NRC Principles of Good Regulation:

Compliments and Critiques

This week was an eventful one in the nuclear field.  The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission held its annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) on March 8 through 10, and the 5th anniversary of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident fell on March 11.  Since I have already read some excellent blogs on 3-11, as the Japanese sometimes call it, I will focus my attention on the RIC, and in particular, on a session near and dear to my heart.  (All RIC sessions were recorded and should soon be available on the NRC webcast archive.)

As I have previously reported, this year marks the 25th anniversary of the promulgation of NRC's Principles of Good Regulation.  NRC started its celebration of this milestone with the internal seminar covered in my earlier blog.  They continued the celebration with a technical session at the RIC.  The session was chaired by Mike Weber, Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and included speakers addressing the PGR, as they have come to be called, from a variety of perspectives. 

The first two speakers were Tom Wellock, the NRC historian, and Kenneth Rogers, who was the Commissioner responsible for proposing that NRC develop a set of principles and for directing their development.  Tom Wellock put the PGR in historical context--noting events of the time and the evolving view of regulation, as well as how the concept of the PGR has spread.  Commissioner Rogers described some of the internal processes and debates behind the PGR, and also spotlighted some places where similar sets of principles have taken root.

The third speaker was Maria Korsnick, currently the COO of the Nuclear Energy Institute.  She gave the NRC high marks for independence and openness, but said that the principles of efficiency, clarity and reliability need more work.  Particular areas for improvement that she cited include better prioritization of regulatory actions and more accurate and transparent cost-benefit analysis.  She also had messages for the industry, saying they need to be more accountable in explaining how they would implement NRC requirements.  Overall, she concluded that NRC is "justifiably internationally renowned." 

The next speaker, Diane Curran, an attorney who has represented citizens groups against the NRC, had a different view.  She critiqued the implementation of the principles of openness and transparency.  On openness, she seemed to suggest that NRC may hold open meetings but is not necessarily making them easy for the public to attend, and is not necessarily listening to the public.  On the principle of independence, she seemed to suggest that it was wrong of the principles to equate licensees and the general public in this principle, as the interests of the public are paramount.  (The principle states:  "All available facts and opinions much be sought openly from licensees and other interested members of the public.  The many and possibly conflicting public interests much be considered.  Final decisions must be based on objective, unbiased assessments of all information, and must be documented with reasons explicitly stated.") 

The final speaker, Joseph Klinger, from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, gave a state perspective.  He said that, 25 years ago, he saw isolation between the NRC and the states.  This isolation has largely disappeared.  He attributes the change to the PGR.  He felt the NRC really excelled in openness and transparency.  He also said that Illinois had embraced the same principles.  He noted that the 37 Agreement States are responsible for most of the regulation of radioactive materials, and thus collaboration between NRC and the states is critical.  He particularly cited the importance of collaboration to achieve efficiency, one of the five principles. 

References to the PGR were not confined to this session.  They were mentioned in Chairman Stephen Burns' welcoming letter on the first page of the RIC program, and again in a one-page summary of the NRC on the third page.  And they were raised repeatedly by Commissioners, NRC managers, and others throughout the conference.

Later, speaking to someone from NRC in the hallway between sessions, I learned that one of the non-US attendees in the audience at the session on the PGR (the RIC had attendees from 33 countries this year) noted that he thought that it was good to have something like the PGR, and he intended to bring the idea back to his country. 

It was interesting to see the mix of positive and negative comments.  While the compliments were, of course, good to hear, I think the criticism is also important to hear.  While we may individually debate whether we agree with the comments, positive and negative, they all reflect how the NRC and its action appear to the various stakeholders.  Like all lofty, aspirational goals, NRC will never be able to declare victory and rest on its laurels.  There will always be times when it didn't meet the goals perfectly, and even when it does, there will still be room for improvement in the future.  

I like to reflect back on the period, 25 years ago, when I worked in Commissioner Rogers office and helped develop the PGR.  Little did I know then what impact it would have.  It is nice to see that it thrives today, and if anything, its influence is growing.

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Nuclear Energy Institute:

A Top Workplace

This week, the Washington Post published its survey on the best places to work in the Washington, DC region.  I was delighted to see that the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) made this list.  Kudos to the management and staff of NEI for this distinction!

The results were based on a questionnaire to the employees of 317 firms in the DC area who agreed to participate, and companies were ranked in categories based on their size.  NEI was ranked 44 out of 75 companies whose rankings were published.  (Companies ranked below the top 75 were not listed.)  The category "small workplace" appears to represent companies with fewer than 150 employees in the DC area.  NEI has about 120 employees.

According to the Post, one of the reasons that the survey results were divided according to size is that smaller firms generally tend to score higher than larger firms, so NEI's ranking might have been even higher if all the companies had been ranked against each other irrespective of size. 

The survey looked at a variety of measures of employee satisfaction, including feeling "connected to their workplace through meaningful work and the belief that their company is moving in the right direction," feeling genuinely appreciated by their employer, having confidence in their leadership, and, of course, pay and benefits.

Since I live in the Washington area and have worked on nuclear policy issues for many years, I have had frequent opportunities to rub elbows with NEI management and staff.  I have always found them to be highly competent, helpful, upbeat, and enjoyable to work with.  I should also add that they have been very supportive of various elements of the nuclear community, in particular, students, and they have housed and advised the American Nuclear Society (ANS) supported students in the Washington Internships for Students of Engineering (WISE) program for many years. 

However, I must admit that, if you had asked me if NEI would have come in high on a survey of good places to work, I might not have guessed that they would.  Why?  I can imagine that the work of the NEI staff is often frustrating.  After all, we live in an environment where members of the public and Congressional decision-makers often have strongly held, but very distorted, views of nuclear power.  The staff must often feel like they are beating their heads against a wall in their efforts to promulgate factual information. 

In addition, one must realize that NEI does not operate as a completely free agent.  They work for their member companies, and while their members all share an interest in nuclear power, the companies vary in size, in their other operations, and in the regulations of the regions in which they operate.  What is best for one company is often not best for others, and NEI must constantly balance and consider the different perspectives and needs of their membership.  This, too, can be a difficult, and sometimes unappreciated, challenge.

So, what is it that makes NEI rise to the top ranks as a desirable place to work?  NEI published its own analysis, which I think does a good job of highlighting the things that make NEI a special place.  Marvin Fertel, the president and CEO of NEI, said, "NEI thrives because we believe the most satisfied and engaged employees are those who enjoy their work environment; have good camaraderie with their colleagues; are able to maintain a vibrant work-life balance; have good health and wellness; are provided opportunities to grow their knowledge and skills, and feel that they are directly achieving our mission and vision." 

Marv Fertel's statement goes on to say how NEI actively promotes these elements through targeted, proactive programs to assure a good work-life balance, to foster a healthy, productive work environment, and to assure high job satisfaction and morale." 

The NEI article also emphasizes the commitment of NEI's employees to the importance of their mission, noting that, "NEI employees are extraordinarily committed to NEI’s core mission, which is to foster the beneficial uses of nuclear energy and commercial nuclear technology.  NEI employees feel that nuclear energy, as a clean-air source of electricity, plays a vital role in meeting the growing need for low-carbon electricity." 

So this survey makes me realize that, while I have sometimes felt sorry for the monumental difficulties that NEI often faces, the commitment the staff shares to the importance of their work, and the recognition and appreciation they see from their management, makes them enjoy the challenges.

So, congratulations again to NEI staff and management on this notable and well-deserved recognition! 

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Nuclear Power Plant Performance 2014:

Maintaining High Levels

One recent bright spot was the announcement by the Nuclear Energy Institute that the performance by the U.S. nuclear power industry in 2014 was the highest ever.  In particular, the average estimated capacity factor for 2014 was 91.9 percent – the highest capacity factor achieved by the U.S. nuclear industry in any year.

The second highest capacity factor in a year was 91.8 percent in 2007.  Now, one can argue that this isn't a statistically significant improvement.  However, what this does tell us is that U.S. nuclear power plants are continuing to operate at very high levels of performance, probably about the highest that can realistically be achieved.  And they are doing this in an environment where there are a lot of negative pressures, both economic and other, that are affecting operating nuclear power plants.

I therefore take the news as a positive indication.

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Nuclear Liability:

The Logic of Liability Regimes

Once again, I have seen an article criticizing the fact that nuclear liability regimes assign financial responsibility solely to the nuclear plant operator, thus appearing to insulate vendors from financial claims.  On the surface, these criticisms seem to have some logic--after all, who wouldn't want to go after the "real" culprit, if there is one; or after everyone, just to make sure?

This viewpoint, however, neglects to consider fully what the likely outcome would be of a system that tried to assign the "real" blame, or that opened the field to everyone suing everyone.   The likely outcome:  Chaos.  Delay.  Hugh litigation costs.  More delay.  Strong possibility of no compensation for victims. 

It is just those likely outcomes that motivated the originators of all the major nuclear liability compensation regimes (both US and international) to focus the responsibility on the operator.

There is a fundamental logic to that approach.  After all, we always say that it is the operator that is ultimately responsible for the safety of a nuclear plant.  Not the regulator.  Not the vendor.  Not the other suppliers.

Assigning the operator responsibility puts the onus on the operator to check what the vendor and other suppliers do, to hold them to the highest standards, not to skimp where safety is concerned.  While a blog like this is not the place to make final determinations about who knew what and when, and who should have done something about it, I can at least identify the type of questions one would have to address if one were to try to specify exactly who is to blame for the Fukushima accident.

Let's look at the article cited above, which advocates assigning responsibility for the accident to GE.  In the first place, the article identifies critiques of the GE BWR Mark I design by officials of the US Atomic Energy Commission dating from the early 1970s and gives that as a rationale for concluding that GE should take the blame.  However, the article does not note that modifications were made to that design and were implemented in US plants.  Operators--and regulators--in Japan should have known this.  So, who knew what?  When did they know it?  What did they do about it?

The article mentions that GE was "involved" in shaving down the cliff where Fukushima Dai-ichi was constructed, thus increasing its vulnerability to tsunamis.  I don't know what they mean by "involved."  Who recommended it?  Who approved it?  Who brought in the bulldozers?  I have a feeling that everyone shares some blame here, so who should be considered to have the ultimate responsibility? 

While the parallel may not be exact, some of the same thinking went into the approach used to compensate the families of the victims of the World Trade Center--and when presented with the option to litigate endlessly or to accept a one-stop, fixed-price compensation system, most opted for the latter.

I am not here to defend GE--or to vilify it.  I am just here to point out that multiple liability regimes have concluded that it is in the best interest of any injured parties to achieve a prompt resolution of claims, and that can best be done by assigning full responsibility to the one party where one can truly say, "The buck stops here."

As to the final argument in the article cited above, that accepting the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage would saddle the taxpayers of Japan either directly or indirectly with the cost of cleanup, that argument, too, has been considered by the framers of this convention, as well as of other liability regimes.

The liability regimes all establish provisions for substantial amounts of compensation that would have to be paid by utilities.  That compensation is expected to be more than adequate for most cases.  However, in very rare cases--and Fukushima is one--the regimes all recognize that governments do have an ultimate responsibility.  Governments have that responsibility for natural disasters, such as tsunamis.  Governments also have that responsibility for other industrial infrastructure.  The government responsibility has been recognized in actions following large industrial accidents and in compensation schemes for other industries.

The Nuclear Energy Institute and the American Nuclear Society have published good accounts of the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, which is the US nuclear liability law, and give some examples of other industries that have similar liability limits.  The World Nuclear Association has a comprehensive piece covering the different international liability regimes (as well as some of the national ones).  I commend all 3 for further reading:

• NEI Fact Sheet on the Price-Anderson Act
• ANS Background Paper on the Price-Anderson Act
• WNA Information Paper on Liability for Nuclear Damage

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The Nuclear Renaissance:

Putting it in Perspective

I think everyone has a tendency to try to extrapolate from limited information.  One reactor order equals a renaissance, and one shutdown shows that nuclear power is on its deathbed.  The truth, as usual, is much more complicated than either extreme, so I was very gratified to read a piece by Richard Myers of the Nuclear Energy Institute on the Intelligent Utility website. 

Richard makes several points.  Perhaps the most important among them is that the announcements of shutdowns this year mainly represent anomalies.  In particular, 3 of the 4 units (2 at San Onofre and 1 at Crystal River) and are due to steam generator replacements gone wrong.  He points out that this should be viewed against a backdrop of 110 steam generator replacements, 57 of them in the United States.  Only one, Kewaunee, was the victim of market conditions.  It is indeed possible that a few other plants, particularly older, smaller, single units in merchant markets, might also be vulnerable, but just because 4 units close in one year, it does not mean that this is a trend.

Another point Richard makes is one that I hadn't previously thought much about.  He observes that estimates suggest that approximately 100 gigawatts (GW) of generating capacity will be retired this decade, primarily because it does not make economic sense to install the pollution control technology required by more stringent environmental standards.  This is approximately 10 percent of installed capacity, and demonstrates some of the pressures the entire utility industry is facing.

He also contrasts the shutdowns to the new builds.  In addition to the 4 units under construction in Georgia and South Carolina, TVA is also completing work on the long-stalled Watts Bar station.  Even more important, dozens of other reactors are under construction or being planned around the globe.  And I might add, some of them are in countries just entering the nuclear power arena.  As Richard points out, "The nuclear energy industry is a global enterprise with a global supply chain. It would be a mistake to gauge its health by taking a snapshot of one country at a single point in time."

Richard points out that much of what we are seeing today is a function of the economic turn down coupled with the currently low price of natural gas. 

Discussions of the surge in wind or solar power stations should be viewed with the same caution.  It is easy to achieve large percentages of growth when starting from a low level.  It is much harder to sustain the same rate of growth when the base level is higher or when other conditions change.

I always like to cite the Yogi Berra quote that it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.  (Note:  I've also seen this quote attributed to Niels Bohr and a lot of other people.)  In this case, it is very true.

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Nuclear Power and the Press:

Getting it Right vs. Making a Splash

Last year (actually a couple of months ago), someone shared an article on a Columbia Journalism Review critique of an Associated Press article on possible cancer risks from Fukushima. The review points out that the article gets the facts right, but spins the message. For example, the title of the article is "Future cancers from Fukushima plant may be hidden." The first line of the article says, "Even if the worst nuclear accident in 25 years leads to many people developing cancer, we may never find out."

So, not only may people get cancer from Fukushima, we won't even know they are getting cancer from Fukushima. Scary, right? The CJR review continues by saying that is just the point. The article itself refutes the title, citing one expert saying, "The cancer risk may be absent...," another as saying that the 2 million residents of Fukushima Prefecture probably got too little radiation to have a noticeable effect on cancer rates, and yet a third who said that, from what he'd seen, nobody in Fukushima except for some plant workers has been exposed to harmful levels of radiation.

OK, I'm cherry picking here, too, as several quotes talk about risk levels too small to detect--and that is where the authors have picked up their headline. However, my very point is that the headline and the lead-in to the article don't promote the idea that the cancer risk may be very low or even non-existent. Rather, they just say it will be "hidden." That actually sounds more ominous than a specific, but small, number. By contrast, as I read the quotes, I would probably have titled the article "Few if any cancers expected from Fukushima accident." But that wouldn't sell newspapers. And that is probably why I went into engineering, and not journalism.

But the story reminded me of several other news items I'd come across in the same vein--that is, articles that slant the coverage in one way or another. The Nuclear Energy Institute did a great analysis of a series in the Associated Press a few months ago on safety at US nuclear power plants. (It should be noted that the CJR, at NEI's request, looked into that series. While it largely agreed with NEI's criticism of the reporting, it also critiqued NEI's response.)

Some more specific examples, especially of headlines, are also of interest. For example, Reuters came out with a story at around that same time on the post-Fukushima review of the nuclear reactors in France. The title of the Reuters article was "France needs to upgrade all nuclear reactors." The first paragraph of the article states that the head of the French nuclear safety agency [IRSN] said that France "needs to upgrade the protection of vital functions in all its nuclear reactors to avoid a disaster in the event of a natural calamity," but goes on to say--in that first paragraph--that there is no need to close any plants. Other media that picked up this story entitled it "Are all of France's nuclear power plants unsafe?" and in their first paragraphs, stated (without citing a source) that French nuclear power plants are "unsafe and need a massive overhaul."

For the final example I want to highlight today, it is Reuters that goes for the sensational title. In this case, it is a report on the release of a draft of the International Energy Agency's 2011 World Energy Outlook. The title reads "Exclusive: IEA draft: Nuclear to fall as power demand." I'd say that sounds like a prediction, right? Reading the article, we see that this was the low nuclear case, and there is a specific quote in the report that the low nuclear case is not a forecast but "is intended to illustrate what a pessimistic view of the prospects for the nuclear power industry might entail."

I also note that the IEA later slammed the press for jumping to publish its story based on a partial draft that IEA said had been revised and updated, and its own press release when the report was later published makes it clear that this was intended to illustrate the significant consequences of a major reduction in the use of nuclear energy. In fact, the primary scenario shows a significant growth in nuclear power, even with the consequences of the Fukushima accident factored in. The WEO-2011 report is available for purchase from IAE, but a very good summary has been posted on-line by the World Nuclear Association. Furthermore, in the wake of the publication of the report, the IAE has been vocal on the need for nuclear power, both in general and for specific countries such as Japan.

All the above is not intended as a rant against journalism, or against hard-hitting reporting. However, I do feel justified in complaining about one-sided reporting, or about misleading reporting. I realize that a sensational headline sells newspapers (or whatever media is being used), and that we are unlikely to see these kinds of practices ending anytime soon. Nevertheless, just as the press ideally helps keep our institutions honest, I feel a duty to call the press out when it is less than completely honest.

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US Industry Response to Fukushima:

A Status Report

On October 12, 2011, Anthony Pietrangelo, Senior VP and CNO of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), made a presentation to the Washington, DC Section of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). The talk was entitled "US Industry Leadership in Response to Events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant." I have tried to make it a practice to provide summaries of nuclear- and energy-related events in the Washington, DC area that I attended--at least when I find something worth reporting--and I want to continue that practice by providing some highlights of Tony's talk. (I should note that part of my delay in publishing this post was that I waited until the ANS Section posted the viewgraphs. This is the first chance I've had to publish my post since the viewgraphs went up.)

Tony started the meeting by noting that, even outside the concerns about Fukushima, nuclear plants in the US have faced an unusual number of natural challenges this year. He mentioned the tornadoes in the path of Browns Ferry and Surry, the flooding at Ft. Calhoun, the earthquake near North Anna, and the hurricane that swept past a number of nuclear plants.

He also provided some statistics on NEI's outreach in the aftermath of Fukushima. Among their activities were a conference call with hundreds of financial people and a hundred-fold increase in the number of hits on their website.

The bulk of his talk discussed some of the activities and plans of 3 key industry groups: NEI, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Key facts about the activities of these groups are highlighted in his viewgraphs.

To me, some of his most interesting comments were his relatively positive views of the response from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the public. Among his observations were the following:

• Since March 11, 2011, there have been 5 license renewals at US plants, including Vermont Yankee, Palo Verde, Prairie Island, and Hope Creek

• There have been 2 power uprates (increases in the maximum power level at which the reactor is licensed to operate)--Limerick and Point Beach

• Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) have been completed on 7 new reactors in Georgie, South Carolina, Texas and Maryland

• The Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) has been issued for the ESBWR

• Construction-related activities are taking place at Watts Bar, Vogtle, and V.C. Summer

• Public opinion, while down somewhat, is still favorable to nuclear power.

One interesting observation he made is that the NEI has shifted the focus of its public relations efforts. Early on, they focused on safety, but more recently, had been focusing on the environment, cost, and jobs. They have now shifted back to a focus on safety.

Tony fielded a lot of questions during the Q&A session that followed his talk. I can't go into all of them, but he pointed out some of the differences in procedures and requirements for hardened vents for US BWRs versus for those in Japan. Some of the questioners were particularly concerned that the industry initiative could get ahead of the NRC and that NRC might later impose additional, or different, requirements. Tony indicated that they were working closely with the NRC and wouldn't be getting too far ahead.

Tony also noted lessons learned that have been implemented in the industry in response to past events that he thinks will serve us well in responding to the Fukushima experience. In particular, he noted that some of the equipment intended to respond to a 9/11 type event could also be used for natural disasters. He referred to the current approach as "symptom-based and event-informed," in contrast with the historic event-based approach. The symptom-based approach facilitates such actions as using "9/11 equipment" to respond to, for example, a station blackout triggered by some other type of event.

I'm sure we will be hearing much more about the industry activities in the weeks and months ahead. From what was presented at this meeting, it looks like the industry is off to a very good start.

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Energy Infrastructure and Energy Politics:

Energy and the Real World:
Views from an Insider

I recently attended a very interesting talk by Marvin Fertel, President and CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute. The presentation was to an audience of Washington, DC-area local section members of the American Nuclear Society and covered a broad range of topics of interest to the nuclear community. Working in the world of politics as he does, he brings to his thinking a realistic, pragmatic perspective that is often missing elsewhere.

Perhaps his most important take-home messages to me were the difficulties of introducing any new energy technology on a large scale, and the fact that the "friends" and "enemies" in the nuclear business do not fall into neat slots. Both of these are observations I've made myself, but he had some facts that were new to me.

First, he pointed out that all new technologies require substantial changes in infrastructure to realize the often optimistic projections. The vision of an electric automobile in every garage, for example, is dampened by the reality that many more transformers would be needed on suburban electrical grids. Taking carbon emissions from coal plants and sequestering them somewhere requires pipelines. He made the sobering observation that it will take 30-40 years to make any large-scale changes in our energy sector. If we have only 10 years before we reach the tipping point for climate change, he observed, we out to be talking about adaptation strategies rather than about mitigation.

Taken in this light, it is not surprising that he also recognizes that there are limits to the rate at which we can build new nuclear power plants. He didn't go into detail on all the limitations, but we've heard them before--licensing, competing demands for commodities like steel (see my blog dated ...), manufacturing capability, skilled workers on site, etc. Nevertheless, he remains optimistic that we can ramp up reasonably quickly to create a substantial new-build program in the United States. He sees a ramp-up period in the next 8 years in which 4 to 7 new plants could be built, but by 2030, believes there could be 45 new plants on line in the United States, with at least an equal number in the pipeline.

Mr. Fertel also spoke about the perceived Democratic-Republican party split on the nuclear issue. He feels that the issue of climate change is not a partisan one, and he sees growing support for nuclear power in the public arena and in the Administration. He pointed out some recent positive actions by the Obama Administration, such as "fixing" the loan guarantee program, which the previous Administration had not done. And in fact, shortly after the meeting, the nuclear community saw further evidence of the Administration's views on this issue when Secretary of Energy Steven Chu announced that he will push for billions of dollars in new loan guarantee authority for new nuclear power plants.

Mr. Fertel's slides are available on the ANS Washington-DC Section website. They contain some other interesting background. He also made some other interesting observations, which I hope to bring into future posts.