Energy and Wildlife:

A Complicated Relationship

This week has seen more than the usual number of news items about energy and the the animal kingdom, and I thought it would be fun to put them together.

The first and by far most unusual story comes from Japan, where wild monkeys are being outfitted with special collars containing radiation meters, GPS receivers, and data recorders to allow for more detailed data collection on the radiation levels from Fukushima fallout in remote mountainous and forested areas.

Take away message: Wildlife is helping assessing the impact of the Fukushima accident.

The second story is similar to ones I'd heard before. The cooling water from nuclear power plants has been beneficial to a number of species. In the past, most of the stories I'd heard were of species, like shrimp, that are food sources. But in this case, the Turkey Point nuclear power plant in Florida has proved a haven for an endangered crocodile species. In particular, the cooling canals have been adopted by crocodiles as nesting sites, and Florida Power's management of its cooling canals has been credited with a significant rebound in the population of crocodiles in South Florida.

Take away message: Nuclear energy is helping wildlife.

The third story is not as cheerful. Again, it is not a new story. As the idea of wind power has captured the imagination of the public, stories have begun to emerge that wind turbines are detrimental to a lot of the airborne segment of the animal kingdom. While it's not new, the latest article I've read on the dangers of wind power to wildlife points out that new guidelines about to be issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service could "create another challenge" for the wind industry.

Take away message: Wind energy and wildlife have a fraught relationship--wind turbines kill birds and bats, and rules to reduce these kills may hamper wind power development.

Perhaps my "take away" messages are an oversimplification. There are cases of fish being sucked up into the intakes of nuclear plant cooling systems and being killed, but there are, as noted, cases where the outlet water has supported aquaculture. I have heard of no such plus-minus for wind turbines. There are said to be some promising ways that wind farm operators can reduce fatalities, but they are still speculative. In the meantime, the role of the monkeys in assisting with radiation monitoring in Japan and the role of Turkey Point in helping rebuild the crocodile population in Florida are real.

***

Radium in the Basement:

Unexpected Finds from Fukushima Radiation Searches

It was almost a moment of comic relief to me. After all the stories from Fukushima, especially the stories about pockets of high radiation levels being found far from the plant site, I read a story about an anomalously high radiation reading in Tokyo that turned out to be Radium-226 for luminous paint!

And the story hit somewhat close to home for me! The material was found in an abandoned home in Setagaya Ward, which is the part of Tokyo in which I lived when I spent a year there in 1998-1999. It was not in my immediate neighborhood, but close enough to get my attention. The material was found under the floorboards of an unoccupied house. The owner, a 90-year-old widow who vacated the house early this year, has no idea how it got there. Her deceased husband was an office worker and had nothing to do with radioactive materials. (Storage under the floorboards does not have the somewhat sinister implications it often has in US culture. Japanese houses have no basements and are built with crawl spaces under them. In small buildings with limited storage space, the space under the floorboards is often used for storage.)

The source of the material and the reason it's there is still a mystery. So far, no one is implying the house was broken into while vacant. The bottles are old, and the authorities are busy estimating the dose the woman would have received assuming they had been there a long time.

Of course, the comic relief was temporary. Like other cases where radioactive materials have found their way into the public domain, this could have had much more harmful consequences. What if someone had bought the house and had children sleeping just above the material? It is an accidental piece of luck that a search for radiation hot spots from Fukushima turned up this stash and possibly prevented the exposure of innocent people.

But after all the stories of radioactive contamination, and hot spots unexpectedly far from the reactors, it was a nice piece of news to hear that the search led to a discovery that might have prevented a smaller tragedy, but a tragedy nonetheless.

***

Blogs about Fukushima:

A Look at the Past 6 Months

It has occurred to me that I have reached a bit of a hiatus in blogging about the Fukushima accident and its aftermath. No doubt there will be more issues that arise in the future that will get my attention again, but for now, I thought it might be convenient to list the dozen and a half or so posts I have written in the first 6 months since the accident and to provide a very brief summary of each.

The Japanese Government and Transparency: Another Issue for Nuclear Reactor Regulation August 30, 2011. This post looks at the different rules that govern Japan and the United States with respect to keeping records of meetings between regulators and licensees and making these records available to the public.

Observations on Japan and its Nuclear Program: Not Anti-Japanese! August 18, 2011. In response to criticism from a friend that my posted seemed anti-Japanese, I tried to point out what I do admire about the Japanese, and to explain why it is important to note the features of the Japanese system that may have contributed to how the Fukushima events unfolded.

Japanese Regulation: The Elements of Independence August 11, 2011. In this blog, I recognize that, as Japan strives to create a more independent regulator, they need to be aware that there are really several different types of independence that are important in nuclear regulation.

Suggested Changes to the Japanese Nuclear Program: Guidelines versus Requirements August 5, 2011. This blog reflects the fact that the Japanese can't just take the existing model of another country and adopt it whole cloth. A new regulatory authority will have to operate within the Japanese system, and therefore any model used must be adapted to work in that system.

Nuclear Regulatory Independence in Japan: The Role of Technical Capability July 24, 2011. In this post, I note that the Japanese government tends to be staffed primarily with generalists, and that it would be desirable to try to increase the number of technical specialists in the Japanese regulatory agency.

Fukushima and Coverups: Eraser Society July 22, 2011. When I lived in Japan, on several occasions, I saw people erasing or whiting out minor errors and I realized that it was an attempt to hide a mistake. I speculate that some of the reports we saw coming from the Fukushima accident may have represented a similar attempt to hide mistakes.

Considering the Fukushima Accident: Does Culture Matter? July 18, 2011. One famous homily that children learn in Japan is that "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down." I raise a question about whether some engineers in Japan didn't stand up to authority when they should have because they were so carefully taught not to "stick out."

Post-Fukushima Findings: The Origins of the Problem begin to Emerge July 15, 2011. This post reports on news items about how some of the original construction decisions made for Fukushima Dai-ichi may have exacerbated the effects of the tsunami.

Nuclear Regulation: Finding the Right Balance June 17, 2011. While this blog was not explicityly about Fukushima, it was probably spurred by all the thinking I was doing about Fukushima at the time. It reflects on how difficult it is for the regulator to find the right balance between too little regulation and too much regulation.

Replacing Nuclear Power: And Other Fantasies June 11, 2011. Although this post was about whether or not nuclear power could be replaced, it was spurred by the post-Fukushima demands by citizens in some countries that seem to suggest the citizenry thinks that it will be simple and quick to replace nuclear power with other sources of energy.

Nuclear Revival: A Scientific American View May 29, 2011. This blog mainly covers an article published by Scientific American prior to Fukushima, but also discusses a post-Fukushima editorial in the publication that proposes that reactor designs and regulatory processes should be improved in the wake of Fukushima.

Japanese Nuclear Regulation: A Call for Change May 13, 2011. I was pleased to see that some of my colleagues in Japan who are active in the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) were the first to propose that the Japanese regulatory system needed fixing, and I summarized their first announcements on the issue.

Fukushima and Amakudari: A Problem with a Long History May 6, 2011. In this blog, I discuss the fact that Japan has a system called amakudari, whereby government employees often move into positions in the industries they control. This system makes it very difficult to maintain the regulatory independence that is required for nuclear power.

Post-Fukushima: Some New Directions? April 23, 2011. This post provides a summary of two of the early discussions of some of the specific changes that the United States might want to make to reflect the lessons learned from Fukushima.

Positive Views on Nuclear Power: A Small Bright Light in a Difficult Time April 14, 2011. In the early days after Fukushima, I was pleased to see that the coverage of the accident was, in many places, more positive than I thought it might be, and this blog lists several articles that had appeared in the first few weeks after the accident.

Fukushima: The Devil is in the Details March 27, 2011. In the first days and weeks after the accident, there was much concern about US reactors of similar design and vintage. Thus, I was happy to report on an article that identified some differences between the Fukushima reactors and the ones at TVA.

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Some Observations March 19, 2011. This was my first post about the Fukushima accident, and it covers my earliest observations.


Also: Nuclear Regulation in Japan after Fukushima August 2011, in the JANUS "Toward Post-Fukushima" Series (now renamed "Fukushima Reconstruction Support" and on a new website). This blog was written for Japan NUS (JANUS) for a series of essays from various experts around the world on different aspects of the accident and what it might mean in the future. I was pleased and proud to be asked to contribute to this series and used the essay to summarize my thoughts on nuclear regulation. Other essays in the series provide the insights of experts from around the globe.

(Finally, while not related to the Fukushima situation, I should note that I've also done a series of a dozen blogs on other nuclear topics for JANUS in the last year or so, all of which can be found at "Dr. Marcus' Room" on their website.  Note that this link and the link above were updated on November 21, 2015, as the original link has changed.)

***

Japanese Regulation:

The Elements of Independence

The discussions that have been going on in Japan regarding the need for greater independence of the nuclear regulatory organization have, to date, focused mainly on the organizational independence. There are really at least three types of independence that are important--organizational independence, independence from the licensee, and ability of staff to assess the technical situation independently. While these have been discussed separately, it is worth considering them together. This blog post will look at the role each of these characteristics plays in creating an independent agency.

Organizational Independence

Organizational independence is, indeed, important. I have addressed this issue previously, as have others. The placement of the organization within a government's structure does matter because of both the perception and the real possibility that a regulatory organization that is subordinate to other government functions could be subject to pressures to slant its judgments to help support the other missions of the parent body. For example, there could be concerns that a safety issue is dismissed to help assure that power demands can be met. Many other countries originally had regulatory organizations buried within promotional ministries or departments, much as Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) is buried in the Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI). Most have now separated these functions.

Independence from the Licensee

I have previously written about my concern that the Japanese system of amakudari makes it difficult for the regulator to maintain true independence from its licensees. This system, which I believe is unique to Japan, institutionalizes the movement of government employees from an agency into companies regulated by the same agency. People often counter this concern by noting that people move between the government and industry in other countries as well. This is true, and some movement between sectors is probably even a good thing. We all need to understand the issues, constraints, difficulties, and concerns faced by the people and organizations with which we interface. However, in other countries, such movement between sectors occurs in both directions and is based on individual initiative. In fact, there are often even some temporary restrictions on the activities of government officials who move into the private sector. But most importantly, such moves are not managed by the personnel department and do not depend on coordination between government and private organizations as is the case in Japan.

Technical Ability of Staff

Another characteristic of the Japanese government is that the majority of the government employees are generalists. Although the Japanese government does employ some specialists in different fields, the majority of staff, even in highly technical areas, do not have technical degrees or experience in technical fields. Furthermore, the government employment system operates much like the US military and diplomatic personnel systems operate--that is, individuals are rotated to positions throughout their agency, and sometimes to other agencies. Because of this, they do not become specialists in a single area, even after a career in one agency. As a result, government agencies have come to rely heavily on committees of outside experts. Japanese government staff is overly reliant on the advice and is unable to develop any of their own independent assessments. Therefore, they may not be able to recognize it in the hopefully rare case where an expert adviser makes an error. Of course, regulatory agencies in other countries use expert advisers and expert contractors as well. The difference is that the staffers in other countries are capable of reviewing the technical materials developed by others and making independent judgments.

***

Nuclear Regulatory Independence in Japan:

The Role of Technical Capability

One area that has been somewhat neglected in the discussions of regulatory independence in Japan is the role of the technical capability of the regulatory staff. In the long run, this factor is probably as important as the other factors that have been discussed, including the organizational independence and the implications of amakudari, and deserves more attention. I will try to make a few observations here.

One fundamental characteristic of the Japanese government is that the majority of the government employees are generalists. Although the Japanese government does employ some specialists in different fields, the majority of staff, even in highly technical areas, do not have technical degrees or experience in technical fields.

Furthermore, the government employment system operates much like the US military and diplomatic personnel systems operate--that is, over the course of their careers, individuals are rotated to positions throughout their agency, and sometimes to other agencies, in a deliberate career-building process managed by personnel departments. As in the US military and diplomatic systems, individuals "belong" to/have a lifetime employment promise from the agencies that hired them originally and a permanent transfer to a new agency, e.g. the independent regulator, raises complex career questions. (This helps explain why Japanese government reorganizations are very infrequent.)

One of the objectives of the process is for senior employees to have achieved a broad understanding of the full range of activities of their organization, rather than to have an in-depth understanding of any single part of the agency's activity. Thus, for an agency like NISA's parent agency, the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), which has a large scope of responsibility, an individual may move from positions dealing with the oil sector to the nuclear sector to the manufacturing sector to international trade to economic development, without ever becoming a qualified expert in any single areas.

As a result of this process, government agencies have come to rely heavily on committees of experts, mostly drawn from universities and sometimes including retirees from industry. These experts have in-depth technical training and are able to review technical matters and provide advice to government agencies. As far as I can tell, the advice is usually good. The problem is that the staff is overly reliant on the advice and is unable to develop any of their own independent assessments. Therefore, they may not be able to recognize it in the hopefully rare cases where an expert adviser makes an error. There is also a danger that accidental biases in committee selection could bias results and give less attention to certain issues.

In 1992, I was working at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and I was assigned to spend 6 months at the regulatory organization in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the predecessor to NISA in METI. My assignment was to monitor the Japanese efforts to license the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), which NRC was then gearing up to do. I remember once asking a staff member at MITI what the basis was for a decision they were making on the licensing of the ABWR. The answer I got was that an advisory committee member said so. When I asked how the advisory committee member had come to that conclusion, the MITI staffer did not know. It was sufficient that he had the word of the advisory committee member. I found it troubling at the time that he had absolute confidence in something that he could not, and did not try to, verify for himself. After all, anyone can make a mistake, even an expert.

Once again, as always, such technical independence is a matter of degree. People could point to the US NRC, and I suppose to every other nuclear regulatory organization in the world, and note that it gets a lot of technical input from outside. The NRC, in particular, has a statutory standing advisory committee, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as well as other advisory groups. In addition, it contracts with the national laboratories, universities, and other organizations to conduct experimental research and to provide technical reports on a number of subjects.

Nevertheless, there is a critical difference--the staff at the NRC, which has about the highest percentage of advanced degrees of any agency in the US government--is capable of independently reviewing and understanding the advice and reports it receives. When an NRC staffer stands up before the Commission or other body to discuss a study produced under a contract he or she managed, that staffer can explain the technical basis for the conclusions of the study.

Like amakudari, the practice of staffing government agencies with generalists is embedded deeply within the Japanese government system and will be a difficult one to overcome. However, the government does employ a small number of technical specialists, so there is some recognition that people with such capabilities are necessary. It seems to me that, along with the the other reforms to the nuclear regulatory system that the Japanese is considering, provisions should be developed to increase the percentage of technically trained staff in the new regulatory organization. Such a change will go a long way toward addressing one fundamental barrier to true regulatory independence in Japan.

***

Fukushima and Coverups:

Eraser Society

I am now going to risk compounding the error of working outside my area of expertise. In a recent blogpost, I talked about the revelation that TEPCO engineers were concerned about a GE decision on the placement of the diesel generators at Fukushima, but that nothing was apparently done about their concern. I attributed this to a social tendency no to want to make waves. I can't tell whether the engineers are to be "blamed" for not raising the issue, or whether the issue was raised, but TEPCO management is to be "blamed" for not challenging GE. Whatever the case, I noted that the behavior fits with the fact that I have learned that children in Japan are taught that "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down."

This started me thinking about whether there are other character traits that may influence safety at nuclear facilities, and I recalled the several instances of coverups that have been revealed over the years at different nuclear facilities. The most well known may be the Monju coverup, but there have been others, including one at Fukushima in 2002. Now, no one from any culture really wants to acknowledge a mistake, and in this case, I don't know what Japanese children are taught, but I do recall several experiences when I lived in Japan that make me wonder if there is a different tolerance for error. I do know that I was always taught that we all make mistakes. The point is to learn from them. Maybe Japanese children are taught that. Maybe not.

What I do recall though, is several instances where I felt a Japanese person made an inordinate effort to "hide" an error, or even an apparent error. In one case, I was talking to an administrative person about arranging a trip. She was making notes in pencil as I laid out my plans. Several times, I started to propose one schedule, then changed my mind. It was my mistake, really. Each time, she industriously erased what she'd written and rewrote the corrected information. Finally, I asked what she was going to do with the paper. She was only going to use it to type out the travel authorization form. I was left wondering why she didn't just cross out the incorrect information.

I never got a satisfactory answer, but sometime later, someone left me a note telling me that the meeting room for an upcoming meeting had been changed. The note was written on yellow lined paper, but something had been whited out with a liquid erase product. You could see that a mistake had been made, but you couldn't see any more what the mistake was. Again, I wondered why not just cross it out? Why use this product, wait for it to dry, and rewrite over that.

Shortly after that, I was walking down a Tokyo street and a local gym was handing out a promotional product. Such handouts are a long-standing advertising commercial tradition in Japan, and the handouts include small useful items, such as packets of tissue, pencils, pens, and pads of sticky notes, all carrying the corporate name. In this case, I was handed what looked like a pencil, but when I got it home and looked more closely, it was an eraser encased in a plastic tube that could be pushed up as it was used up. I remember thinking at the time that pens and pencils would be good giveaways in the US, but I doubted that anyone would use an eraser. At that point, I jokingly started saying that the Japanese were an "eraser society."

(As an aside, one Japanese person to whom I'd made that statement retorted that their erasers were much better than ours! He was right. Their erasers never smeared the pencil lead. Which probably only reinforced my point.)

Now, perhaps I am blowing a few small observations out of proportion. Perhaps the admin person who erased her notes or the other person who whited out his mistake on a casual note were just a couple of unusually compulsive people. And as I already noted, no one likes to be caught making a mistake, and a lot of individuals will cover up mistakes if they think they can get away from it. I'm sure anyone can find dozens of instances in the US, in Europe, and everywhere else. But these small cases, and the eraser giveaway, and some of the well-publicized cases in the Japanese nuclear industry that went all the way to the top of their organizations, have made me wonder if there isn't something to my observation.

If there is, the response of the Japanese nuclear establishment should be to follow some of the examples outside Japan, where people are trained in the importance of not hiding problems, and there is a concerted effort to foster an environment where people are not punished for admitting errors. And, just as important, the Japanese nuclear establishment needs to see from the examples that the situation outside Japan is far from perfect in this regard. The importance of not covering up mistakes or errors is one that needs continual reinforcement, and maintaining an environment that allows people to come forward about mistakes without fear of retribution is a constant challenge.

***

Considering the Fukushima Accident:

Does Culture Matter?

I have given some more thought to the article I cited in my last blog about the placement of the diesel generators being a GE decision. The article stated that some TEPCO engineers were concerned about the decision at the time. It is not clear whether they expressed this concern. Even if they had, it is not clear what TEPCO would have done.

It occurred to me that the incident may reveal some elements of what is said to be the Japanese character. I may be way out of my league here, as I'm not a sociologist. Furthermore, I fully believe every culture and nationality has a full range of personalities. Not every American behaves like a cowboy, and not every Japanese conforms to the socially cooperative behavior supposedly associated with an agriculturally-focused society. Still, we saw in the aftermath of Fukushima that many Japanese did cooperate, share, take their turn, exercise patience, not loot or steal (even when they'd lost everything), etc., much better than we tend to think Americans would do in a similar situation. So maybe there are some tendencies that can be explored.

And I did live in Japan, which I hope gives me a little more insight into matters of national character. I do know, because a number of people have told me, that Japanese children grow up being taught "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down." By contrast, I don't know if we are taught in terms of such a homily, but I know that part of my upbringing was the message that "I was only following orders" was not a good excuse.

So I'm not terribly surprised to see that part of the issue in Japan may have been that the Japanese engineers didn't stand up to authority when they should have. Or, more insidious still, that they did stand up, but were ignored.

Clearly, every personality characteristic has its pluses and minuses, the times where the trait shines and the times where the trait fails the individual or society. Cowboys are independent and self-sufficient, but going it alone doesn't always work--either at nuclear power plants or anywhere else. Social conformity makes for more harmonious interpersonal interactions, but can discourage independence of thought or action where it is needed. So the point is not to change things 180 degrees, but rather to establish the conditions that can enable the appropriate behavior for each situation.

Challenging authority is always a difficult proposition, and I won't pretend that the situation is perfect in the US. But the US government has had a law since 1989 that provides for the protection of Federal whistleblowers, and in addition, the NRC has a system for handling differing professional opinions (DPOs). Whistleblowers in industry are protected by a variety of laws that are administered by the US Office of Whistleblower Protection. In Japan, such measures seem to be much newer and more limited. The Japanese Whistleblower Protection Act, which became effective in 2006, applies to both government agencies and commercial enterprises.

I do know that many people who have challenged authority in the US would say that these provisions have not been completely effective here. And it is still true that many Americans would talk themselves out of standing up to authority, even with these provisions in place. How much more difficult it must be in a culture where children are trained from their earliest days not to challenge authority.

Nevertheless, having specific provisions in place does encourage some people to step up with concerns and put pressure on organizations to address them. Further development of such measures may be a necessary step at in Japan, and training regarding their provisions, could help change the culture in the organizations building, operating and regulating nuclear power plants in Japan.

***

Post-Fukushima Findings:

The Origins of the Problem begin to Emerge

Ground zero: Bulldozers (top) take the top off a 35-meter bluff to prepare the site for the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant in the late 1960s in this image taken from the documentary "Reimei" ("Dawn"). Left: The construction site is seen after the leveling work. Right: An excavated area where the emergency diesel generators were installed is seen at the construction site.
Tokyo Electric Power Co. via Japan Times

Until now, our understanding of the Fukushima accident has been focused on information that was immediately available in its aftermath--the size of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the location of the emergency diesel generators, the loss of all onsite and offsite power, etc.

Recently, some new information has begun to emerge, information that may further inform what else needs to be examined at other nuclear power plants, especially in Japan, and what safeguards need to be put in place for the future.

One Japan Times article points to the huge irony that Fukushima Dai-ichi was built on a hill that had been cut down in an effort to make the plant more secure against earthquakes! It is a well accepted practice in earthquake areas to anchor building structures in bedrock in order to increase the stability of the building in case of a severe earthquake. Coupled with the facts that have already come out about how the potential magnitude of the maximum possible tsunami was grossly underestimated, it probably seemed like a reasonable engineering tradeoff at the time. And the subsequent cost tradeoffs also seem rational in that light. Although we cannot know for certain today what damage the plant might have suffered from the earthquake had it not been built in the bedrock, clearly, the decision to level the hill exacerbated the effects of the tsunami.

Like many others, I'm still puzzled that there was not earlier recognition of the earlier large tsunami in that region of the country, but I am not a seismologist, and only know by what I've been reading when and how such information was understood.

A second Japan Times article indicates that the decision on where to place the diesel generators was made by GE, and that some TEPCO engineers are now saying that they had concerns about this decision but that it was the long-standing policy at Japanese utilities (pre-dating nuclear power) not to make alterations to imported designs. What is not clear yet is if anyone at TEPCO or the regulatory authority at the time voiced these concerns.

Surely, this is the first of a lot more of the history of the design and construction of the Fukushima plant that will emerge in coming months. I hope that the outcome will not degenerate into finger pointing. The damage has been done. What is needed now is to learn from it so that no similar events ever happen again anywhere in the world.

***

Fukushima and Amakudari:

A Problem with a Long History

A number of news articles have been published since the Fukushima accident pointing to the sometimes overly close relationship that exists between the nuclear industry in Japan and its regulators. Since I have lived and worked in Japan, I thought I might be able to help shed some light on these relationships and the reasons for them.

Before I even begin to address the specifics, however, I want to caution readers that some of the articles on "TEPCO" misconduct include some non-TEPCO incidents, specifically Monju and the criticality accident at Tokai-Mura, and do not make it clear that these are not TEPCO facilities or incidents. While the issues may be similar, I think TEPCO has enough to answer for at the moment without ascribing to them incidents in which they are not the principals.

But to get back to the issue of the "cozy" relationships between the regulators and regulated in Japan, I would first point out that the kinds of relationships that are being criticized are not unique to the nuclear power sector in Japan. In fact, the same kinds of relationships exist in many industrial/commercial sectors in Japan. Furthermore, they do not exist for nefarious reasons. That is, no industry in Japan deliberately set out to create a system to insulate itself from criticism. Rather, the kinds of relationships that exist today are a consequence of a military style "up or out" personnel system and an inadequate pension system that results in people in their early to mid-50s being retired from their agencies without a sufficient pension income.

In fact, some people suggest that the problem stems from incomplete reforms introduced during the post-WWII US occupation of Japan and the American attempt to transform an industrial system that was mainly government controlled into a market economy. At that time, ministries were responsible for the operation of industrial organizations in their spheres of control, so the movement of personnel "retiring" from the government agencies to the industries they ran was not unlike movements within branches of any large industrial organization. The US successfully privatized the industries, but did not reform the pension system at the same time.

As a result, the traditional movement of personnel from government agencies to the now-private industries they controlled continued. In fact, it is an institutionalized arrangement, and part of the responsibility of the personnel offices of government agencies is to arrange the outplacement of staffers reaching retirement age, with industries under some pressure to accept the individuals being placed.

Sometimes people will observe that individuals in the US and elsewhere may move from government to industry or vice versa and question why that is any different from the Japanese system. The answer is that it is very different. American civil servants leaving the government and getting positions in industry are not helped by their agencies and therefore do not "owe" their agencies anything. (In fact, US Federal government officials often have certain restrictions on their activities for a period of time after their government employment.)

The Japanese system, often called amakudari, or "descent from heaven" has long been criticized by outsiders. In earlier days, it undoubtedly helped foster the image that used to be called "Japan, Inc." At one time, that mode of operation had considerable benefit for Japan, as it seemed conducive to developing unified positions in confronting the global marketplace. Somewhere along the line, however, that benefit seems to have lessened, and people stopped using that term as much. In fact, at that point, some of the disadvantages of amakudari seemed to emerge, particularly the inefficiencies caused by sometimes force-fitting people into positions for which they were not well matched.

Now, perhaps, a more serious shortcoming of amakudari may have reared its head and it may become more imperative to alter the kinds of relationships that have existed between the regulators and the regulated community.

It would be far too simple to say that reform of the government pension system is the solution to any problem in Japan. Amakudari is certainly not the fundamental cause of the Fukushima crisis, and it is unclear at this time whether any of the problems at Fukushima will be traced to repetitions of the previous instances of TEPCO misconduct and regulatory "indulgence" that have been dredged up by the press. In fact, my guess at this time would be that amakudari is not a factor. Furthermore, there are other Japanese government and industry practices that might also merit scrutiny in the face of current events. Perhaps I might address them in a future blog.

However, getting rid of amakudari will be a giant step in the right direction for an industry that is now under siege, and should help restore the faith of the Japanese people and the world that the nuclear industry--as well as other industries in Japan--will be subject to the kind of regulatory scrutiny the world expects from one one of the most advanced countries in the world.

Many people feel that Chernobyl helped to topple the old Soviet Union. It would be fitting for Fukushima to topple amakudari.

***

Positive Views on Nuclear Power:

A Small Bright Light in a Difficult Time

If I can find anything positive coming out of the events in Japan in the last few weeks, it is the number of articles I have seen in a variety of media that continue to speak of nuclear power in a balanced way. Surely, we all believe there are lessons to be learned and we can't be complacent, but increasing numbers of journalists and others appear to recognize that:

1. The options for a reliable energy supply to meet current and future needs are limited,
2. All forms of energy supply carry certain risks, and
3. Nuclear power is better than a lot of other options.

While I have not tried to track down every viewpoint on nuclear energy, here is a sampling that has crossed my computer screen in recent days:

• Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power, by George Monbiot, appearing in The Guardian. Most tellingly, Mr. Monbiot claims to have previously been against nuclear power, but the fact that such a large natural disaster visited upon old plants has still resulted in no public fatalities has persuaded him to support the technology. He goes on to recount some of the shortcomings of other technologies, including the inability of renewables to meet the demands of the United Kingdom. Although one can object to his characterization of nuclear industry leaders as "liars," my point is that he is able to sort the wheat from the chaff and recognize that every technology comes at a cost, and the cost of nuclear power is less than that of the alternatives. (This article is part of a pro-con, with a link to another article claiming that "Fukushima shows us the real cost of nuclear power" and that the economics doesn't add up.)

• Nuclear power is safest way to make electricity, according to study, by David Brown, appearing in the Washington Post. The title is pretty self-explanatory, but in brief, the article covers nuclear vs. other risks (mainly fossil), and even including Chernobyl in its calculus, shows that nuclear power is significantly safer.

• Another article in the Guardian, by Melanie Windridge, also concludes that Fear of nuclear power is out of all proportion to the actual risks. Like the other authors, Melanie Windridge does not dismiss or trivialize the Fukushima incident, but she puts it in the context of other risks to UK residents.

• Similarly, a Financial Post opinion piece by Lawrence Solomon concludes that Dams are Worse. The focus here, as the title suggests, is on dams, which the other articles do not cover. Since dams are also susceptible to earthquakes, this article helps complete the picture painted by the other authors.

• Likewise, another article by George Monbiot, also in the Guardian, points out The double standards of green anti-nuclear opponents. Here, he takes some of the same points, but weaves them in a different way to point out a number of double standards in the arguments of nuclear opponents who cloak themselves in a green mantle. (One small quibble: I think he means nuclear opponents, not anti-nuclear opponents.)

In addition to these, which all come from mainstream media, are some pieces I've seen on websites and blogs. Most surprising, perhaps, a piece on the Treehugger website is titled Nuclear Power's Bad Rap: Coal Is Far More Deadly. As the title suggests, it compares coal and nuclear and concludes nuclear power is the better alternative. Yet another article is a blog post co-authored by Mark Lynas and Chris Goodall entitled The dangers of nuclear power in light of Fukushima. While the title may seem ambiguous, the article goes on to conclude the dangers are not as great as the hype might suggest.

These are by no means all the articles and blogs that have come across my desk--or computer screen--in recent days. It is a representative sampling. Admittedly, I've seen articles from the opposite camp as well--extrapolating from this accident to conclude there are likely to be more accidents at every plant that is older, a BWR, in an area with any probability of earthquakes, or anywhere near a coast--or for that matter, near any body of water. Still, considering that the Fukushima accident was such a significant event and considering that it is still very much in the news, the fact that so many people from outside the discipline can step back and put things in perspective is one bit of positive news in an otherwise difficult time.

***

Fukushima:

The Devil is in the Details

As the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station continues to unfold, one question on everyone's mind is: Can such an accident happen elsewhere?

The question has several parts. One is the conditions that led to the accident. Clearly, most nuclear power plants are not located in earthquake zones, but some are. Even though the initial evidence is that the tsunami was the main cause of the problems, the earthquake could have been a contributing factor.

Clearly, also, most plants are not located in places where there could possibly be tsunamis, but some are. But are there other natural phenomena that could damage several units--flooding, perhaps, or hurricanes or typhoons?

The other part relates to the plant itself. I've seen a number of articles pointing a finger at plants in the United States that are similar in design to the ones at Fukushima--that is Mark 1 General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Some of these US plants happen to be ones that have been under attack anyway by groups wanting to see the plants shut down. The fact that a plant of similar design has suffered such an accident seems, on its surface, to help justify their arguments to close these other plants.

Those of us in the field know that all these plants are not truly identical, but it has been difficult to get information on the differences, and difficult to explain this point to people whose concerns about nuclear power plant safety have just been ratcheted up by the events in Japan. Indeed it is still unclear which of the many NRC-mandated upgrades to the Mark 1 design over the past decades were implemented in the Japanese units.

TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Thus, I was pleased to see an excellent article by Matthew Wald in today's NY Times that lays out some of the probable plant design differences for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Browns Ferry nuclear power plant. Kudos to TVA for opening their plant to the public eye and helping explain some of these differences.

The article also makes it clear that the TVA personnel are not complacent. Truly, the Fukushima accident has been an eye opener for everyone. We will need to confirm which of the upgrades Fukushima actually implemented and which they did not. Every plant in the world will have to be examined in light of this event, and in some cases, changes will have to be made.

In the meantime, it is very helpful to have a good explanation for some of the differences at other plants that might have helped make a difference at Fukushima--and that would likely make a difference if there were a similarly large external event at another plant.

***

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident:

Some Observations

Along with the rest of the world, I have spent the past week watching in horror the incredible sequence of events unfold in Japan--a record-breaking earthquake followed by a tsunami, together triggering a series of malfunctions in several units of the Fukushima nuclear power station.

My interest in what is happening in Japan is both professional and personal. On the professional side, I am of course interested in what went wrong at the power plant and why, and on how we can learn from this experience. On the personal side, I have lived in Japan and have many friends there, so I am especially saddened by the multiple tragedies they have suffered. I have even visited Sendai, the city hardest hit by the earthquake and tsunami. It is difficult to imagine the pain so many people in that area are now experiencing, and my thoughts are with them as they face the challenges of rebuilding their shattered lives.

I have deliberately not written anything until now, while I tried to sort through my feelings and to figure out what was really happening. While I still don't feel that I can address the many technical issues, I can comment on some of what I have observed over the past week, and what it might mean in the months and years ahead.

First, it is truly inspirational to think of the bravery of those who have, and still are, been fighting to get the power station under control, all the while knowing they face possible death or disease.

Second, it was a little surprising to me how much misinformation circulated about the unfolding events. It seems that our advanced communications technology spreads disinformation ever more efficiently.

Third, public concerns raised by the accident were only heightened when overly optimistic predictions made by some experts repeatedly proved wrong. While well-meaning, when reassuring predictions turn out to be false, they tend to undermine the credibility of the entire profession.

Fourth, it was somewhat disappointing to observe how some traditional nuclear opponents used the accident as a chance to further their agendas, claiming it as "proof" of their claims about nuclear power, regardless of whether the plant or the circumstances were really relevant to their viewpoints at all.

Finally, it has been heartening to me to see a number of public figures, both in the US and abroad, speak up to say that nuclear power is still needed.

It will be months, and maybe even years before we know the whole story about this accident and assimilate the lessons learned from it. In the meantime, we are already seeing some of the consequences of the event. Some countries have announced that they are slowing or suspending plans to build more plants. Others are likely to follow. The reviews almost all countries are doing of their existing plants may lead to some needs for changes, and perhaps even to a few early plant closures.

Nevertheless, from what we can see today, nuclear power will continue to play an important role in meeting needs for clean energy around the globe. While we will certainly face some challenges, most existing nuclear power plants should be able to continue to operate, and many of the plans for new plants will also continue to move forward.

***