Fukushima and Amakudari:

A Problem with a Long History

A number of news articles have been published since the Fukushima accident pointing to the sometimes overly close relationship that exists between the nuclear industry in Japan and its regulators. Since I have lived and worked in Japan, I thought I might be able to help shed some light on these relationships and the reasons for them.

Before I even begin to address the specifics, however, I want to caution readers that some of the articles on "TEPCO" misconduct include some non-TEPCO incidents, specifically Monju and the criticality accident at Tokai-Mura, and do not make it clear that these are not TEPCO facilities or incidents. While the issues may be similar, I think TEPCO has enough to answer for at the moment without ascribing to them incidents in which they are not the principals.

But to get back to the issue of the "cozy" relationships between the regulators and regulated in Japan, I would first point out that the kinds of relationships that are being criticized are not unique to the nuclear power sector in Japan. In fact, the same kinds of relationships exist in many industrial/commercial sectors in Japan. Furthermore, they do not exist for nefarious reasons. That is, no industry in Japan deliberately set out to create a system to insulate itself from criticism. Rather, the kinds of relationships that exist today are a consequence of a military style "up or out" personnel system and an inadequate pension system that results in people in their early to mid-50s being retired from their agencies without a sufficient pension income.

In fact, some people suggest that the problem stems from incomplete reforms introduced during the post-WWII US occupation of Japan and the American attempt to transform an industrial system that was mainly government controlled into a market economy. At that time, ministries were responsible for the operation of industrial organizations in their spheres of control, so the movement of personnel "retiring" from the government agencies to the industries they ran was not unlike movements within branches of any large industrial organization. The US successfully privatized the industries, but did not reform the pension system at the same time.

As a result, the traditional movement of personnel from government agencies to the now-private industries they controlled continued. In fact, it is an institutionalized arrangement, and part of the responsibility of the personnel offices of government agencies is to arrange the outplacement of staffers reaching retirement age, with industries under some pressure to accept the individuals being placed.

Sometimes people will observe that individuals in the US and elsewhere may move from government to industry or vice versa and question why that is any different from the Japanese system. The answer is that it is very different. American civil servants leaving the government and getting positions in industry are not helped by their agencies and therefore do not "owe" their agencies anything. (In fact, US Federal government officials often have certain restrictions on their activities for a period of time after their government employment.)

The Japanese system, often called amakudari, or "descent from heaven" has long been criticized by outsiders. In earlier days, it undoubtedly helped foster the image that used to be called "Japan, Inc." At one time, that mode of operation had considerable benefit for Japan, as it seemed conducive to developing unified positions in confronting the global marketplace. Somewhere along the line, however, that benefit seems to have lessened, and people stopped using that term as much. In fact, at that point, some of the disadvantages of amakudari seemed to emerge, particularly the inefficiencies caused by sometimes force-fitting people into positions for which they were not well matched.

Now, perhaps, a more serious shortcoming of amakudari may have reared its head and it may become more imperative to alter the kinds of relationships that have existed between the regulators and the regulated community.

It would be far too simple to say that reform of the government pension system is the solution to any problem in Japan. Amakudari is certainly not the fundamental cause of the Fukushima crisis, and it is unclear at this time whether any of the problems at Fukushima will be traced to repetitions of the previous instances of TEPCO misconduct and regulatory "indulgence" that have been dredged up by the press. In fact, my guess at this time would be that amakudari is not a factor. Furthermore, there are other Japanese government and industry practices that might also merit scrutiny in the face of current events. Perhaps I might address them in a future blog.

However, getting rid of amakudari will be a giant step in the right direction for an industry that is now under siege, and should help restore the faith of the Japanese people and the world that the nuclear industry--as well as other industries in Japan--will be subject to the kind of regulatory scrutiny the world expects from one one of the most advanced countries in the world.

Many people feel that Chernobyl helped to topple the old Soviet Union. It would be fitting for Fukushima to topple amakudari.

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Post-Fukushima:

Some New Directions?

One clear outcome of the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station is that it will focus technology development and regulatory requirements towards the systems that seemed to contribute to the situation at the Japanese plant.

A number of these systems are obvious, of course: spent fuel pools and emergency diesel generators, for example. Others are extensions of some of these, most prominently, the whole issue of spent fuel storage.

Among those taking an early look ahead are Ernest Moniz, former Undersecretary of the US Department of Energy, and now a professor at MIT and director of MIT's Energy Initiative. An article in the Wall Street Journal's blog by Russell Garland covers Moniz's views on why Japan's accident could change US energy policy assumptions. His four top predictions are 1) higher costs, 2) an end-to-end review of waste-storage practices, 3) a revisiting of the 20-year license extensions in the US, and 4) a shift of R&D from advanced fuel systems to issues associated with cladding and other safety-related matters. He points out that US models of energy supply and demand in the coming decades all assume most license renewal applications will be approved, so any delays (or even retractions of licenses already granted) could affect the presumed availability of tens of thousands of megawatts of clean energy.

A paper by Akira Tokuhiro of the University of Idaho, submitted as a short communication to Nuclear Exchange this month, outlines some 14 technical measures that he has identified as an initial set of lessons learned. They start with the issue of cladding, noting that the hydrogen generation that caused so much trouble was produced by the cladding. His other observations relate to the issues mentioned above (such as back-up power, spent fuel pool) as well as to other issues (an offsite control room, valves for emergency core cooling, backup water supply, and more). In addition to looking at the plant itself, he highlights other areas for possible changes, including establishing alternate routes for access to nuclear plants in emergency, and establishing international teams of emergency responders.

A final push may well be enhanced interest in non-traditional reactor technologies. It has already been observed that a pebble-bed design, for example, would not need water for cooling. It is likely, however, that any look at alternative technologies will now give greater scrutiny to other types of accident sequences and their consequences, such as the possibility of pebbles jamming in an earthquake.

While a lot more remains to be learned about the accident before any such measures are adopted and implemented and all these proposals will need further examination, there will clearly be needs in these areas, and it is useful to see a dialogue developing around the question of what we can learn from the recent events.

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Positive Views on Nuclear Power:

A Small Bright Light in a Difficult Time

If I can find anything positive coming out of the events in Japan in the last few weeks, it is the number of articles I have seen in a variety of media that continue to speak of nuclear power in a balanced way. Surely, we all believe there are lessons to be learned and we can't be complacent, but increasing numbers of journalists and others appear to recognize that:

1. The options for a reliable energy supply to meet current and future needs are limited,
2. All forms of energy supply carry certain risks, and
3. Nuclear power is better than a lot of other options.

While I have not tried to track down every viewpoint on nuclear energy, here is a sampling that has crossed my computer screen in recent days:

• Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power, by George Monbiot, appearing in The Guardian. Most tellingly, Mr. Monbiot claims to have previously been against nuclear power, but the fact that such a large natural disaster visited upon old plants has still resulted in no public fatalities has persuaded him to support the technology. He goes on to recount some of the shortcomings of other technologies, including the inability of renewables to meet the demands of the United Kingdom. Although one can object to his characterization of nuclear industry leaders as "liars," my point is that he is able to sort the wheat from the chaff and recognize that every technology comes at a cost, and the cost of nuclear power is less than that of the alternatives. (This article is part of a pro-con, with a link to another article claiming that "Fukushima shows us the real cost of nuclear power" and that the economics doesn't add up.)

• Nuclear power is safest way to make electricity, according to study, by David Brown, appearing in the Washington Post. The title is pretty self-explanatory, but in brief, the article covers nuclear vs. other risks (mainly fossil), and even including Chernobyl in its calculus, shows that nuclear power is significantly safer.

• Another article in the Guardian, by Melanie Windridge, also concludes that Fear of nuclear power is out of all proportion to the actual risks. Like the other authors, Melanie Windridge does not dismiss or trivialize the Fukushima incident, but she puts it in the context of other risks to UK residents.

• Similarly, a Financial Post opinion piece by Lawrence Solomon concludes that Dams are Worse. The focus here, as the title suggests, is on dams, which the other articles do not cover. Since dams are also susceptible to earthquakes, this article helps complete the picture painted by the other authors.

• Likewise, another article by George Monbiot, also in the Guardian, points out The double standards of green anti-nuclear opponents. Here, he takes some of the same points, but weaves them in a different way to point out a number of double standards in the arguments of nuclear opponents who cloak themselves in a green mantle. (One small quibble: I think he means nuclear opponents, not anti-nuclear opponents.)

In addition to these, which all come from mainstream media, are some pieces I've seen on websites and blogs. Most surprising, perhaps, a piece on the Treehugger website is titled Nuclear Power's Bad Rap: Coal Is Far More Deadly. As the title suggests, it compares coal and nuclear and concludes nuclear power is the better alternative. Yet another article is a blog post co-authored by Mark Lynas and Chris Goodall entitled The dangers of nuclear power in light of Fukushima. While the title may seem ambiguous, the article goes on to conclude the dangers are not as great as the hype might suggest.

These are by no means all the articles and blogs that have come across my desk--or computer screen--in recent days. It is a representative sampling. Admittedly, I've seen articles from the opposite camp as well--extrapolating from this accident to conclude there are likely to be more accidents at every plant that is older, a BWR, in an area with any probability of earthquakes, or anywhere near a coast--or for that matter, near any body of water. Still, considering that the Fukushima accident was such a significant event and considering that it is still very much in the news, the fact that so many people from outside the discipline can step back and put things in perspective is one bit of positive news in an otherwise difficult time.

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ANS Japan Relief Fund:

Donations Welcomed

ANS has set up a mechanism to collect contributions to support our Japanese friends and colleagues who have been affected by the devastating earthquake and tsunami. I am pleased to support this worthwhile effort and have posted a link in the right-hand column of this blog.

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Fukushima:

The Devil is in the Details

As the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station continues to unfold, one question on everyone's mind is: Can such an accident happen elsewhere?

The question has several parts. One is the conditions that led to the accident. Clearly, most nuclear power plants are not located in earthquake zones, but some are. Even though the initial evidence is that the tsunami was the main cause of the problems, the earthquake could have been a contributing factor.

Clearly, also, most plants are not located in places where there could possibly be tsunamis, but some are. But are there other natural phenomena that could damage several units--flooding, perhaps, or hurricanes or typhoons?

The other part relates to the plant itself. I've seen a number of articles pointing a finger at plants in the United States that are similar in design to the ones at Fukushima--that is Mark 1 General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Some of these US plants happen to be ones that have been under attack anyway by groups wanting to see the plants shut down. The fact that a plant of similar design has suffered such an accident seems, on its surface, to help justify their arguments to close these other plants.

Those of us in the field know that all these plants are not truly identical, but it has been difficult to get information on the differences, and difficult to explain this point to people whose concerns about nuclear power plant safety have just been ratcheted up by the events in Japan. Indeed it is still unclear which of the many NRC-mandated upgrades to the Mark 1 design over the past decades were implemented in the Japanese units.

TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Thus, I was pleased to see an excellent article by Matthew Wald in today's NY Times that lays out some of the probable plant design differences for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Browns Ferry nuclear power plant. Kudos to TVA for opening their plant to the public eye and helping explain some of these differences.

The article also makes it clear that the TVA personnel are not complacent. Truly, the Fukushima accident has been an eye opener for everyone. We will need to confirm which of the upgrades Fukushima actually implemented and which they did not. Every plant in the world will have to be examined in light of this event, and in some cases, changes will have to be made.

In the meantime, it is very helpful to have a good explanation for some of the differences at other plants that might have helped make a difference at Fukushima--and that would likely make a difference if there were a similarly large external event at another plant.

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The Fukushima Nuclear Accident:

Some Observations

Along with the rest of the world, I have spent the past week watching in horror the incredible sequence of events unfold in Japan--a record-breaking earthquake followed by a tsunami, together triggering a series of malfunctions in several units of the Fukushima nuclear power station.

My interest in what is happening in Japan is both professional and personal. On the professional side, I am of course interested in what went wrong at the power plant and why, and on how we can learn from this experience. On the personal side, I have lived in Japan and have many friends there, so I am especially saddened by the multiple tragedies they have suffered. I have even visited Sendai, the city hardest hit by the earthquake and tsunami. It is difficult to imagine the pain so many people in that area are now experiencing, and my thoughts are with them as they face the challenges of rebuilding their shattered lives.

I have deliberately not written anything until now, while I tried to sort through my feelings and to figure out what was really happening. While I still don't feel that I can address the many technical issues, I can comment on some of what I have observed over the past week, and what it might mean in the months and years ahead.

First, it is truly inspirational to think of the bravery of those who have, and still are, been fighting to get the power station under control, all the while knowing they face possible death or disease.

Second, it was a little surprising to me how much misinformation circulated about the unfolding events. It seems that our advanced communications technology spreads disinformation ever more efficiently.

Third, public concerns raised by the accident were only heightened when overly optimistic predictions made by some experts repeatedly proved wrong. While well-meaning, when reassuring predictions turn out to be false, they tend to undermine the credibility of the entire profession.

Fourth, it was somewhat disappointing to observe how some traditional nuclear opponents used the accident as a chance to further their agendas, claiming it as "proof" of their claims about nuclear power, regardless of whether the plant or the circumstances were really relevant to their viewpoints at all.

Finally, it has been heartening to me to see a number of public figures, both in the US and abroad, speak up to say that nuclear power is still needed.

It will be months, and maybe even years before we know the whole story about this accident and assimilate the lessons learned from it. In the meantime, we are already seeing some of the consequences of the event. Some countries have announced that they are slowing or suspending plans to build more plants. Others are likely to follow. The reviews almost all countries are doing of their existing plants may lead to some needs for changes, and perhaps even to a few early plant closures.

Nevertheless, from what we can see today, nuclear power will continue to play an important role in meeting needs for clean energy around the globe. While we will certainly face some challenges, most existing nuclear power plants should be able to continue to operate, and many of the plans for new plants will also continue to move forward.

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Energy Subsidies:

A Matter of Perception?

The juxtaposition of events could not have been more timely--and more irritating. I had just gotten through reading my morning paper, the Washington Post, and learning that Martin O'Malley, the governor of my fair state of Maryland, is proposing that Maryland ratepayers pay several dollars more a month to subsidize an off-shore wind farm "at a price far above the market rate and at which its developers agree they could turn a profit." [emphasis added] The fee has been estimated at $1.44 a month for residential customers, but a legislative budget analysis puts the initial fee at more than double that--$3.61. Plus, they would tack on a state administrative fee of $0.15 a month to "study" and write offshore wind regulations. And that's just for starters.

I then walked over to my computer and read the day's newsclips there. Among them was a headline from Nuclear Power Daily stating that, "After 50 Years, Nuclear Power is Still Not Viable Without Subsidies." The article refers to a Union of Concerned Scientists report by almost the same name--"Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable Without Subsidies." [Now, I must point out that, at the time of this writing, is some glitch in the Nuclear Power Daily report, as the link to the UCS report goes to a UCS document with a totally different title: EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions. A brief search, however, revealed the right report, and the links in this blog are to the correct reports.] As expected, the UCS reports apply the term subsidy very broadly, labeling measures such as loan guarantees and Price-Anderson accident liability insurance subsidies, even though they are not funded by our electric bills or taxes.

Now, I'm not sure what UCS would call a $3.76/month direct surcharge on my electricity bill for wind that doesn't always blow, but in this case, I would use the "S-word."

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