems in our lives seem to work.  Airplanes get to their destinations, food is untainted, and nuclear power plants hum along.  If anything, regulation often seems intrusive--it costs money and it takes time away from other activities.  And at worst, regulation can be excessive, or outdated, or misdirected.

But the 2 recent accidents involving the Boeing 737 Max 8 point to the fact that trying to skimp on regulation, or allowing the regulated entities to have too much say in how they are regulated and inspected, can have tragic consequences.  I am referring, of course, to the crash of the Indonesian Lion Air plane off the coast of Indonesia on October 29, 2018, killing all 189 people aboard, followed by the March 10, 2019 crash of the Ethiopian Airlines flight just after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing all 157 people aboard.

I will be the first to say that I'm not an expert on aviation safety, and that the investigation of the accidents is still underway, so it is premature to draw firm conclusions.  However, enough facts have emerged to paint a troubling picture of some of the practices of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  Among other things, the FAA had a policy that allowed aviation manufacturers to certify that their own systems complied with FAA's air safety regulations.

I don't usually cite comedians, but Trevor Noah, on the Daily Show, captured the issues very well.

It is of particular note that the FAA's oversight of manufacturers had been criticized by the Department of Transportation's Inspector General (IG).  Among other things, the IG said at different times that the FAA’s system for deciding which technologies carried the highest safety risks was not effective, that those doing the safety checks were not focusing on the potentially high-risk issues, and that the FAA had not adequately trained company employees to spot noncompliance with safety requirements.  In its defense, the FAA has sighted its expanding and shifting role, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.   

Again, I am not the one to pass any judgments on the FAA.  But what is striking is that this discussion is playing out in the news at about the same time that the nuclear industry is calling for the the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to cut back on their inspections and allow for more self-assessments by the nuclear power plant operators.  

At the very least, the timing of this nuclear industry initiative is bad.  This is not to say that NRC's regulation is perfect, or that there are no ways that that the inspection process could be made more efficient.  Not at all.  The message is that the two similar aircraft accidents occurring so close together provides a cautionary tale, both for aerospace regulation, and for other types of health and safety regulation. 

Regulation can always be increased, and it can always be decreased.  And I'd be the last person to say that the NRC, or any other regulatory organization, has found the perfect balance.  But any changes need to be considered carefully.  If self-assessments replace some of the current inspections, how will NRC assure that the utility people involved in the assessments are properly trained and that they are conducting the inspections appropriately?  How will NRC review or check on the results?  How will the public be assured that the same standards are being met?

Regulation should certainly be open to internal change.  Some changes may be spurred by technology changes, some by the identification of new risks, and some by the interest in improving efficiency and effectiveness.  And there can be a role for industry self-assessment.  But, as the recent aircraft crashes so dramatically and so sadly suggest, there can be a serious downside to insufficient regulatory guidance and oversight.  

The NRC has usually been very careful in its decisions on what and how to regulate.  In this time of heightened awareness of the tragic consequences that appear to stem in part from insufficient oversight, the NRC should be particularly sensitive to how it implements any changes in its inspection processes. 

***

A Tribute to Harold Denton:

A Man for the Moment

 Harold Denton, left, is shown in the control room at Three Mile Island 

with President Jimmy Carter and a power plant technician on April 1, 1979. (AP)

Sadly, this is one of two posts this week of the deaths of two icons of the technical community, and of my professional career--Harold Denton, who was the face of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the time of Three Mile Island (TMI), and Mildred Dresselhaus, an MIT professor who did pioneering work in the field of nanotubes, and so much more.  Both have achieved a kind of "rock star" status during the course of their careers. 

I only learned of the death of Harold Denton about a week after his February 13, 2017 death, when I saw an obituary for him in the Washington Post.  Although Harold Denton had a long and distinguished career at NRC and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the article focuses almost exclusively on Harold Denton's role in the aftermath of the TMI accident.  This is fitting, as the accident was a pivotal moment for NRC and the nuclear industry.  As the obituary makes clear, Harold Denton exuded an air of calmness and competence that was critical in reassuring the public--and in beginning what would be a long process of analyzing and responding to the accident.

I did not join the NRC until a few years later, and I never worked directly for Harold, but while I was at NRC, I had many opportunities to see him in action in meetings and to speak to him.  By this time, the "rock star" status was past history--the Post reports that Harold was profiled in People magazine, he was awarded honorary degrees by several Pennsylvania colleges, and his likeness even appeared on T-shirts--but he still was held in high esteem at NRC.  Even when the issues were contentious, he never seemed to lose his cool.  The same calm manner that reassured the public gave him an air of authority among his peers.  

It is interesting to reflect on the importance of the competence he brought to a frightening situation.  While many people criticize regulatory overreach, regulators often play a key role in averting crisis in the first place, and when the unimaginable happens, of working to assure the safety of the public.  The Post comments that, "He was that oft-maligned figure, a $50,000-a-year federal regulator, who managed to be the voice of competence and reason at a time of peril."

Not every regulator is a Harold Denton, of course, and most of the time--fortunately--we are not dealing with events as extraordinary as TMI.  Had TMI never happened, Harold would have had a very successful career at NRC and would, undoubtedly, have made significant contributions to nuclear power regulation, but except among his colleagues, these contributions would have been largely unnoticed.  

It shouldn't take a TMI to bring to the public attention the kinds of skills and talents that reside in the bowls of our government agencies and the importance and value of those skills and talents for the American public.  Harold Denton would have been a remarkable public servant even if he had never been in the public eye.  The world has truly lost someone who probably never expected to be in the limelight, but who, when the need arose, stepped up to the plate and did a remarkable job.

*** 

 

Term Limits at DNFSB:

Good or Bad?

My last blog on my experiences in the Presidential appointment process as a candidate for a position on the board of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) elicited several comments about the undesirability of Board members staying on after their terms have expired if they are not immediately replaced.

Since this is an issue I have had occasion to think about in the past, I thought I'd follow up the comment with a little history of practices in several different agencies.

First, a primer on boards and commissions versus single administrator agencies.  Basically, boards and commissions operate very differently from single administrator agencies.  In the latter, once an administrator is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, they serve "at the will of the President."  That is, they are able to stay in their position until either the end of the President's term of office or until the President replaces them.  The President can replace any such individual at any time and for any reason.  If there is a gap between when one administrator leaves and another is nominated and confirmed, that position is filled on an acting basis by the most senior civil service employee of the agency. 

On the other hand, boards and commissions have several members who are co-equal in status (in terms of their votes on agency decisions), although one is designated by the President as the chairman.  Boards and commissions generally have an odd number of members (usually 5 or 7) in order to minimize tie votes, and since they are required to represent a spectrum of views, no more than 3 (in the case of a 5-member commission or board) or 4 (in the case of a 7-member one) can be from the party in power.  The other members are from the opposite party, or may be Independents.

The members of boards and commissions are appointed for staggered terms.   The terms are fixed in that, if a new board member or commissioner is appointed in the middle of a term, the official end of the term, they do not get a full 5-year (or 7-year for larger boards) term.  These terms are independent of the presidential cycle, so some appointed members may continue to serve into the next Administration.  They cannot be removed, except for "cause" (doing something illegal), so their term cannot be terminated for political reasons.  

However, for most boards and commissions, a commissioner or board member whose term has expired is permitted to stay in the position until a replacement is appointed.  That is the situation for the DNFSB.  There have been cases, where either the President has not nominated a replacement or the Senate has not confirmed the replacement, where an individual has been able to stay in their position for several years, even though their term had expired.

On the surface, it might appear that this has one advantage--a board or commission could continue to have a full, or nearly full, complement of members even if the President or the Senate failed to act.  However, as the comments I've received suggest, this has undesirable aspects as well.  It appears to remove the pressure for the President and the Senate to act, and depending on the politics, it could encourage a Senate that is hostile to the President to stall a confirmation to maintain the status quo.

Another feature of commissions and boards is that, if a vacancy develops, there is no provision for someone to serve as an acting member.  Therefore, there can be cases where the board is evenly split between parties and tie votes can occur; alternatively, there can be cases where the board split is 3 to 1 (for a 5-member board missing one member).  If a chairman leaves, one of the other board or commission members does fill in as the acting chair, but there are no acting board members or commissioners.  

It turns out that there are some variants to the rules for commissions and boards.  One notable example is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  I recall a discussion many years ago with the late Manning Muntzing, who headed a prestigious law firm in Washington prior to his death.  Earlier in his career, Mr. Muntzing had worked as an attorney for the local telephone company.  In that capacity, he dealt with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and observed the effects of this practice.

Later, he worked as a lawyer at the Atomic Energy Commission and was there at the time that the AEC was split up and the NRC was created.  In this capacity, he helped draft the legislation establishing the NRC.  He claimed responsibility for inserting the language into the authorizing legislation for the NRC that require an NRC commissioner to leave his or her position the day his or her term expires.  I recall that he was very proud of this provision.  He felt it would hold the President's and the Senate's feet to the fire and assure that they made timely appointments to the NRC.

How did that work?  Well, over the history of the NRC, it has frequently operated with four, or even three, members instead of the full complement of five, either because the President did not nominate someone to fill a seat that was expired or about to expire, or because the Senate did not act to confirm a nomination.  On one occasion, the NRC was down to two members, leading to concerns about the legal standing of any significant actions taken when there was less than a quorum of members.  Fortunately, that period was brief and the Commission managed to avoid any critical decisions.

Conceptually, this could happen again, since the NRC only has three members at present, and Chairman Svinicki's term ends this June 30.  Presumably, since the President just named her as Chair of the Commission, I would expect that he will reappoint her, and since the Senate has a Republican majority, I would expect her to have an easy reconfirmation.  Therefore, in this case, it is NOT likely that the Commission would go down to two members.  However, in other circumstances, a three-member Commission with 4-1/2 months to go on the term of one of them could be a cause for concern.

During the last few months, I became aware of yet another nuance in the rules, at least at one agency.  At the FCC, I recently learned, commissioners can stay on after their terms have expired, but only until the end of the session of Congress during which their term expires.  What the reasons are for this particular variant of the rules, I don't know, nor have I been able to find any other agencies that have a similar requirement, or that have any other variants.  What this does show is that, while most agencies operate under the same rules as the DNFSB, there are other models.

It is not clear that any one of these models is better than the others.  As the examples above illustrate, there is a downside in each case.  While a board that operates with 3 of its 5 members holding expired terms--as I believe has been the case at DNFSB since October 30--leaves something to be desired, the alternative model under which the NRC operates introduces other potential problems.

In any event, the only way of changing the rules for board members or commissioners of such agencies would be to modify the authorizing legislation of the agency.  That is probably a measure most agencies would not want to take for an action that might only substitute one set of problems for another. 

***

Women at ACRS:

Another Step Forward

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has just announced the appointment of 4 new members of its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).  They are:  Margaret Sze-Tai Chu, Walter Kirchner, Jose March-Leuba, and Matthew Sunseri.   Their bios can be found in the above NRC news release and will not be repeated here.

What is particularly noteworthy about the new appointments is that it will be the first time there will be more than one woman serving on the Committee at one time.  Margaret Chu joins Joy Rempe, who is the only other woman to have served on the ACRS since its inception in 1947 under the Atomic Energy Commission.

I have had the privilege of knowing both of these women.  Joy Rempe has been serving with distinction on the Committee since 2003.  Margaret Chu joins the Committee after a distinguished career, and I know will bring a lot to the Committee as well.

Not mentioned in this announcement is the fact that the former Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Materials (ACNW&M) had a female member long before the ACRS did.  The first--and only--woman to serve on the ACNW&M (which began in 1988 as the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, or ACNW) was Ruth Weiner, who at that time was at Sandia Laboratories.  Ruth Weiner, who I also have had the privilege of knowing, served with distinction on the ACNW&M from 2003 to 2008, when it was disbanded and its responsibilities absorbed into the ACRS.

While I like to celebrate the successes of women in the field and am delighted to see a step forward, I have slightly mixed emotions in this case.  I have to scratch my head and wonder why it took so long to appoint a woman to either body, and why there are still only 2 women out of the more than a dozen members of the ACRS.  When you think about it, there have at times been two women serving as NRC Commissioners at one time, and that is a body of only five people.

With a growing number of women now in the technical workforce, I look forward to a time--hopefully, in the not-very-distant future--when it is no longer so unusual when a woman is appointed to the ACRS.

***   

NRC Principles of Good Regulation:

Compliments and Critiques

This week was an eventful one in the nuclear field.  The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission held its annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) on March 8 through 10, and the 5th anniversary of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident fell on March 11.  Since I have already read some excellent blogs on 3-11, as the Japanese sometimes call it, I will focus my attention on the RIC, and in particular, on a session near and dear to my heart.  (All RIC sessions were recorded and should soon be available on the NRC webcast archive.)

As I have previously reported, this year marks the 25th anniversary of the promulgation of NRC's Principles of Good Regulation.  NRC started its celebration of this milestone with the internal seminar covered in my earlier blog.  They continued the celebration with a technical session at the RIC.  The session was chaired by Mike Weber, Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and included speakers addressing the PGR, as they have come to be called, from a variety of perspectives. 

The first two speakers were Tom Wellock, the NRC historian, and Kenneth Rogers, who was the Commissioner responsible for proposing that NRC develop a set of principles and for directing their development.  Tom Wellock put the PGR in historical context--noting events of the time and the evolving view of regulation, as well as how the concept of the PGR has spread.  Commissioner Rogers described some of the internal processes and debates behind the PGR, and also spotlighted some places where similar sets of principles have taken root.

The third speaker was Maria Korsnick, currently the COO of the Nuclear Energy Institute.  She gave the NRC high marks for independence and openness, but said that the principles of efficiency, clarity and reliability need more work.  Particular areas for improvement that she cited include better prioritization of regulatory actions and more accurate and transparent cost-benefit analysis.  She also had messages for the industry, saying they need to be more accountable in explaining how they would implement NRC requirements.  Overall, she concluded that NRC is "justifiably internationally renowned." 

The next speaker, Diane Curran, an attorney who has represented citizens groups against the NRC, had a different view.  She critiqued the implementation of the principles of openness and transparency.  On openness, she seemed to suggest that NRC may hold open meetings but is not necessarily making them easy for the public to attend, and is not necessarily listening to the public.  On the principle of independence, she seemed to suggest that it was wrong of the principles to equate licensees and the general public in this principle, as the interests of the public are paramount.  (The principle states:  "All available facts and opinions much be sought openly from licensees and other interested members of the public.  The many and possibly conflicting public interests much be considered.  Final decisions must be based on objective, unbiased assessments of all information, and must be documented with reasons explicitly stated.") 

The final speaker, Joseph Klinger, from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, gave a state perspective.  He said that, 25 years ago, he saw isolation between the NRC and the states.  This isolation has largely disappeared.  He attributes the change to the PGR.  He felt the NRC really excelled in openness and transparency.  He also said that Illinois had embraced the same principles.  He noted that the 37 Agreement States are responsible for most of the regulation of radioactive materials, and thus collaboration between NRC and the states is critical.  He particularly cited the importance of collaboration to achieve efficiency, one of the five principles. 

References to the PGR were not confined to this session.  They were mentioned in Chairman Stephen Burns' welcoming letter on the first page of the RIC program, and again in a one-page summary of the NRC on the third page.  And they were raised repeatedly by Commissioners, NRC managers, and others throughout the conference.

Later, speaking to someone from NRC in the hallway between sessions, I learned that one of the non-US attendees in the audience at the session on the PGR (the RIC had attendees from 33 countries this year) noted that he thought that it was good to have something like the PGR, and he intended to bring the idea back to his country. 

It was interesting to see the mix of positive and negative comments.  While the compliments were, of course, good to hear, I think the criticism is also important to hear.  While we may individually debate whether we agree with the comments, positive and negative, they all reflect how the NRC and its action appear to the various stakeholders.  Like all lofty, aspirational goals, NRC will never be able to declare victory and rest on its laurels.  There will always be times when it didn't meet the goals perfectly, and even when it does, there will still be room for improvement in the future.  

I like to reflect back on the period, 25 years ago, when I worked in Commissioner Rogers office and helped develop the PGR.  Little did I know then what impact it would have.  It is nice to see that it thrives today, and if anything, its influence is growing.

***

A Regulatory Comparison:

FCC versus NRC

In a recent blog on NRC's Principles of Good Regulation, someone commented that they wished that someday, nuclear power could be less controversial and regulation could be more like that at FAA and FCC.  This comment was particularly interesting to me, as I am quite familiar with the FCC (see below), so I responded that the grass may seem greener on the other side of the fence, but that many issues at FCC were at least equally contentious and divisive.  In return, the commenter pointed out that FCC doesn't regulate the technology that led to, for example, the iPhone.

It was interesting that he chose the FCC as a point of comparison, because my husband worked for the FCC for many years, and for much of that time, we were both in regulatory agencies--he at FCC and me at NRC.  (And, in fact, if I may be allowed a small brag, he was responsible for the regulatory changes at FCC that allowed for the development of what became Wi-Fi.)  Furthermore, we both had postings in Japan involving our regulatory counterparts there, both working in their offices and observing them from other perspectives.

So we have had a lot of opportunity to compare and contrast FCC, NRC, and other regulatory entities--their philosophies, their operations, their staffs and management, etc.  (While my husband also had some familiarity with FAA, as telecommunications is important for the FAA, I have less, so I will leave FAA out of the discussion, and just make my points based on a comparison of FCC and NRC.)

There are many ways in which I could compare and contrast FCC and NRC regulations, but let me focus in this blog post on the particular point raised in the comment on my previous blog--that the controversies at FCC are not at the level where they significantly delay technology development.  The commenter cites as his example that no license submittal is required for the next model iPhone.  

That is technically true.  However, one must consider the whole situation.  The original iPhone was in the eyes of FCC a package of several radio systems--each of which had been previously approved for general use. Hence it was only subject to routine staff approvals. As a result of several decades of deregulation, FCC allows many types of radio technologies "permissionless innovation".  However, this allowance is spotty and all new radio technology above 95 GHz needs nonroutine approvals that could take as long as approving a reactor design.

In fact, at present, there are a number of start-ups developing various telecommunications-related technologies, some of which do require changes in FCC regulations for them to be implemented.  My husband has seen some of these companies fold because of foot-dragging by FCC, mainly to cater to entrenched interests.  In these cases, there is not even a rationale that we need to be move slowly to be sure of the safety.  The delays and roadblocks are strictly about competing economic interests. 

By pointing this out, I am not implying that NRC regulations are perfect or that NRC gets a pass because of the focus on safety.  I just want to be sure that people who compare regulatory agencies--particularly these two--see the whole picture.  

***

Principles of Good Regulation--25th Anniversary:

NRC Celebrates 25 Years of the 

Principles of Good Regulation

On January 19, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission launched what they characterize as a year of celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Principles of Good Regulation.  The first event was an employee seminar on the history and evolution of the Principles.  I was very pleased and proud to have been asked to be a part of that event.

I had wanted to report on this seminar earlier, but Mother Nature (the Snowzilla that hit the Washington, DC area a few days later) caused me to move up my vacation plans.  I escaped the blizzard in time, but the things I'd planned to do the remainder of that week got put off until now.

I have previously discussed the thinking behind the NRC Principles of Good Regulation and will not repeat that here.  I will focus instead primarily on what was discussed at this event.

NRC dates the effective beginning of the Principles of Good Regulation to the publication of the Principles in the Agency's Five Year Plan for 1991-1995 and the dissemination of the Principles to all NRC staff in a memorandum from the Chairman of NRC at the time, Kenneth M. Carr, on January 17, 1991.  The Principles have become very important to the Agency in the last 25 years, and therefore, the NRC has apparently decided to do a number of things this year to recognize the role of the Principles and to set the scene for their future.

The first of these events was the January 19 staff seminar.  It was held in the Rockville, MD headquarters of the NRC, but was broadcast to all the NRC regional offices.  (I will also note that it was held on the 41th anniversary of the day NRC started--January 19, 1975.)   There are plans for several other events and initiatives to be held this year focusing on the Principles.  For example, at the upcoming NRC Regulatory Information Conference (RIC), there will be a panel discussion on the Principles.

The seminar brought together a number of people who had been at the NRC when the Principles were developed, as well as some who have been involved with the Principles in more recent years.  The current NRC Chairman, Steven Burns, the current head of the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Michael Weber, and the current Executive Director for Operations, Victor McCree, were all on the NRC staff at the time the Principles were promulgated.  Mike Weber and Vic McCree each made opening remarks.  Mike had been a technical assistant in Chairman Carr's office in 1991, so was heavily involved in the "birth" of the Principles.  Vic McCree noted how the Principles later led to a staff-initiated statement of values a few years later.  Commissioner Ostendorff, who has been one of the more recent champions of the Principles, made opening remarks as well, focusing on how he has tried to promote this concept to regulators in other countries.

The main speakers were former Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers, myself, and the current NRC historian, Thomas Wellock.  The three of us tried to detail how the concept for the Principles developed and evolved. 

The idea for the Principles came from Kenneth C. Rogers, who was a Commissioner at the time.  While many people contributed to the Principles, Commissioner Rogers had assigned me the task of gathering and synthesizing inputs to the document.  The two of us reconstructed for the NRC audience some of the details of that effort:  his discussions with the other Commissioners, my interactions with their assistants and with senior NRC management, initial skepticism in some quarters and our efforts to incorporate suggestions that helped bring everyone aboard, the attempt to draw from previous statements and documents, the process for identifying and narrowing the list of potential principles to a reasonable set, and the decisions on what order to put the principles in and what language to use to explain and clarify them.

Tom Wellock then tried to give some historical perspective to the Principles.  (He abbreviated them PGR, which is probably a good idea.  And while I'm mentioning good ideas, I noticed that, although I always painstakingly try to put them in the order we initially used--independence, openness, efficiency, clarity, and reliability--I have seen the acronym ICORE used, which probably makes them a whole lot easier to remember!)  He confirmed what we always thought--that as far as he has been able to find, NRC's Principles were the first of their kind.  However, he noted that he has found a number of other statements of regulatory principles that were created after NRC's, including in the UK, Ireland, the EU, and IAEA.  He also put the initiative in a broader historical perspective--pointing to the 1960s, when more regulation was often viewed as a good thing (he cited Nader's initiatives), to the deregulatory efforts of the 1980s.   Most interestingly, he pointed to antecedents for some of the principles we used--words like independent, open and reliable began popping up in NRC documents in the 1980s. 

Of course, the true measure of the value of something like the Principles is in their impact, and that is much harder to assess.  The explanation of several of the Principles suggests the difficulty.  Each of these Principles is important, but there is always a balance to be struck.  Independence should not mean isolation.  Efficiency should not force NRC staff to act so quickly that they miss something.  Therefore, the goal is to minimize delay as much as is reasonably possible.  Reliability should not mean that regulations must be cast in stone.  Rather, the goal should be to make sure that changes in regulations are justifiable.

I have certainly seen times when NRC has been criticized for falling short on its adherence to the Principles of Good Regulation.  Some of this criticism may have been colored by the viewpoints and positions of the critics.  But even someone without an ax to grind might find fault at times in some of NRC actions.  After all, the Principles are a very ambitious set of rules to follow, and require a continual balance between opposing objectives.  What I think is encouraging is that, after performing this balancing act for 25 years, the NRC has made a conscious decision that this is still a valid standard of behavior to set for themselves, and has committed to continuing to try to hold themselves to that standard. 

***

Nuclear Regulation, Openness and Transparency:

Answers to Some Questions

I have already reported on my visit to Japan a couple of months ago and the presentation I gave to some Japanese executives.  In that talk, I focused on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as an example of an agency that behaves in an open and independent manner.  I got a couple of interesting questions on NRC's openness and independence at the conclusion of my talk.  I tried to answer them at that meeting, but I have been wanting to expand upon my answers and share them with a wider audience.

The basic question was, "How can NRC say it is independent and open when individuals in the NRC meet privately with people in industry?"

In thinking about the question and the reason behind it, I feel that sometimes, people interpret the word independence too literally.  Especially as Japan implements the changes to the way its regulatory system works, it is important to keep several things in mind.

In fact, NRC addressed this very concern when its Principles of Good Regulation were written.  They explicitly state that "independence does not imply isolation."  Therefore, independence should not be viewed as requiring regulators to cut off all contact with the rest of the world.  Rather, it should be viewed as a process that allows regulators to have access to all information and all points of view and assures that decisions take all relevant information into account and treat it appropriately.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a tutorial on the regulatory control of nuclear power plants on its website that gives a great explanation of regulatory independence at the NRC.  They outline 8 elements that facilitate regulatory independence (I have provided somewhat abbreviated versions of most of their descriptions of these elements):

Separation of functions:  NRC has no responsibility for promoting or developing nuclear energy, and is completely separate from government bodies having such mandates.

Political influence:  No more than three of the five NRC Commissioners can come from a single political party, and Commissioners may also only be removed for "cause."  Acceptable causes for removal are limited to inappropriate behavior, and not based on a Commissioner's viewpoints. 

Conflicts of interest:  Neither the NRC Commissioners or staff can have any financial or personal interest in organizations that may be subject to their regulatory decisions.   I would also add that neither Commissioners or the NRC staff can accept gifts, meals, or other favors from anyone subject to their regulatory decisions.

Openness:  NRC’s decision-making process is conducted in public.  The Government in the Sunshine Act requires advance public notice of meetings, with a right of attendance by interested parties. The Freedom of Information Act requires broad public access to any materials used in the decision-making process.

Reporting:  NRC provides extensive information related to all aspects of its activities and decisions to the public, media, other governmental bodies, without the need for review or clearance from any other government agency.

Budget and finance:  Almost all of NRC's budget is covered by fees paid by licensees, as authorized in an annual appropriations act by the Congress. The IAEA asserts that this "full cost recovery" approach is believed to provide at least some insulation from political pressures that could result from having its resources derived entirely from tax revenues.  (As an aside, I want to point out that the cost recovery provision was not instituted for this reason, and I think the pros and cons of this provision could be debated--but that is not the subject of this discussion.)

Technical capabilities:  NRC has a large staff with a high degree of technical competence that  covers cover a wide range of technical areas.  This gives them adequate scientific, engineering, management, financial and legal expertise to regulate a complex technology like nuclear power, and assures that they can assess information provided by licensees independently and competently.

Oversight mechanisms:  NRC is subject to several layers of review and oversight. These include the Office of Inspector General (an independent, internal body), Congressional oversight, and reviews of NRC decisions by the courts. 

The IAEA discussion notes that these measures, taken together, are designed to help assure that safety decisions are not influenced by political, economic or social considerations.  Having such assurance   helps maintain public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy, which is critical to the continued use of nuclear power in democratic societies.

Tellingly, the IAEA list is preceded by a discussion saying that it is somewhat difficult to "define" regulatory independence, and followed by a discussion that acknowledges that the system is not perfect.  I think these comments reflect the dilemma I felt when tried to address the question in a public forum.

There is always a balance.  I have to admit that, on the surface, someone who sits alone in an ivory tower and doesn't talk to anyone else clearly cannot be influenced by anyone else.  That is easy to see.  Once someone meets with other people, it is much harder to be sure that they are not unduly or inappropriately influenced by others. However, if they do not meet with other people, they will not have all the facts to allow them to make good decisions about complex and difficult issues.  The two needs, independence and access to information, must both be satisfied. 

In the end, independence without isolation is achieved by a variety of checks and balances designed to help assure that NRC staff and Commissioners can obtain all the information they need, but that their decisions remain independent and technically sound. 

***

Nuclear Engineering:

Where the Grads Go

I have discovered that LinkedIn maintains statistics, by field, of where LinkedIn members in different fields work, what they do (ex., engineering, research, operations), and where they went to school.  The fields they have analyzed include nuclear engineering.  That alone makes this survey somewhat special, and nuclear engineering is a fairly small field and I have seen many studies that do not identify nuclear engineers as a separate category.

Their statistics represent over 23,000 nuclear engineers.  The complete table shows the top 25 places of employment, schools, and areas of work (by numbers in each category).  I will not reproduce the entire table here, but thought it would be fun to share the top 5 in each category:

     Schools:              Penn State, MIT, UMichigan, Texas A&M, RPI

     Employers:         USNavy, Westinghouse, Duke, Exelon, NRC

     Areas of Work:   Engineering, Research, Operations, Education, Program/Project
                                  Management

Interested readers can find the top 25 responses in each category at the link above. 

I have not tried to analyze how these statistics compare to the numbers reported in any other sources of such data, but with more than 23,000 nuclear engineers in their database, I suspect that these numbers represent a pretty fair cross section of the industry.  I do recognize that this is a somewhat superficial survey, and it is unclear whether "nuclear engineer" is defined in any consistent way--whether by degree, nature of work, or self-reporting.

Therefore, the numbers need to be used with a bit of caution.  Nevertheless, the table is a helpful way to get a broad overview of of the distribution of nuclear engineers today.  And it may be of interest to some to see where their alma maters and employers fall on this list.

***

Irradiated Food:

The Case for More

I was pleased to see a recent NRC blog that highlighted the value of irradiating food to eliminate the harmful pathogens in our food supply that all too regularly cause massive outbreaks of illness and even deaths.  They were responding to news of recent outbreaks of illness traced to lettuce from Mexico served at the major US restaurant chains of Olive Garden and Red Lobster--only the latest of many such outbreaks in many parts of the US over the years
.

I have been following this issue for a number of years, and even I was surprised at the statistics they cited--that, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 1 in 6 Americans falls ill each year from tainted food.  Most of these food-related illnesses, of course, prove to be minor, but 128,000 people are hospitalized each year and 3,000 die.

That is far too many, and it should be unnecessary.  While some say that the solution is higher standards of cleanliness in the food production chain--and I cannot disagree with that--I do not think that is a complete answer.  The food chain is too far-flung and too distributed for the traditional methods of oversight to work effectively all the time.

With food irradiation, we have an option to provide a much higher guarantee of safety than we can possibly achieve by rules and inspections alone.  It's been proven safe, and contrary to what many people think, it has been in use for a number of years for certain food products, such as spices.

It seems, however, that expanding the use of irradiation to other foods has run into repeated roadblocks due to misconceptions about what irradiation does to food.  The NRC blog tries to address that issue.  I am glad to see them weighing in on this issue, but I can say from personal experience that they have a steep climb ahead of them.

I have previously told the story of what might be termed my ANS irradiated cheese caper--how, in 2001-2, when I served as president of the American Nuclear Society (ANS), I thought I would bring to America the cheeses from France that we cannot import!  I would ask for only a one-time exemption, I offered to post signs at the reception to remind pregnant women and others with health concerns not to eat the irradiated cheese, and I would engage the help of Congressman Joe Barton.  Piece of cake, I thought (or perhaps I should say, piece of cheese).

As I reported, it was all to no avail.  The FDA would not budge.  In the end, we held the ANS reception sans les fromages de France.

I tell this cautionary tale because I know the challenges that are faced by the efforts to improve the safety of our food through irradiation.  I am hopeful that, over time, the opinion of the public will change, the voice of the NRC will be influential, and that the FDA will begin to approve the irradiation of more foods.  I only hope that it will not take more disease outbreaks and more deaths for this to happen.

***

Reid, Magwood, Jaczko:

The Saga Continues

Those of us who live and work "inside the Beltway" can sometimes get a little smug in our conviction that we really understand how things work around here.  Recent events, however, are leading me to question my own sense of certainty about my understanding.

The first blow to my feeling that I "know the ropes" came last December, when the news went public that four of the Commissioners at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had written a letter to the White House complaining about the behavior of its then-Chairman, Gregory Jaczko.  I don't want to go so far as to assert that this event is unique in the history of the Republic, but in the more than six months since that incident, I have not been able to find anyone who can point to a comparable incident.  After all, this letter was endorsed by all of Jaczko's peers on the Commission, by both Democrats and Republicans, and was not a closed-door intervention, but rather, was a message to the very top of the Administration. 

With the departure of Jaczko at the end of June and his replacement by Dr. Allison Macfarlane as Chairman, I would have thought that the story had come to a logical conclusion.  Not so.  In recent days, I see that the issue is still simmering.  In the first place, Jaczko's friends and former Senate colleagues put on a farewell-cum-fundraising party for Jaczko, to help him pay off the legal expenses he incurred defending himself against the charges brought against him, and have now established a website to collect additional funds.

For those who may wonder why he needed legal support, since he was not sued and had no court appearances, I know from my own past, when I worked for the government, that I frequently got advertisements for insurance that would cover legal costs that might be incurred in defending oneself against accusations of wrong-doing.  (And in fact, agency guidance always recommended hiring legal counsel in such cases.)  Therefore, the fact that he had an attorney was probably prudent of him.  The fact that he did not carry the insurance was surely a mistake.  The fact that his colleagues are publicly raising money for this purpose is an unseemly postscript to this unfortunate affair.

And yesterday, I discovered that the saga has still not ended.  In a piece published in Huffington Post, Senator Reid made a strong attack on Commissioner Magwood, accusing him of lying and calling him various unflattering names.  Again, I can't confirm that this is completely unprecedented--and I do know that Senators and Congressmen sometimes resort to name-calling--but this incident certainly has some unusual overtones.  Name-calling is usually reserved for members of the opposite Party; Senator Reid and Commissioner Magwood are both Democrats.  Name-calling usually occurs in the heat of the battle; this battle would seem to be over, with Jaczko ousted and a new Chairman--in fact, one who was Reid's choice--installed.

In fact, the biggest question my friends and I have been debating in the past day or so is:  Why now?  The end of the article suggests that Reid "wasn't looking to eviscerate Magwood and would have kept his concerns private if he hadn't been asked."  That seems disingenuous to me.  Surely, a Senator could respond to such a question by saying that this chapter is closed.  After all, it is hard to imagine a likely scenario where Magwood could be appointed Chairman of the NRC.  If Romney wins the election, he will appoint a Republican.  If Obama wins, Macfarlane will most likely stay in her position.  There is a hint in the final sentence of the article that Reid might be trying to assure that Magwood is not nominated for any other position.  One wonders if that means that something along those lines has been floated?  Or if he is posturing to help Obama in the State of Nevada? 

So this whole episode appears to be lingering long beyond what we'd all expected.  At this point, I don't suppose it is any special "inside the Beltway" wisdom or insight to say that it seems that the saga is not yet over, but the only thing most of us can do now is to stay tuned. 

***

Funding Nuclear Engineering Education:

More on the Issues

I recently had several excellent comments on my March 2, 2012 blog on funding for nuclear engineering education. In that blog, I had expressed my dismay that DOE and NRC the 2013 Federal budget request had zeroed out funding for nuclear engineering education programs. I had expressed the hope that funding would be restored by Congress as it considers the budget request and had suggested that people make their views known to their Senators and Congressmen/women.

The comments went beyond what I had written. Specifically, they provided some thoughts on the issues associated with industry funding of nuclear engineering programs. All of the commenters bring expertise beyond my own to the table. Since I'm not sure all the readers of the original blog will go back and read the comments, I thought I'd highlight some of the thoughts in a new blog, and add a couple more of my own thoughts.

(Only one commenter provided his full name, so I can only give credit by name to Rod Adams, whose nuclear credentials are well known in the blogging community and beyond. Another commenter reported being a member of the Nuclear Engineering Student Delegation last year, so has been actively involved in the debate on supporting nuclear engineering education. A third commenter brought insights about INPO's activities to the discussion.)

Among the key thoughts expressed by the commenters (rephrased in my own words) are the following (but I urge you to go back to the posting for the full comments, which are expressed a bit more colorfully than the wording below):

• It is inconsistent of the Administration to take credit for supporting new nuclear power plant construction--which guarantees that we will need more skilled nuclear engineers for the foreseeable future--while at the same time cutting off the academic pipeline.

• The government believes that they have "primed the pump" enough, as enrollments have increased. The government thinks it is now industry's turn to continue the needed support, and "political demagogues" consider funding nuclear education to be a form of "corporate welfare"--even though the money goes to students and universities, not to corporations. Having funding tied to a specific industry--particularly the nuclear industry, which is not universally loved--makes it an even harder sell.

• It would be great for the nuclear industry to step up to the plate by increasing its support for nuclear engineering programs and not rely so much on the government. By and large, however, industry is under pressure to control costs and justify expenses, and it is a hard sell in the boardrooms when the goal is a rather nebulous "assuring a pipeline of trained engineers."

• One comment noted that INPO does provide substantial support to nuclear engineering students, but cited a further issue--that only about 20% of nuclear engineering graduates go to work in the nuclear power industry. This fact makes it difficult for the industry to justify providing support. (Note that this commenter pointed out that many of the other graduates go into federal government or the national labs, or into related fields, such as nuclear medicine--all of which to me would be a further argument for Federal support.)

• The same commenter noted that the situation is different when looking at the associate degree level. There is increasing support for industry for nuclear training in technical schools. However, this doesn't address the need for nuclear engineers.

• Of particular interest to me was one comment about NSF funding for students. I hadn't thought about NSF funding for a long time. As far as I know, NSF funds students in just about all other science and engineering disciples. Nuclear engineering has long been separated out to be funded by DOE and NRC (and, as the commenter notes, NNSA). The commenter notes that the reason is that NSF "doesn't have the personnel to judge the merits of the applications." I'm not sure if that is the full reason or if there are other factors, but that is not important for this discussion. What is important is that the fact that nuclear engineering is treated differently by the US government tends to lead to disparities such as we are now seeing, where the nuclear engineering support programs are treated differently than those of other disciplines.

These comments provide excellent additional perspective to what I wrote, and I thank all the commenters for taking the time to send their thoughts. All of them are strong supporters of nuclear engineering education and echoed my concern about the funding of nuclear engineering programs and the importance of support, in one way or another. I can only hope that our collective voice will be heard.

***

Post-Fukushima Activities in the US:

American Nuclear Society and Utility Initiatives

Two related pieces of news crossed my desk yesterday. Both have to do with decisions and actions by US entities in the follow-up to Fukushima.

The first news item was the release of a study of the Fukushima accident by the American Nuclear Society (ANS). (Conflict-of-interest alert--I'm a former President of the ANS.) The study, chaired by former NRC Chairman Dale Klein and University of Wisconsin Professor (and President-Elect of the ANS) Michael Corradini, provides a review of the accident and makes some recommendations. Particularly noteworthy is a conclusion that has been widely circulated in the press that the report concludes that emergency zones around nuclear power plants "should not be based on arbitrary mileage designations," and that the necessary changes "in some cases could expand the standard 10-mile evacuation zone."

Unfortunately, these statements do not appear in the report itself. The report contains only a more neutral statement on emergency planning: "The U.S. nuclear community recognizes the need for a clear approach to emergency planning in case of a serious accident. We recommend that the NRC work together with other agencies and industry to develop a more risk-informed approach to emergency planning for U.S. NPPs."

This neutral statement is correct, but it skirts the very points that make the press reports compelling. In trying to track down the source of the quotes, I discovered that ANS developed a set of talking points for the media events. The talking points go a bit farther. The quote about the arbitrary mileage designations comes from the talking points, but the specific comment about possible expansion of the 10-mile zone does not. Rather, it seems to have come from an Associated Press interview with one or both of the primary co-authors of the report.

I was especially interested in the conclusion about the 10-mile zone because it has been my observation that many people in the media fail to draw a distinction between the ANS and industry groups such as the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). The report itself takes pains to mention the distinction, but critics might point out that most of ANS's positions are aligned with industry interests. I am glad to be able to point to a statement by ANS that provides evidence that the ANS is--as it should be--willing to take positions, when warranted, that could favor more stringent requirements. I only wish they had included this discussion in the report itself.

The second news item was a report that the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is criticizing industry, claiming that industry is trying to skirt new NRC requirements that haven't even been finalized yet. Specifically, UCS is taking aim at the utility industry for implementing improvements to the current fleet of reactors as a response to the Fukushima events prior to the publication of final NRC requirements. This one is puzzling, as I more often find the UCS and other critics of the nuclear industry complaining that the industry is dragging its feet! In this case, the industry is getting out ahead of the curve, and they are still being criticized.

The point of the UCS criticism, as I understand it, is that industry is racing to stay ahead of requirements the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) might require in the expectation that they will be able to use their political influence to avoid other, possibly more costly, changes.

All I can say is that this presumes a lot. It presumes that the utilities are acting primarily to position themselves for a later political fight, and not to protect their multi-billion dollar investments. It presumes that the NRC requirements will be significantly different and more stringent than what the utilities are doing, even though the barrage of information that has circulated about the vulnerabilities seem to point clearly to certain kinds of actions. It presumes that the utilities will be successful in exerting political pressure to avoid taking safety-related measures, even though the politicians, the media, and the public are all now hyper-sensitive to issues of nuclear power plant safety.

Rather than criticism, the nuclear utilities deserve credit for being pro-active on the post-Fukushima changes. After all, NRC repeatedly makes the point that the utilities have the first line of responsibility for the safe operation of their plants. These actions are evidence that the utilities are meeting that expectation.

So rather than seeing negatives, I see this week's actions by the ANS and the utilities as demonstrating that major nuclear organizations in the US are shouldering their responsibilities appropriately.

***

Nuclear Engineering Education:

Caught in the Budget Debate?

When the 2013 budget requests for the coming fiscal year were announced, a number of us were highly disappointed to see that support for nuclear engineering was zeroed out, this time, in both the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

It seems to me that in general, it is penny-wise and pound-foolish for a nation to skimp on education. I know the budget is tight and I know there are many other important programs, but we really can't stop looking ahead.

The case for nuclear engineering education is particularly important. The current workforce of nuclear engineers is rapidly retiring. During all the years of when nuclear power development was stagnant in the US, the pipeline of new engineers dried to a trickle. Many academic nuclear engineering programs closed their doors, research reactors on campuses were shuttered, and only a small number of visionary students could see much of a future in this field.

In recent years, due in large part to government funding, the academic infrastructure for nuclear engineering in the US began to experience the beginnings of a revival. Several new academic departments were started and enrollments began to increase. While the improved prospects for new nuclear power plants in the US was certainly a factor, the real turnaround can be traced to support from the Office of Nuclear Energy at the DOE about the year 1999-2000, when Bill Magwood, now a Commissioner at the NRC, headed the Office. (Truth in advertising--I was Deputy Director of that office at the time.)

This is not the first time that the program has been threatened. Several years ago, DOE failed to fund the program. I was no longer working for the government at that time, so can't provide the backroom details, but NRC ended up stepping in and developing its own program to assure continued support of nuclear engineering educational activities. In fact, most of the DOE staff working on nuclear engineering education programs moved over to the NRC. A year or two later, DOE restarted an educational program, which appears to be complementary to NRC's.

Now, both programs are threatened.

Worse still, this threat comes at a time when the nuclear industry in the US seems to be on the verge of revival. Admittedly, some don't believe that the revival will extend much beyond the few projects that are currently underway. I think that view is shortsighted.

However, even if we were not seeing new reactor development, we would still need to support nuclear engineering education to assure sufficient replacements for retiring engineers at currently operating plants and related facilities--and later, for the decommissioning of plants.

It is difficult to understand why an agency would seek to save a small amount of money by targeting educational activities in a discipline where it is so important to have a high level of expertise.

Some may feel that we can ramp up the educational programs quickly as the need arises, or retrain engineers in other fields. It is not that easy. While some positions can be filled that way, many positions require the in-depth understanding that a full nuclear engineering curriculum provides.

Lest I sound too alarmist, I should point out that the zeroing of budget lines for nuclear engineering education does not mean that there will be no support at all for universities. Both the DOE and the NRC have significant research programs, and some research funds have always gone to universities. I am certain the intention will be to continue support through research. However, research funding--even if it increased--cannot be used for all the same purposes.

The budget request is only the first step in the budget process. From here, the budget must be considered by Congress. One hopes that some of the supporters of nuclear energy on the Hill will notice this cut and restore the funding. I would encourage those who share my concern to contact your members of Congress and ask for their help in restoring funding for educational programs.

***

Japanese Nuclear Power Regulation:

Addressing "Sloppy Inspection Procedures"

I haven't blogged about the situation in Japan in some time now. The situation at the Fukushima site has somewhat stabilized, and Japan has begun the long and painful process of recovery. Along with so many others, I have been watching this process. It has reached a stage where there is not as much, day to day, where I feel I can add some special insight.

Recently, however, some new revelations published about the Japanese inspection process have spurred me to return again to the post-Fukushima issue. The article in question, entitled, "Sloppy inspection procedures threaten Japan's nuclear safety regulations," was a very interesting analysis in the Mainichi Daily News detailing differences between Japanese inspection procedures and practices and those of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The article indicates that Japanese inspectors have had a practice of essentially copying material for their inspection reports from the companies they are inspecting. It includes a somewhat frightening quote by someone at the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), which operates under the jurisdiction of the government's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). The quote essentially rationalized that it didn't matter that the JNES inspectors essentially just repeated the same steps the plant operators had developed.

The article also cites the observations of a Japanese visiting professor at the University of Tokyo who had worked for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI--now called the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, or METI) in the early 1990s and had been assigned for almost two years to the NRC.

(As an aside, his assignment is part of an excellent program run by the NRC. In addition to bringing Japanese government officials to the NRC, this program has also brought a number of government engineers from emerging nuclear countries to the NRC to participate actively in NRC inspections and technical reviews, and in so doing, to learn practices that they can bring back to their own countries.)

It is very telling that a junior Japanese government employee saw and recognized the differences between US and Japanese procedures and practices. Other Japanese employees were assigned to NRC and must have made similar observations. Nevertheless, the system did not change. I have previously speculated on some of the differences that I believe are responsible for the way the Japanese nuclear regulatory system has worked, and will not repeat those discussions here. Suffice it to say that there are no real surprises in what is now being publicized so widely. These were issues that were known for a long time, both by outsiders and by insiders.

While I am sorry that it took an accident of this magnitude to spur a serious effort to change, one should view the past practices in context. These deficiencies are not unique to the Japanese nuclear program, but rather, as I have previously discussed, are strongly embedded in the culture and institutions of the country. Changing culture and long-standing institutional practices is neither easy nor painless. Clearly, when things were going well, it was impossible to generate any pressure to make the necessary changes.

The task ahead is no easier now, but by the same token, it is no longer possible to deny that the deficiencies exist and must be addressed. A number of initiatives are being started that appear to be serious efforts to raise the bar on how nuclear power is managed and regulated in Japan. This is as challenging a task, in its own way, as are the physical tasks of stabilizing the reactor and decontaminating the surrounding communities. While success at this point is not a given, the concerted efforts being started look promising.

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Comm. Rogers on the Current NRC:

Too much politicization?

I recently became aware that my former boss, Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers had published a guest column in the Seattle Times addressing what he sees as the politicization the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the current Chairman.

Since I know Japan is now considering how to change its regulatory approach, some of Commissioner Rogers' comments on this issue, and some of my recollections of my time at the NRC, may be useful.

Commissioner Rogers refers to the Principles of Good Regulation, which were developed under his leadership during his time on the Commission. The very first principle is independence. One of the main criticisms of the Japanese regulatory system was its lack of independence--from licensees, from the promotional parts of the government, and from politics. What Commissioner Rogers' guest column makes clear is that an organizational structure can help foster independence, but structure alone is not enough, and saying you are independent is not enough. The ongoing commitment of all parties to maintaining independence is required.

Commissioner Rogers identifies his concerns about some of what we are hearing is happening at the Commission now, and says that, in his 10 years on the Commission, he "even though there were policy disagreements between commissioners...I never identified any initiatives by a member as politically driven."

This is very true. The Commission of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I worked for him, was an excellent model for how a commission should act. The commissioners set the tone. Athough it was surely not perfect, as far as I could ever tell all information was shared, and all the commissioners' offices were invited to meetings where issues were discussed and views were exchanged. The commissioners didn't always agree on everything, but the tone was open and professional. And it was usually apolitical. I once commented to my husband that I usually couldn't tell by their votes what party each commissioner came from. Occasionally, yes. But often not.

By contrast, my husband worked, at the time, for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). There, every vote was strictly along party lines. There, every commissioner actually had either a donkey or an elephant after his name in the annual report! But communications issues are financial issues and nuclear issues are health issues, and therein lies the difference. Or so I thought at the time.

It is for just that reason that I think Commissioner Rogers' guest column is important. As he so eloquently said, the Commission must have "a status of independent, solidly based integrity in which broad public interests rather than narrow partisan interests must dominate. Dedicated adherence to The Principles of Good Regulation could provide the way to get there, if all commissioners shed the political attachments they entertained before joining the commission."

This also is the goal to which the new Japanese regulatory organization, whatever form it takes, must constantly strive.

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