Whither Nuclear Power:

Status and Prospects

The New Year is always a time for reflection on the past and the future.  And a new decade (if you count 2020 as the start of a decade) doubles the incentive to try to look at where things are headed for nuclear power. 

As always the picture for nuclear power is very mixed, and depending on which report you read which day, you can conclude either that nuclear power is on its way out, or that nuclear power is poised for great things ahead.  I try to stay away from making predictions--there always seem to be too many moving parts--but I thought it might be interesting to summarize a few facts--things that are happening now in the nuclear power industry around the world--and to try to put them in perspective.

For inspiration, I turned first to 2 recent articles on the World Nuclear Association (WNA) website, Plans for New Reactors Worldwide, and Reactor Shutdowns Outweigh Start-ups in 2019.  Taken together, these might appear to be confusing--2019 saw a decrease in the number of reactors, but on the other hand, nuclear power capacity worldwide is anticipated to increase in the coming years. 

When you peel back the layers, you begin to see that there are a number of elements involved in what is happening.  While there were more shutdowns than startups in 2019, it is important to note that there were still a number of startups.  Furthermore, most of the shutdowns had been planned for some time and were based on the ages of the plants, government subsidies for competing sources and wholesale market economics (at least in the U.S.), or on national plans to reduce the use of nuclear power in some countries.  Most of the startups in the past year were not surprises either.  They were largely in Russia and China, both of which have aggressive nuclear power programs. 

Likewise, many of the plants listed as being under construction are in Russia and China, as well as elsewhere in Asia.  The WNA article on future plans identifies about 50 reactors under construction.  It also notes that, in the past, nuclear power plant shutdowns have roughly been balanced by new units starting operation:  in the last 20 years, from 1998-2018, they indicate that 89 reactors were shut down and 98 new reactors started operation; and looking ahead, one prediction is that 154 existing reactors will close in the next 20 years (by 2040), while 289 may come online by 2040.  The WNA article on plans for new reactors also cites the extensions of reactor operating lifetimes in the U.S. and other countries as a positive development in sustaining the nuclear contribution to electricity supply, and both articles mention power uprates in several countries.  I would also particularly highlight the recent approval by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the first applications for license extensions from 60 to 80 years.

Of course, predictions are always subject to a lot of change--changes in governments and national (and sometimes, local) policies, changes in public opinion, a major nuclear accident, shutdowns of fossil fuel plants, decreasing costs of renewable energy options, technological developments in nuclear technology, and much more, can all alter these projections.  And the changes can be positive or negative.  Recently, concerns about climate change are causing some countries to revisit past anti-nuclear policies.  But historically, a number of active construction projects have failed to be completed, especially in the United States, but also elsewhere; and sometimes, plants have been shut down even after license renewals were granted.  Therefore, it is too soon to tell whether the current trends will be sustained over a 20-year period.

Other factors that neither of these articles cite is the potential role of some of the advanced nuclear technology under development.  Current R&D is focusing a lot on small modular reactors (SMRs) and even micro-reactors, and there are also a number of projects focused on alternatives to the current light water reactor technology.  In the U.S., some specific causes for optimism include the recent Congressional budget appropriation for fiscal year 2020 that provides a 12.5% increase in funding for nuclear projects and an early site permit for SMRs at TVA's Clinch River site issued by the NRC. 

This work is focused mostly on the longer term, and some of it, especially the micro-reactors, is focused on applications other than power to the electricity grid.  Therefore, this work quite rightly has not been incorporated into the 20-year prediction offered by WNA.  However, in the longer term, some of this work could result in a new generation of reactors that would be appropriate for providing power to the grid, and that might address some of the concerns, such as the high cost of constructing a large reactor, and the impact of an accident, that have hampered nuclear power deployment in recent years.  In fact, SMRs might also be attractive for areas that are not suitable for large reactors, and thus, have the potential to lead to an expansion of the use of nuclear power.

To summarize, in recent years, nuclear power seems to have regained some of the momentum that was lost after the Fukushima accident in Japan.  In fact, some countries, such as Poland, that had previously had an anti-nuclear stance, are now looking seriously at incorporating nuclear power in the future.  Thus, there is some reason to believe that the WNA projections are realistic.  Nevertheless, experience has shown that unanticipated developments have sometimes drastically altered the short-term trends.  Looking further ahead, there is considerable potential for the new technologies under development to have a significant impact in the longer term, but further effort is needed to confirm that these newer designs meet expectations about cost and safety. 

I know that some will be disappointed that my projections are not more definitive.  Alas, I lack a crystal ball!  But I remain cautiously optimistic that the WNA projections will be realized, and that current R&D will pave the way for a new generation of nuclear power in the future.

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Nuclear Liability:

The Logic of Liability Regimes

Once again, I have seen an article criticizing the fact that nuclear liability regimes assign financial responsibility solely to the nuclear plant operator, thus appearing to insulate vendors from financial claims.  On the surface, these criticisms seem to have some logic--after all, who wouldn't want to go after the "real" culprit, if there is one; or after everyone, just to make sure?

This viewpoint, however, neglects to consider fully what the likely outcome would be of a system that tried to assign the "real" blame, or that opened the field to everyone suing everyone.   The likely outcome:  Chaos.  Delay.  Hugh litigation costs.  More delay.  Strong possibility of no compensation for victims. 

It is just those likely outcomes that motivated the originators of all the major nuclear liability compensation regimes (both US and international) to focus the responsibility on the operator.

There is a fundamental logic to that approach.  After all, we always say that it is the operator that is ultimately responsible for the safety of a nuclear plant.  Not the regulator.  Not the vendor.  Not the other suppliers.

Assigning the operator responsibility puts the onus on the operator to check what the vendor and other suppliers do, to hold them to the highest standards, not to skimp where safety is concerned.  While a blog like this is not the place to make final determinations about who knew what and when, and who should have done something about it, I can at least identify the type of questions one would have to address if one were to try to specify exactly who is to blame for the Fukushima accident.

Let's look at the article cited above, which advocates assigning responsibility for the accident to GE.  In the first place, the article identifies critiques of the GE BWR Mark I design by officials of the US Atomic Energy Commission dating from the early 1970s and gives that as a rationale for concluding that GE should take the blame.  However, the article does not note that modifications were made to that design and were implemented in US plants.  Operators--and regulators--in Japan should have known this.  So, who knew what?  When did they know it?  What did they do about it?

The article mentions that GE was "involved" in shaving down the cliff where Fukushima Dai-ichi was constructed, thus increasing its vulnerability to tsunamis.  I don't know what they mean by "involved."  Who recommended it?  Who approved it?  Who brought in the bulldozers?  I have a feeling that everyone shares some blame here, so who should be considered to have the ultimate responsibility? 

While the parallel may not be exact, some of the same thinking went into the approach used to compensate the families of the victims of the World Trade Center--and when presented with the option to litigate endlessly or to accept a one-stop, fixed-price compensation system, most opted for the latter.

I am not here to defend GE--or to vilify it.  I am just here to point out that multiple liability regimes have concluded that it is in the best interest of any injured parties to achieve a prompt resolution of claims, and that can best be done by assigning full responsibility to the one party where one can truly say, "The buck stops here."

As to the final argument in the article cited above, that accepting the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage would saddle the taxpayers of Japan either directly or indirectly with the cost of cleanup, that argument, too, has been considered by the framers of this convention, as well as of other liability regimes.

The liability regimes all establish provisions for substantial amounts of compensation that would have to be paid by utilities.  That compensation is expected to be more than adequate for most cases.  However, in very rare cases--and Fukushima is one--the regimes all recognize that governments do have an ultimate responsibility.  Governments have that responsibility for natural disasters, such as tsunamis.  Governments also have that responsibility for other industrial infrastructure.  The government responsibility has been recognized in actions following large industrial accidents and in compensation schemes for other industries.

The Nuclear Energy Institute and the American Nuclear Society have published good accounts of the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, which is the US nuclear liability law, and give some examples of other industries that have similar liability limits.  The World Nuclear Association has a comprehensive piece covering the different international liability regimes (as well as some of the national ones).  I commend all 3 for further reading:

• NEI Fact Sheet on the Price-Anderson Act
• ANS Background Paper on the Price-Anderson Act
• WNA Information Paper on Liability for Nuclear Damage

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Agneta Rising:

A New Head for the World Nuclear Association

The World Nuclear Association (WNA) recently announced that Agneta Rising will become the Director-General of the Association starting January 1, 2013, taking over from John Ritch.

I had previously reported on John's intention to leave that post.  In my earlier post, I noted that John Ritch took the helm of the WNA when the organization morphed from the Uranium Institute to its present incarnation.

John brought a tremendous amount of energy and vision to the organization, and deserves a large share of the credit for making it the important and influential force it is today in the global nuclear community.  I said then, and I reiterate now, that he will be a tough act to follow.

If anyone can fill John's very large shoes, it is Agneta.  The metaphor of a "rising star" seems appropriate for Agneta in more ways than one!  She comes to the position with a distinguished background herself.  She is currently Vice President Environment at Vattenfall AB in Sweden, and has worked in various other positions in Vattenfall since 1980.  Within Sweden, she has served on several government boards and advisory groups on nuclear matters.

Agneta is also well known on the international scene, having served as president of the Swedish Nuclear Society, the European Nuclear Society, and as a founder and president of Women in Nuclear (WIN), an organization with members in over 50 countries.  She has also been associated for a number of years with the WNA and its predecessor, the Uranium Institute, having served as chairman during the transition. 

Although it's been several years since I've seen Agneta, I got to know her 10 or 15 years ago through some of our mutual interests in nuclear professional society activities, so I personally know that she brings a great deal of enthusiasm to her work, and has an outstanding ability to work with other people.  Her selection is an excellent choice that will help continue and further develop the important work of the WNA.

I wish John the best in his "retirement"--although, knowing John, I suspect he will not stay retired for long!--and I wish Agneta the very best as she takes over this key position in the global nuclear community.

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Agneta Rising (Correction Noted):

A New Head for the World Nuclear Association

NOTICE:

This post was originally published the morning the World Nuclear Association (WNA) announced that Agneta Rising will become the Director-General of the Association starting January 1, 2013, taking over from John Ritch.

However, subsequent to publication, I discovered an error in the URL that I could not correct.  Thinking that the error might make it more difficult for people to find the post, I reposted the content on September 14 with a corrected URL.  I apologize for any inconvenience.

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World Nuclear Association:

Changing of the Guard

The World Nuclear Association (WNA) just made an announcement of a pair of very important leadership changes: Tim Gitzel, the CEO and president of Cameco, has just assumed the chairmanship of the WNA, replacing Chris Crane, the president and COO of Exelon (who will continue on as vice-chair); and John Ritch, the Director-General of WNA for more than 10 years, will retire from that position this year.

Since I've gotten to know John Ritch in my last two positions, I will devote the rest of this post to discussing some of his contributions and accomplishments over the past dozen or so years I have known him. I must leave it to others to comment on the change in the chairmanship.

John has had a very distinguished career, first on the staff of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he specialized in East-West relations and nuclear arms control, then as the U.S. Ambassador to United Nations organizations in Vienna, Austria, which include the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and finally, in his present position as the Director-General of the WNA.

I got to know John after I joined the Nuclear Energy office of the U.S. DOE, which was towards the end of his 7-year stint as Ambassador to the IAEA, so most of what I know of his accomplishments in that position is indirect, but I did discover quickly that he was well-respected in the IAEA community, both for the insights he brought to issues and for his ability to work constructively within that diverse community.

Although John left the Ambassadorship in 2001, around a year or so after I joined DOE, I continued to follow his career when he moved on to the WNA, and in fact, had several opportunities to work with him, both while I was at DOE, and later, when I moved on to the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD in Paris.

The very first thing that happened when John left Vienna to take up his new post in London is that the name and focus of the whole organization changed. Originally called the Uranium Institute (UI) with a mission primarily built around serving as a forum on the market for nuclear fuel, the organization was reinvented in 2001 as the World Nuclear Association, with an expanded mission that covers all aspects of the nuclear power industry.

There have been many changes since the UI became the WNA. I'm sure I could not identify all of them, but in addition to the obvious implications of the expansion of its scope, the WNA also became more active as a source of nuclear-related news and analysis, and I often find their website to be one of the better sources of concise information and background on nuclear programs and issues.

I would like to focus particularly on one activity in which I have had a personal involvement--that is, the World Nuclear University (WNU). The WNU was spearheaded by WNA, and in fact, especially by John. The goal of the WNU is to build leadership and develop networks among nuclear professionals around the world by providing a spectrum of short courses and other training activities in partnership with a broad spectrum of governments, industry and universities. Their flagship program is their 6-week Summer Institute, designed as a leadership development course for young professionals.

I well remember when John first came in to my DOE office and briefed several of us on his vision for this new program. Our initial reaction was skepticism. The WNA was not an academic organization. How would they attract the mentors who would be needed to provide the training. Who would provide the necessary financial support. What organizations would let their staff members leave for 6 weeks for such a course.

None of these questions fazed John. He patiently responded to all the questions, and continued to press for our support, as well as for the support of a variety of other organizations. When the WNU officially opened its doors a couple of years later, in addition to the WNA, its founding supporters included the IAEA, NEA, and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO).

The Summer Institute is now held in Christ Church, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, but for the first few years, it rotated among several countries. I myself had the pleasure of participating in the program as a mentor/instructor in its second year, 2006, when it was held in Stockholm, Sweden. I found the Fellows to be an extraordinary group of bright, energetic young professionals. I also thought the opportunity for these people to work together with their peers from a variety of other countries was extraordinary.

I have continued to follow the success of the program and to read some of the comments of the graduates. Many of them point to this as one of the most exceptional experiences of their careers. Since the first Summer Institute in 2005, the program has hosted more than 650 Fellows from more than 65 countries.

Of all John's many accomplishments, I think he can be proudest of having established such an important educational program for the nuclear industry. The students trained through the Summer Institutes and the other WNU programs will help chart the course of the nuclear industry around the world for the next several decades. This in itself is a remarkable legacy.

There has been no announcement yet of just when John will leave the WNA or what he expects to do. I am assuming he may stay until his successor is chosen. That individual will certainly have a tough act to follow.

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Nuclear Power and the Press:

Getting it Right vs. Making a Splash

Last year (actually a couple of months ago), someone shared an article on a Columbia Journalism Review critique of an Associated Press article on possible cancer risks from Fukushima. The review points out that the article gets the facts right, but spins the message. For example, the title of the article is "Future cancers from Fukushima plant may be hidden." The first line of the article says, "Even if the worst nuclear accident in 25 years leads to many people developing cancer, we may never find out."

So, not only may people get cancer from Fukushima, we won't even know they are getting cancer from Fukushima. Scary, right? The CJR review continues by saying that is just the point. The article itself refutes the title, citing one expert saying, "The cancer risk may be absent...," another as saying that the 2 million residents of Fukushima Prefecture probably got too little radiation to have a noticeable effect on cancer rates, and yet a third who said that, from what he'd seen, nobody in Fukushima except for some plant workers has been exposed to harmful levels of radiation.

OK, I'm cherry picking here, too, as several quotes talk about risk levels too small to detect--and that is where the authors have picked up their headline. However, my very point is that the headline and the lead-in to the article don't promote the idea that the cancer risk may be very low or even non-existent. Rather, they just say it will be "hidden." That actually sounds more ominous than a specific, but small, number. By contrast, as I read the quotes, I would probably have titled the article "Few if any cancers expected from Fukushima accident." But that wouldn't sell newspapers. And that is probably why I went into engineering, and not journalism.

But the story reminded me of several other news items I'd come across in the same vein--that is, articles that slant the coverage in one way or another. The Nuclear Energy Institute did a great analysis of a series in the Associated Press a few months ago on safety at US nuclear power plants. (It should be noted that the CJR, at NEI's request, looked into that series. While it largely agreed with NEI's criticism of the reporting, it also critiqued NEI's response.)

Some more specific examples, especially of headlines, are also of interest. For example, Reuters came out with a story at around that same time on the post-Fukushima review of the nuclear reactors in France. The title of the Reuters article was "France needs to upgrade all nuclear reactors." The first paragraph of the article states that the head of the French nuclear safety agency [IRSN] said that France "needs to upgrade the protection of vital functions in all its nuclear reactors to avoid a disaster in the event of a natural calamity," but goes on to say--in that first paragraph--that there is no need to close any plants. Other media that picked up this story entitled it "Are all of France's nuclear power plants unsafe?" and in their first paragraphs, stated (without citing a source) that French nuclear power plants are "unsafe and need a massive overhaul."

For the final example I want to highlight today, it is Reuters that goes for the sensational title. In this case, it is a report on the release of a draft of the International Energy Agency's 2011 World Energy Outlook. The title reads "Exclusive: IEA draft: Nuclear to fall as power demand." I'd say that sounds like a prediction, right? Reading the article, we see that this was the low nuclear case, and there is a specific quote in the report that the low nuclear case is not a forecast but "is intended to illustrate what a pessimistic view of the prospects for the nuclear power industry might entail."

I also note that the IEA later slammed the press for jumping to publish its story based on a partial draft that IEA said had been revised and updated, and its own press release when the report was later published makes it clear that this was intended to illustrate the significant consequences of a major reduction in the use of nuclear energy. In fact, the primary scenario shows a significant growth in nuclear power, even with the consequences of the Fukushima accident factored in. The WEO-2011 report is available for purchase from IAE, but a very good summary has been posted on-line by the World Nuclear Association. Furthermore, in the wake of the publication of the report, the IAE has been vocal on the need for nuclear power, both in general and for specific countries such as Japan.

All the above is not intended as a rant against journalism, or against hard-hitting reporting. However, I do feel justified in complaining about one-sided reporting, or about misleading reporting. I realize that a sensational headline sells newspapers (or whatever media is being used), and that we are unlikely to see these kinds of practices ending anytime soon. Nevertheless, just as the press ideally helps keep our institutions honest, I feel a duty to call the press out when it is less than completely honest.

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International Nuclear Power

Notice:
Publication of Last JANUS Essay:
Nuclear Power in a Global Context

As I reported when I began this blog, I had previously posted five essays on the website of Japan NUS Co., Ltd. (JANUS). At that time, I had agreed with JANUS that I would prepare and post one more essay. That essay, "Nuclear Power in a Global Context" is now available on the JANUS website in both Japanese and English.

To complete the series on this blog, I have amended my first posting to include the essay and to indicate that the series is now complete.  (For previous readers of this blog, the links in this posting and the other blogs citing my JANUS essays have been updated, as the essays have migrated to a new site.)

I have also added a note to that first posting that I will repeat here. I am honored to have been selected as the first guest writer for the "Global Energy Essays" series of JANUS. I enjoyed the experience of writing those essays, and in fact, was largely inspired by that experience to start my own blog.

Currently, the JANUS essay series will continue with another guest writer.

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