A Visit to Fukushima:

The Site Today

 

[Note:  Paragraph 5, on observable impacts to the area outside the plant, and paragraph 8, on observations at the site, were modified on November 9 to add a couple of additional observations.]

I recently had an opportunity to visit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station for the first time.  While many people have visited the site since the accident on March 11, 2011, the site does keep changing, so I thought my observations might be of interest.

I was in Sendai, Japan to participate in the International Conference on Maintenance Science and Technology (ICMST), and on the day following the conference, they offered a bus trip to the plant and a tour of the site.  A group of about 3 dozen of us boarded the bus at 8 am at the Sendai train station for a tour that would take us first to the Naraha Center for Remote Control Technology Development, run by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and then to the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi site.

The Naraha site, about 2-1/2 hours south of Sendai (past Fukushima), was established following the Fukushima accident, is intended to provide a center for organizations engaged in nuclear power plant decommissioning activities to develop and test robotics and other equipment and procedures for decommissioning.  We visited the 2 main facilities--a full-scale mock-up test area, and a virtual reality system.  The virtual reality demonstration was particularly dramatic, as we "toured" the inside of the power plant.

We then turned north again and traveled to the Fukushima plant.  As we got close, my first reaction was that nothing seemed wrong in the surrounding area.  There was other traffic going in both directions on the route we were traveling.  There were stoplights on the road we were on.  We were passing houses and shops.  All of them seemed intact.  They were not boarded up, there were no signs of vandalism, and there were cars parked in front of the buildings.

It was only when we looked closely that we started seeing that something was not quite right.  There were no people around any of the shops.  Some of the side streets were blocked off, or had policemen controlling access.  In fact, entrances to parking areas were also blocked, so you could drive through the area, but not stop here.  As we really focused on what we were passing, we could see places where the grass and bushes and trees were clearly taking over, covering paved areas and entries to buildings.  Once we had figured out what to look for, it became obvious that we were driving through a no-man's land.  And to drive the fact home, from time to time, there were displays on the side of the road broadcasting current readings from local radiation monitors.   

When we got to the nuclear power station, we were taken first to a building where we had a briefing on what we were about to see, and then to another building to prepare for our tour.  While I've seen and heard reports of groups that have toured some areas by foot, we were going to stay on a bus and tour strictly by bus.  That was a disappointment, but it undoubtedly saved a lot of time, as we didn't have to don much protective gear.  It seemed to take long enough as it is for all of us to be issued entry cards, dosimeters and cotton gloves, and to be processed in.  And, unfortunately, we had to leave all cameras and cell phones behind, so I have no personal photos of this visit.

Once into the facility, we boarded another bus and went on a very thorough tour of the facility from the roads.  We passed all 6 units, and probably got within 50 yards of several of the damaged units, with frequent stops for the guide to explain what had happened at each unit, and what has been done since then.  In Unit 1, we still could see the skeletal remains of the building, while Unit 3 has been covered with a dome for the refueling operation.  Where damage is still visible from the vantage point of the bus, they pointed that out.  As we drove around the facility, they also indicated where the ice wall was, and the pipes that feed it.  One impressive feature is the hundreds of tanks that have been brought in to allow the storage of contaminated water.

They also showed us some of the human side of the facility, both before and after the accident--the remaining cherry trees of the hundreds that used to line the main drive and that were enjoyed by the staff in the spring (many had to be sacrificed for some of the post-accident activities), the new administration building, the housing for staff.  Also obvious were cars without license plates sitting in the parking lot; they had been on the site at the time of the accident and are now limited to use on the site.  They were particularly proud of some of the progress they've made.  In 96% of the facility, decontamination has reduced contamination to low enough levels that no protective clothing or only light protective clothing is needed.  (Of course, some of the more intense work is in the areas that are still contaminated, so a significant percentage of the staff still needs to suit up.

In the briefings and on the tour, there was much emphasis on the fact that they are only 7 years into an activity that is expected to last for decades.  It will be interesting to continue to follow this activity and track the progress over time, although many of us ruefully commented to each other that we might not be here to see the completion of the project. 

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Fukushima and Safety Culture:

A Complex Issue

An article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in recognition of the anniversary of Fukushima has brought new attention to the concept of safety culture and how it may differ between organizations.  The article compares the fate of the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station operated by Tohoku Electric Power Company to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami.  The article, which is based on a research paper from the University of Southern California, concludes that, despite a lot of similarities between the two sites (age and type of nuclear reactors, strength of earthquake, height of tsunami), the Onagawa site fared much better than the Fukushima site.  The article attributes this to differences in safety culture in the two companies.

The article and the longer research paper present an interesting thesis, but years after the fact, it is very difficult to sort out all the details behind the differences in the decisions of the two companies that produced the different outcomes.  In reality, the situation is very complex. 

As I reported almost 3 years ago, one of the factors that really caught my attention in the early reports following the accident was the fact that the height of the hill on which Fukushima Daiichi was built had been lowered!  This issue has been a continuing source of discussion over the last 3 years and is addressed once again in the new study.   Had they not cut off the top of the hill, the reactors would have been above the height of the tsunami.  How could they have made such a decision? 

The first article I saw reporting that the hill had been lowered noted that one possible factor in the decision was that it would allow the base of the reactors to be built directly on solid bedrock to mitigate any earthquake threat.  While that sounds like reasonable justification, other evidence cited in the same article suggests that the final decision was based on a cost-benefit calculation of the operating costs of the seawater pumps.  (Although it is not mentioned, presumably, there are alternatives for earthquake mitigation, perhaps more costly as well, that would not have required lowering the height of the site.)  And, we must remember that the decision was approved by the regulatory authority at the time. 

In fact, a little over a year after the accident,  the Japanese government's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission concluded that "This was a disaster 'Made in Japan.'"  The report explains:  "Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to 'sticking with the program'; our groupism; and our insularity."

So, is the problem "Japanese culture"?  Perhaps.  But the article on the Japanese report notes that American culture is almost the opposite, yet the US has had its share of industrial accidents, many of which reflect similar types of technical misjudgements and institutional arrogance.

Is the problem "TEPCO culture"?  Maybe, but Fukushima Daini, which was also a TEPCO site,  survived almost unscathed.  Were the details of the challenges different, or was the subculture at the site different?

As is the case for most industrial accidents, there were many contributing factors to the Fukushima accident.  One can look at the situation and postulate a number of points, from the construction of the plant to the initial management of the accident, at which a different decision or a different action might have prevented, or at least drastically reduced, the magnitude of the accident.  One can look at both TEPCO's decisions and actions, and those of the government. 

Just as it is difficult today to understand fully the underlying motives for decisions made by TEPCO during the construction of the Fukushima plants, it is also true that there may be factors other than safety culture alone that led to the survival of the Onagawa site.  However, even if that is the case, it is clear that there were some significant differences at the two sites, and therefore, that there are lessons that can be learned.  The caution is that these are not the only lessons that need to be learned, and TEPCO is not the only entity that needs to absorb the lessons. 

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Akira Omoto and the Japan AEC:

The Rest of the Story

On March 14, Nucleonics Week reported on the resignation of Akira Omoto from the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), where he had served as a Commissioner since January 2010.  As Nucleonics Week content is available by subscription only, let me summarize the article by saying that it presents several factual events:  that Omoto resigned from his position on the JAEC on March 7, that he had been called before the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) on February 26, that he said he was a paid advisor to the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) from November 2009 to March 2012, that he refused to reveal the amount of compensation he received from TEPCO for his advisory services, and that he saw no conflict between his two roles (JAEC Commissioner and TEPCO advisor).  The article also reported that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga, the chief Cabinet secretary, had both said that the public would find it "difficult to understand" Omoto's view, but that they had rejected a suggestion to fire Omoto.

Since I know Akira Omoto well, I was surprised at this news.  Over the years, I've had a number of conversations with him about nuclear activities in Japan, and I had always found him to be honorable, and to take the "high ground" on issues.  The more I thought about the article, and the more I communicated with people in Japan, I realized that the Nucleonics Week article had missed a number of relevant points:

• The role of the JAEC is to formulate nuclear power policies, not to regulate or license nuclear power plants, so it seems improbable that Omoto's dual positions could be used to influence government actions on behalf of TEPCO;
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• Omoto's position on the JAEC was as a part-time Commissioner, and part-time Commissioners usually hold other positions outside the JAEC;
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• Omoto was working for TEPCO prior to his appointment as a JAEC Commissioner, and that work was declared to the Diet as part of his confirmation process;
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• Omoto's advisory role to TEPCO focused on activities related to new entrants (based on his experience in his previous position with the IAEA), not on matters related to JAEC jurisdiction; and
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• The hearing before the Diet leading to his forced resignation came a year after Omoto had resigned his position as an advisor to TEPCO.

Although there may be elements to this situation that I don't know, the facts I do have make the actions of the Japanese government seem disproportionate.  Given the situation in Japan, perhaps it should not be surprising that the Japanese government is looking for "scapegoats" to try to provide an appearance that it is cleaning house.  I don't doubt that the public is skeptical, so even though the connection between the positions is remote, and even though the conflict, if any, has now been removed, some may feel that "punishment" is still due.

However, it seems to me there are more productive actions the Japanese government could be taking to "clean house."  Forcing the resignation of an individual who used to work for the industry in a position that appears to have no conflict with his government role seems cosmetic at best.  It is sad to see a good name maligned for what appears to be political purposes. 

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