Nuclear Regulation:

Finding the Right Balance

The recent focus on nuclear reactor regulation, both in Japan and in the US, is a reminder of just how difficult it is to find the right balance. As the Japanese now move toward their stated goal of changing their regulatory system, they should be reminded by events in the US and elsewhere that this is only the first step in a continuing process. If they need no other evidence, they can look to the recent NRC meeting on the preliminary findings of the post-Fukushima review of their own regulation of US plants.

Indeed, the role of the regulator is often an uneasy one. Those against a technology or enterprise will always feel that the regulators are not exercising enough oversight, and those in favor of it will always feel that the regulators are exercising too much oversight. One of the most educational experiences I had in my 14 years at NRC was a meeting--I have forgotten the topic--at which the industry and its opponents could agree on only one thing: that the NRC was doing it all wrong!

At the time, my temptation was to conclude that, if the parties at both extremes were unhappy with us, and for opposite reasons, maybe we were doing just the right thing! Of course, once I enunciated that theory, someone pointed out that this conclusion did not necessarily follow from the evidence, and I have since been very careful about making such statements.

However, the observation that NRC is usually a convenient target for all sides of an issue is one that has recurred repeatedly in the years since that meeting. Perhaps it is usually not so dramatic as when all parties were in the same room, but nevertheless, on issue after issue, I will read one article that claims that the NRC is soft on industry, while another claims, with equal fervor, that the NRC is regulating nuclear power to death.

The other age-old problem of regulation that we have discovered time and again is that fixing one thing sometimes exacerbates another. There are a number of examples from the annals of nuclear regulation, and I'm sure some of my readers have their favorites. Perhaps one of the easiest for a lay person to understand is that making access to portions of the plant more difficult to improve security may also make it more difficult for people to move around the plant in case of an emergency.

Thus, more is not always better in regulatory space, and one of the perennial problems of regulation is to continually refine regulation in the light of new evidence. In fact, the balance exists on several planes. One is the balance between different regulatory objectives (such as the security vs. emergency access situations noted above). Another is the balance between absolute safety and practicality. A quote I once read said that the only absolutely safe vehicle is one that has so many safety features that it is too heavy to move. So it is with nuclear power plants. The trick is to find the right mix of features that provide the necessary assurance of safety and still allow the vehicle to operate.

Regulation must also continue to evolve. It is tempting to say that, after so many years of nuclear power plant operation, we should have figured everything out. However, nuclear plants operate in a world that isn't static. As noted, sometimes we make a change in the plants that have unexpected consequences. Other times, things outside the plant change. 9/11 is perhaps the biggest external change agent we have faced in recent years, but there have been others.

So perhaps the biggest message for the Japanese government is that changing the regulatory system, while a necessary step, will not alone solve the problem.

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Replacing Nuclear Power:

And Other Fantasies

Individuals who are anti-nuclear or just plain afraid of nuclear have long harbored the illusion that existing nuclear power is easy to replace. "Just build more solar arrays," I have heard, or "Just put up more windmills." Few are aware of how long it takes to build any new capacity in substantial quantities.

While individuals can, perhaps, be forgiven for not being able to "do the math" and figure out what is really involved in substituting for a substantial fraction of a nation's electricity supply, it is more troubling when countries start subscribing to the same myths, as several countries have done in the last couple of weeks.

Not surprisingly, given its history, Germany has led the way. "We'll just build more renewable energy sources and improve the grid," the government has said. Switzerland soon followed. Grudgingly, the governments are acknowledging that their move in this direction means that they will burn more fossil fuels, at least in the near future.

Actually, it will probably mean that they will build more fossil fuels for quite some time, as they are acknowledging that the shutdown of nuclear plants will require new fossil fuel capacity. It is hard to see them building new fossil-fueled power plants for just a few years of operation. Therefore, the first casualty of the German and Swiss decision is the effort to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.

What Germany and Switzerland are not acknowledging is that they will actually not cut their effective use of nuclear power by very much. One advantage of the interconnected European grid is that they can draw on power produced by their neighbors. This allows them to self-righteously proclaim that they are leading the world to a newer, greener nirvana, while they conveniently block out the fact that their neighbors produce much of the electricity by means of nuclear power plants.

As an aside, I should say that I'm not completely sure that France and other neighbor countries can make up for the loss of this much nuclear power without having some negative effects for their own country. So, the second casualty of the German and Swiss decision may be some larger geopolitical consequences.

In any event, Japan doesn't have the luxury of drawing electricity from neighboring countries. Being an island, it is not interconnected to other sources of supply, nuclear or non-nuclear. Therefore, despite the magnitude of the accident, it is surprising and troubling to hear some people in Japan speculate that they may not restart reactors as they shut down for routine maintenance, and that all of Japan's reactors could be closed a year from now. While this may be an extreme view, even the less extreme views seem to be disconnected with reality.

It is true that there is a lot of local opposition to nuclear power at the moment, and the concern of the public is understandable. However, Japan is already suffering power shortages with the plants that are currently shut down. And it isn't even the height of summer there yet.

Even before the accident, Japan had a tight power supply by Western standards. Of course, I know that Americans use more energy than other industrialized nations, and that other countries maintain a standard of living similar to ours with a lower per capita energy expenditure. Still, having lived in both Japan and France, I can say from personal experience that not only are homes smaller in Japan than elsewhere, but the supply of electricity per household is also smaller.

Therefore, I am disappointed to see Japan appearing to retreat from reality. Germany and Switzerland may be able to survive with their heads in the sand, while others feed their thirst for electricity, but Japan has no such options. So a consequence of the directions Japan is beginning to take may have severe consequences on the Japanese economy.

In short, the rosy optimism countries seem to have that they will "just" replace nuclear power with other sources of electricity is likely to have some serious negative consequences, both within their own borders and around the world.

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Nuclear Revival:

A Scientific American View

After having reported a couple of months ago that Scientific American readers were not as positive about nuclear energy as I would have expected, I was pleased to see an article in a subsequent issue of Scientific American providing a very positive report on the US nuclear revival.

In particular, the article does not focus on the reactors of the future, which one might expect from a science-oriented publication, but rather reports on the current construction projects in the US, particularly the Southern Nuclear Operating Company project at Plant Vogtle and the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company project at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

The Scientific American report is basically positive, touting the two projects as currently being on time and on budget. In addition, it mentions the Tennessee Valley Authority efforts to complete Watts Bar Unit 2, and the applications for 20 or so other reactors being reviewed by the NRC. It also summarizes a few of the factors aiding this revival--the lessons learned from construction projects abroad, the increased supply of large forgings, and the new fuel fabrication capabilities in the US.

On the other hand, it notes Constellation Energy's withdrawal from the Calvert Cliffs project, and notes that other US nuclear projects have been dropped or delayed, and it includes the usual statement about the lack of a waste disposal facility.

They quote Marvin Fertel, President of the Nuclear Energy Institute, several times in the article. Most notably, he says, "There will be a lot of [new] plants between now and 2050, just not a lot between now and 2020."

This article was written before Fukushima, but a later editorial in Scientific American, published after the March accident, addresses the potential impacts of the Fukushima accident. This article raises the concern that abandoning nuclear power would leave us with alternatives that are more harmful to people and the environment, or that are far from sufficient in availability. It does find fault with both the NRC and the nuclear industry, and some in the industry might take issue with particular statements. Yet, the overriding message I take from the article is that the problems it identifies are manageable, and it proposes that reactor designs and regulatory processes be improved rather than that nuclear power should be ditched.

While all the information in the two articles will be well known to most readers of this blog, I always find it interesting to know what other people are reading, and I was pleased to see this very fair and balanced article in the pages of a publication that is read by a broad spectrum of scientists and engineers.

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Japanese Nuclear Regulation:

A Call for Change

After writing a blogpost last week on the Japanese government and nuclear power activities, I realized I might have more insights to offer over time, based on my experiences living and working in Japan. However, I did not think I'd be writing again on that topic so soon.

A recent article in a Japanese publication has moved this topic back up the queue again. (On the other hand, Blogspot just lost a nearly complete draft of this blog, so if they screw up again, there's no telling when this post will see the light of day.)


Asahi (publisher of one of Japan's largest newspapers) recently reported that on May 9, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) recommended the consolidation of all regulatory activities in Japan under a single independent authority. I have felt for a long time that this would be a good idea, and I applaud their action in making this recommendation.

As the article reports, the current responsibility for nuclear regulation is divided among 3 different agencies in Japan:

• The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) operates out of the Prime Minister's Office and is responsible for the basic policy and philosophy of national nuclear safety regulations in Japan.

• The Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) is responsible for the general oversight and inspection of commercial nuclear power plants and other facilities, and for the enforcement of national regulations for nuclear power.

• The Nuclear Safety Division of the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology (MEXT) has similar responsibilities for experimental and research reactors and facilities using radioisotopes.

While these agencies do interact with each other, the fact that they operate under three different organizations inevitably makes coordination and consistency more difficult to achieve. Outside observers have long found the separation of functions confusing and difficult to track.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that NISA is under the same Ministry as the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), the agency responsible for the promotion of nuclear power (as well as of other energy sources).

In fact, in 1992, I served as a liaison from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to NRC's counterpart in what was then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The regulatory group at that time was actually a part of ANRE, and the offices of the regulatory group were directly across the hall from the offices of the ANRE group responsible for nuclear promotion.

Therefore, when NISA was separated from ANRE in 2001, I thought it was a move in the right direction. However, as the article indicates, the organizations have remained closely linked.

I hasten to say that I never saw any indication that the regulators were directly influenced by their proximity to the promoters, and I certainly cannot at this time attribute any specific elements of the Fukushima incident to the present government organizational structure. Nevertheless, the close day-to-day contact between the regulators and promoters does not generate confidence that the functions are truly separate.

AESJ, which is the nuclear professional society of Japan, has many members who are very familiar with regulatory structures in the United States and other countries, so they are in a good position to understand the strengths and weaknesses of different systems and to know what can work for Japan. Therefore, I consider it a significant step for them to make this recommendation.

Once again, in this time where all things nuclear are under review in Japan, it may be a good moment to achieve a long-needed reform.

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Fukushima and Amakudari:

A Problem with a Long History

A number of news articles have been published since the Fukushima accident pointing to the sometimes overly close relationship that exists between the nuclear industry in Japan and its regulators. Since I have lived and worked in Japan, I thought I might be able to help shed some light on these relationships and the reasons for them.

Before I even begin to address the specifics, however, I want to caution readers that some of the articles on "TEPCO" misconduct include some non-TEPCO incidents, specifically Monju and the criticality accident at Tokai-Mura, and do not make it clear that these are not TEPCO facilities or incidents. While the issues may be similar, I think TEPCO has enough to answer for at the moment without ascribing to them incidents in which they are not the principals.

But to get back to the issue of the "cozy" relationships between the regulators and regulated in Japan, I would first point out that the kinds of relationships that are being criticized are not unique to the nuclear power sector in Japan. In fact, the same kinds of relationships exist in many industrial/commercial sectors in Japan. Furthermore, they do not exist for nefarious reasons. That is, no industry in Japan deliberately set out to create a system to insulate itself from criticism. Rather, the kinds of relationships that exist today are a consequence of a military style "up or out" personnel system and an inadequate pension system that results in people in their early to mid-50s being retired from their agencies without a sufficient pension income.

In fact, some people suggest that the problem stems from incomplete reforms introduced during the post-WWII US occupation of Japan and the American attempt to transform an industrial system that was mainly government controlled into a market economy. At that time, ministries were responsible for the operation of industrial organizations in their spheres of control, so the movement of personnel "retiring" from the government agencies to the industries they ran was not unlike movements within branches of any large industrial organization. The US successfully privatized the industries, but did not reform the pension system at the same time.

As a result, the traditional movement of personnel from government agencies to the now-private industries they controlled continued. In fact, it is an institutionalized arrangement, and part of the responsibility of the personnel offices of government agencies is to arrange the outplacement of staffers reaching retirement age, with industries under some pressure to accept the individuals being placed.

Sometimes people will observe that individuals in the US and elsewhere may move from government to industry or vice versa and question why that is any different from the Japanese system. The answer is that it is very different. American civil servants leaving the government and getting positions in industry are not helped by their agencies and therefore do not "owe" their agencies anything. (In fact, US Federal government officials often have certain restrictions on their activities for a period of time after their government employment.)

The Japanese system, often called amakudari, or "descent from heaven" has long been criticized by outsiders. In earlier days, it undoubtedly helped foster the image that used to be called "Japan, Inc." At one time, that mode of operation had considerable benefit for Japan, as it seemed conducive to developing unified positions in confronting the global marketplace. Somewhere along the line, however, that benefit seems to have lessened, and people stopped using that term as much. In fact, at that point, some of the disadvantages of amakudari seemed to emerge, particularly the inefficiencies caused by sometimes force-fitting people into positions for which they were not well matched.

Now, perhaps, a more serious shortcoming of amakudari may have reared its head and it may become more imperative to alter the kinds of relationships that have existed between the regulators and the regulated community.

It would be far too simple to say that reform of the government pension system is the solution to any problem in Japan. Amakudari is certainly not the fundamental cause of the Fukushima crisis, and it is unclear at this time whether any of the problems at Fukushima will be traced to repetitions of the previous instances of TEPCO misconduct and regulatory "indulgence" that have been dredged up by the press. In fact, my guess at this time would be that amakudari is not a factor. Furthermore, there are other Japanese government and industry practices that might also merit scrutiny in the face of current events. Perhaps I might address them in a future blog.

However, getting rid of amakudari will be a giant step in the right direction for an industry that is now under siege, and should help restore the faith of the Japanese people and the world that the nuclear industry--as well as other industries in Japan--will be subject to the kind of regulatory scrutiny the world expects from one one of the most advanced countries in the world.

Many people feel that Chernobyl helped to topple the old Soviet Union. It would be fitting for Fukushima to topple amakudari.

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Post-Fukushima:

Some New Directions?

One clear outcome of the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station is that it will focus technology development and regulatory requirements towards the systems that seemed to contribute to the situation at the Japanese plant.

A number of these systems are obvious, of course: spent fuel pools and emergency diesel generators, for example. Others are extensions of some of these, most prominently, the whole issue of spent fuel storage.

Among those taking an early look ahead are Ernest Moniz, former Undersecretary of the US Department of Energy, and now a professor at MIT and director of MIT's Energy Initiative. An article in the Wall Street Journal's blog by Russell Garland covers Moniz's views on why Japan's accident could change US energy policy assumptions. His four top predictions are 1) higher costs, 2) an end-to-end review of waste-storage practices, 3) a revisiting of the 20-year license extensions in the US, and 4) a shift of R&D from advanced fuel systems to issues associated with cladding and other safety-related matters. He points out that US models of energy supply and demand in the coming decades all assume most license renewal applications will be approved, so any delays (or even retractions of licenses already granted) could affect the presumed availability of tens of thousands of megawatts of clean energy.

A paper by Akira Tokuhiro of the University of Idaho, submitted as a short communication to Nuclear Exchange this month, outlines some 14 technical measures that he has identified as an initial set of lessons learned. They start with the issue of cladding, noting that the hydrogen generation that caused so much trouble was produced by the cladding. His other observations relate to the issues mentioned above (such as back-up power, spent fuel pool) as well as to other issues (an offsite control room, valves for emergency core cooling, backup water supply, and more). In addition to looking at the plant itself, he highlights other areas for possible changes, including establishing alternate routes for access to nuclear plants in emergency, and establishing international teams of emergency responders.

A final push may well be enhanced interest in non-traditional reactor technologies. It has already been observed that a pebble-bed design, for example, would not need water for cooling. It is likely, however, that any look at alternative technologies will now give greater scrutiny to other types of accident sequences and their consequences, such as the possibility of pebbles jamming in an earthquake.

While a lot more remains to be learned about the accident before any such measures are adopted and implemented and all these proposals will need further examination, there will clearly be needs in these areas, and it is useful to see a dialogue developing around the question of what we can learn from the recent events.

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Positive Views on Nuclear Power:

A Small Bright Light in a Difficult Time

If I can find anything positive coming out of the events in Japan in the last few weeks, it is the number of articles I have seen in a variety of media that continue to speak of nuclear power in a balanced way. Surely, we all believe there are lessons to be learned and we can't be complacent, but increasing numbers of journalists and others appear to recognize that:

1. The options for a reliable energy supply to meet current and future needs are limited,
2. All forms of energy supply carry certain risks, and
3. Nuclear power is better than a lot of other options.

While I have not tried to track down every viewpoint on nuclear energy, here is a sampling that has crossed my computer screen in recent days:

• Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power, by George Monbiot, appearing in The Guardian. Most tellingly, Mr. Monbiot claims to have previously been against nuclear power, but the fact that such a large natural disaster visited upon old plants has still resulted in no public fatalities has persuaded him to support the technology. He goes on to recount some of the shortcomings of other technologies, including the inability of renewables to meet the demands of the United Kingdom. Although one can object to his characterization of nuclear industry leaders as "liars," my point is that he is able to sort the wheat from the chaff and recognize that every technology comes at a cost, and the cost of nuclear power is less than that of the alternatives. (This article is part of a pro-con, with a link to another article claiming that "Fukushima shows us the real cost of nuclear power" and that the economics doesn't add up.)

• Nuclear power is safest way to make electricity, according to study, by David Brown, appearing in the Washington Post. The title is pretty self-explanatory, but in brief, the article covers nuclear vs. other risks (mainly fossil), and even including Chernobyl in its calculus, shows that nuclear power is significantly safer.

• Another article in the Guardian, by Melanie Windridge, also concludes that Fear of nuclear power is out of all proportion to the actual risks. Like the other authors, Melanie Windridge does not dismiss or trivialize the Fukushima incident, but she puts it in the context of other risks to UK residents.

• Similarly, a Financial Post opinion piece by Lawrence Solomon concludes that Dams are Worse. The focus here, as the title suggests, is on dams, which the other articles do not cover. Since dams are also susceptible to earthquakes, this article helps complete the picture painted by the other authors.

• Likewise, another article by George Monbiot, also in the Guardian, points out The double standards of green anti-nuclear opponents. Here, he takes some of the same points, but weaves them in a different way to point out a number of double standards in the arguments of nuclear opponents who cloak themselves in a green mantle. (One small quibble: I think he means nuclear opponents, not anti-nuclear opponents.)

In addition to these, which all come from mainstream media, are some pieces I've seen on websites and blogs. Most surprising, perhaps, a piece on the Treehugger website is titled Nuclear Power's Bad Rap: Coal Is Far More Deadly. As the title suggests, it compares coal and nuclear and concludes nuclear power is the better alternative. Yet another article is a blog post co-authored by Mark Lynas and Chris Goodall entitled The dangers of nuclear power in light of Fukushima. While the title may seem ambiguous, the article goes on to conclude the dangers are not as great as the hype might suggest.

These are by no means all the articles and blogs that have come across my desk--or computer screen--in recent days. It is a representative sampling. Admittedly, I've seen articles from the opposite camp as well--extrapolating from this accident to conclude there are likely to be more accidents at every plant that is older, a BWR, in an area with any probability of earthquakes, or anywhere near a coast--or for that matter, near any body of water. Still, considering that the Fukushima accident was such a significant event and considering that it is still very much in the news, the fact that so many people from outside the discipline can step back and put things in perspective is one bit of positive news in an otherwise difficult time.

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