All of the Above:

A Matter of Common Sense

One recurring discussion we seem to face is what the mix of energy sources should be.  This discussion has become particularly important as the drive to reduce carbon emissions grows, and as the costs of renewable energy simultaneously seem to be plummeting.  That combination of factors has tempted some to envision a world powered entirely by the sun and the wind.

Many of us in the energy field have long tried to challenge such a scenario.  Experience has taught us that new problems often emerge as the use of a technology increases.  I recall many years ago reading a "look back at history" type of article that lauded the fact that those newfangled automobiles would solve the pollution problems created by horses in the city.  No one recognized then that automobiles would bring another type of pollution, and that, years later, we would spend time, money and energy to address that pollution.

Therefore, I was very pleased to see a very rational discussion of the issue entitled The Environmentalist Case against 100% Renewable Energy Plans.  The article draws a distinction between what is technically possible and what is optimal, thus transforming the argument from whether or not something can be done to whether it should be done.

The article also takes on the difficulty of achieving a 100% renewable power supply.  Although proponents of such a scenario cite various storage possibilities (as well as grid interconnections), the article points out that energy storage is not just a daily problem.  Wind patterns are seasonal, and there can be extended patterns of wind variability for other reasons.

In fact, shortly after I read this article, I saw some statistics from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) that graphically showed a 5-month period at the beginning of 2015 where the capacity factors of wind plants on the West Coast were lower than the average of the previous 5 years.  The EIA notes that capacity factors vary non-linearly with wind speed, so small decreases in wind speeds can result in much larger changes in capacity factors.

As a result of these variations, a huge investment in storage would be required in order to assure a reliable energy supply during extended periods of low wind speeds.  Yes, wind and solar mixes can complement each other, and yes, grid interconnections can bring renewable-generated electricity from far away, but each of these scenarios has costs and limitations as well.  Reliable baseload sources can do the same job much more efficiently.

The article also takes on some of the other, less technical, issues.  In particular, it notes the irony that eliminating nuclear power in favor of wind and solar energy requires much more transformation of the landscape to produce the same amount of energy, which draws opposition from other environmental groups, as well as from people who don’t want wind turbines marring their scenic views.

The article raises other points as well.  For example, it notes that all energy technologies are evolving, so the projected benefits of advanced solar or wind systems should be compared to the those of advanced nuclear systems and advanced carbon capture and storage systems, not to present technologies.  This is a point that I have found is often glossed over--by proponents of all technologies.

There are probably other points that the article could have made.  It comments on the small footprint of nuclear power plants compared to wind and solar plants, but not on the greater amounts of materials needed for renewable plants producing the same amount of power, and the environmental impacts of mining and manufacturing those.  Or of the need for specialized materials such as rare earths.  It mentions an allegation that mining uranium is energy intensive (and therefore, generates carbon at the front-end), but it doesn't challenge that assumption or compare the front-end energy demands with those for renewable energy sources.    

The article emphasizes that replacing some non-emitting sources with other non-emitting sources gains nothing environmentally, while adding a lot to the cost.  It concludes that the best option is a mix of energy technologies, noting that the optimal mix may vary, depending on location. 

In summary, the article makes a good start at looking at our energy mix holistically.  In particular, it helps make the case of why something that is technically possible (maybe!) is not necessarily the best path to pursue, and suggests how we should be approaching decisions on our future energy supply.

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Energy Policy and Disruption:

Managing Change

Two items hit my mailbox yesterday, both of which relate in some way to the issue of the disruption that can be caused by technological transitions.  Therefore, although I addressed issues related to the evolution of energy technologies only a few weeks ago, I decided there were more dimensions to the problem that merited further examination.

The first of the two articles actually doesn't relate specifically to energy supply and demand.  However, it points out that the concerns about disruptive technologies are not limited to the energy arena, and are not limited to the historic changes I gave as examples in my last blog.  The more modern example that I can cite is the possibility of robots replacing human labor in more and more ways.

This is not a blog about robots, so I won't dwell on this, but we all know that we have been interacting with increasing frequency with machines instead of humans (think ATMs instead of bank tellers), and we can all see still more such interactions in our future (think driverless cars).

In the article, Vint Cerf, who is considered one of the fathers of the Internet (and who I've had the pleasure of meeting) is quoted as saying, "Historically, technology has created more jobs than it destroys and there is no reason to think otherwise in this case.  Someone has to make and service all these advanced devices."  This is probably true, although it may be difficult for people whose jobs are affected to take the long view.

The second article is from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and includes a graph showing that mining and related activities constitute a large part of the economies of several states.

This graph reveals a dimension I had not thought about too much before, and that is how profoundly some of the anticipated changes in our energy supply might affect some states.

Up until now, my thinking has been much like Vint Cerf's thinking--I assume that new jobs will replace the old ones, and I have regarded that as the main consideration.  I have always realized that argument is not as simple as it sounds.  At a minimum, people will need to be retrained for the new jobs.  There are also issues of whether the pay will be the same, whether the working conditions will be as attractive, etc.  In addition, people may need to move for the new jobs, and although we are a mobile society, moving is disruptive, especially if you feel you are being forced to move against your will.

But, what I hadn't thought about was to what extent there might be a large net migration of jobs out of some states.

At first glance, today's situation does not seem that different from technological and other transitions made throughout the course of history.  The types and distribution of jobs have not remained static in the past.  If they had, we would have remained mired in the Stone Age. 

And as job opportunities and other things have changed, people have moved.  That is also nothing new.  The United States was shaped by people who moved for better opportunity (or for other reasons, but this is not a sociological blog), whether it was out of other countries and to the US, or from the East Coast to the Midwest and West.

These moves have had profound consequences.  Cities prospered or declined due to the fortunes or misfortunes of the industries they harbored and the movement of people to or from their jurisdictions.

In the past, I don't think people could predict these transitions well, and both individuals and municipalities struggled as a result.  What is different today is that we understand better what the potential impacts of various actions and decisions may be.  And we have the time to act.  We will need to replace existing coal and other fossil fuel plants with cleaner technologies, which costs money and takes time.  This should allow time for individuals and states to adapt.

States and companies can continue to challenge new requirements--that, after all, is the American way--but they should also be looking to help promote other uses of coal products and cleaner coal technologies, to attract the development of replacement energy technologies, and to attract other industries.  When they lobby the Federal government, they should not simply fight all change, but they should lobby for ways to make the changes work for them.

I realize that this is easier said than done, and not everything states may try will succeed.  It may, therefore, seem easier just to try to keep things as they are, but that is a temporary solution anyway.  The argument for preserving jobs is a powerful one, but it is up against a more powerful argument of effects on public health and the environment.  Change is inevitable, whether it comes sooner or later, and the states and companies that anticipate that and start to position themselves will stand the best chance of surviving the transition--and perhaps even of improving their lot. 

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EIA International Energy Outlook 2011:

The Nuclear Perspective

On September 19, 2011, the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA) rolled out its latest International Energy Outlook, IEO 2011 at a briefing presented by the deputy director and acting director of EIA, Dr. Harold Gruenspecht, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. The report makes projections about the global supply and demand of different energy resources between now and 2035. I attended the event, so heard the overview of the report as well as the Q&A session that followed. I will not try to summarize the whole report, as much of it deals with oil and gas, and in any event, is available on the EIA website, as is a video of the presentation. However, I thought I could augment the report by making a couple of general observations about the IEOs in general, and also by highlighting a couple of comments Dr. Gruenspecht made that are not in the report itself.

I first want to recognize that the nuclear community has a long-standing ambivalence with past versions of this report. Over the years, many have complained that it is too pessimistic about the prospects for nuclear power. Indeed, when I worked at DOE, the projections of the Office of Nuclear Energy, where I worked, and the projections of EIA, which is an independent arm of the DOE, often differed significantly.

One fundamental reason for these differences is that the EIA makes its predictions based on existing policies and programs. In that sense, while their projection is not literally a straight-line projection, it has some of the characteristics of a straight-line projection. The projection does recognize population impacts and price impacts, but it doesn't assume that policies will change or that long-range plans will necessarily materialize, so it ends up off the mark when some of these plans actually come to pass. On the other hand, the Office of Nuclear Energy, the industry, and others often include anticipated policy changes and long-range plans in their projections, so their projections end up overestimating nuclear power growth when some of these plans and policies do not materialize.

Leaving aside the philosophical discussion about what anticipated changes one should or should not include when making projections, I found this year's report, and the discussion at the briefing, particularly interesting from a nuclear perspective.

In particular, the report has been a year in the making, and some of the information in it is already dated. The report shows the penetration of nuclear power increasing from 5% to 7% of total energy demand globally by 2035. However, Dr. Gruenspecht pointed out that the nuclear portion of the report was developed prior to the Fukushima event, and was not adjusted to reflect the decisions several countries have made following that event.

Dr. Gruenspecht did not attempt to quantify what he thought this effect might be, but he mentioned several countries whose changed nuclear stance would likely affect the projection. The countries he named were Germany, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, and China.

Now, I'm not disagreeing that the projected percentage is down--IAEA is making similar predictions (in terms of percent of global electricity demand). However, I found his list of countries a little puzzling. These countries have all announced very different decisions, and I would think their impacts on the 2035 IEO projection would range from significant to almost no change.

In the case of Germany, the change does indeed seem pretty clear. Japan is also certainly on a downward trend for the near future. In the case of Italy, Italy was only at the very beginning of their nuclear "revival" when Fukushima occurred, and since EIA doesn't factor in "plans" lightly, I have to wonder if Italy was even considered in arriving at the 2035 estimate, and therefore, if the Italian decision will affect the projection at all. Switzerland has already modified its initial statements, and I'm not sure that what it is saying now will lead to a significant change in the IEO projection. China has reportedly scaled back its new reactor plans somewhat, but many (myself included) always doubted whether their stated plans could be realized, so I seriously doubt whether the IEO projection for 2035 was based on the original Chinese plans anyway.

It will be useful to see a realistic projection, by country, taking into account 1) how optimistic or pessimistic the previous estimates were in the first place, and 2) seeing how the recent announcements by different countries have been factored in.

In that regard, however, the future of the IEO is unclear. Dr. Gruenspecht alluded to budget constraints possibly limiting EIA's ability to produce this report in the future. While some in the nuclear community will not mourn its loss, it has proved to be a useful report for many purposes. It does pull together a lot of useful information on resource estimates, price trends, population changes, and other factors.

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International Energy Outlook 2010:

What's the Word for Nuclear?

Last Tuesday, the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA) released its 2010 International Energy Outlook (IEO). I was fortunate to be in an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC that morning, where Deputy Adminstrator Howard Gruenspecht of the EIA gave a briefing on the IEO.

Some of the key findings have already been reported by the press. Most notably, worldwide, the EIA is forecasting an increase in energy consumption of 49% between 2007 and 2035. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming fraction of the increases (84%) will be in the non-OECD countries. Also of interest is the confirmation that the recession has dampened energy demand in the near term. As the world (hopefully) moves out of this recession period, the EIA is seeing that the pace of recovery in China and India exceeds that of Japan and European Union member countries.

Much of the study discusses the conventional fossil fuel resources (coal, oil and gas) as well as unconventional fossil fuels (coal to liquid, gas to liquid, oil sands and oil shale). However, news that has not been as widely reported is the IEO findings on nuclear. Most noteworthy is that the projection for nuclear electricity generation in 2030 is 9% higher than the projection published in last year's IEO.

As many long-term watchers of the EIA will recall, it has long had a reputation of being skeptical, at best, when it came to assessing the prospects of nuclear power. I can well recall, during my tenure in DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, meeting with the top management of EIA (at that time) to tell them why we thought their assessment of nuclear power was unduly negative. Although they listened politely, I'm not sure we ever changed their thinking. It is therefore very encouraging to me to see a 9% increase in their projections in just one year.

I should point out what most readers of this post will know, or will guess--that most of this increase is in Asia.

It is important to keep in mind that EIA makes its projections based on existing laws and regulations, not on projected ones. Thus, even President Obama's recent call for higher fuel efficiencies of heavy vehicles would not be incorporated into this study. (In addition, that particular announcement also probably came as the study was being completed.)

For those who are interested in reading and understanding the details of the study, the whole report is available for downloading from the EIA website.

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