Sunday, April 2, 2017

Westinghouse Bankruptcy:

What Happened?

In the wake of the announcement this past week that Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy as a result of the losses incurred in the construction of four AP1000 units in Georgia and South Carolina, everyone is trying to figure out what happened.

Westinghouse, after all, certainly has long and extensive experience in the nuclear power design and construction business.  They have been in the nuclear business since the 1950s, and were responsible for the Shippingport reactor, one of the first commercial power reactors in the world.  The Westinghouse website states that, "Our technology is the basis for nearly 50 percent of the world's operating commercial nuclear power plants." 

And, after all, NRC had put in place a rule, Part 52, that was designed to make the licensing process more efficient and predictable than the old process (Part 50) had been.

So, what could have gone wrong?

In just the few days since the announcement, I have read several analyses that come to very different conclusions about the cause of the bankruptcy.  I am still sorting out all the views, but in the meantime, I thought it might be helpful to start tracking the various opinions and thinking about them.  I thought some of what I have been finding might be useful to share.

Regulatory requirement 

One of the first analyses I read, by Rod Adams, focuses on regulatory requirements that were imposed on these four units at a late stage in their design.  In particular, he points to changes in 2009 in NRC's requirements regarding aircraft impacts.  He notes that the NRC exempted current plants, and plants for which a construction license had already been granted.  Although the Summer and Vogtle units did not yet have construction permits and the detailed design was not yet complete, the design as it existed at that point had been sufficient to serve as the basis for a cost estimate and a firm price.  The subsequent redesign effort led to delays and resulted in a significant impact on the facility structure.  

Business decision

Another early analysis, by Jim Conca, attributes Westinghouse's problems to bad business decisions.  Conca points out that Westinghouse chose the Shaw Group to manage the construction of the four units at the two sites.  Shaw had no direct experience building nuclear power plants, but it had bought Stone and Webster out of bankruptcy.  Stone and Webster was an old nuclear company and had been responsible for building a number of nuclear power plants between the 1950s and the 1970s.  This gave Shaw the credibility to win the contract.  However, Stone and Webster no longer had any real nuclear expertise or staff, and the project experience significant delays and cost overruns.  Conca details further transactions, including to Chicago Bridge and Iron, which was a large engineering firm, but also had no nuclear experience.

Erosion of Expertise

Still another view is espoused by Paul Dickman, who previously worked at the NRC.  He points to the loss of the skilled workforce.  Of interest, he attributes lack of experience as a factor on all sides, not only on the construction side.

Scale of Project

One argument I haven't seen offered yet for the particular case of the Westinghouse bankruptcy, but that I have seen mentioned before for large-scale projects like nuclear power plants is the fact that many, if not most, large-scale projects seem prone to significant cost overruns.  Much has been made about this in the case of recent projects to build facilities for the Olympics, but many of the articles on the cost overruns for the Olympic facilities also mention other "megaprojects," such as bridges, highways, railways, and power stations.

All of the above?

My own guess is that several of these factors, perhaps even all of them, may be contributing elements.  For any one element, perhaps one could argue that Westinghouse should have anticipated some problems and built in some margin in its estimates or incorporated some flexibility in their contracts, but perhaps the combination of all these factors was a "perfect storm." 

The only thing we can be sure of at the moment is that there is likely to be a lot more evaluation of all the circumstances leading up to this bankruptcy, and a lot more guessing about what Westinghouse should have done.  Or, perhaps of more relevance, about what vendors should do in the future.   


Friday, March 17, 2017

Energy and Jobs:

A Delicate Balance

I have long been troubled by the question of how society should deal with the human impact of technology advances.  I have been especially concerned when I see advertisements for an industry arguing that a factory or a power plant or a coal mine needs to be kept open because of the jobs these industries generate.  Therefore, I was very pleased to see an article by Professor Maria Zuber of MIT reflecting on just this situation for the coal mining industry, and offering some practical suggestions for dealing with the impacts of change in a constructive way. 

In the past, when I've heard advertisements by industry groups promoting themselves on the basis of the jobs they create, one part of me has always reflected on the fact that a lot of occupations that once employed thousands of people now exist as niche markets, if they exist at all.  Somehow, in the past, the job market has always evolved and people have adapted.  So why is today different?

But another part of me recognizes that the situation is much more complex than just telling people to get another job.  In past generations, there were more people who were self-employed or who worked at small businesses, and they were spread out geographically.  The need for farriers or buggy-whip manufacturers or other such occupations diminished over a period of time, so probably, to a large extent, there was a natural progression.  People in these professions continued to work in the professions, but new people didn't take those jobs.  Since they were geographically spread, people needing these services could continue to get them, but perhaps had to travel a little farther.

I'm not saying that all this happened without any disruption or difficulty, but that kind of transition is not the same as a company employing hundreds or thousands of people in one area suddenly shutting down.  We have had some experience with large companies, or industries that dominated a region, closing their doors, and it has not been good.  Cities and towns have been devastated by the large-scale unemployment that has resulted from changes of fortune of the industries they  hosted.  When hundreds or thousands of people in a region are suddenly left without jobs, there is no place for them to turn.  It is easy to say they should move to a different region or to a different industry.  It is harder to accomplish. 

Yet, every time I have heard an industry argue that it is important because of the jobs it has creased, I have wondered how we can ever move ahead if we need to keep the doors open because of the jobs.  How can we reduce the pollution from dirty industries?  How can we reduce the health and safety risks from inherently dangerous occupations?  How can we replace outmoded technologies with new ones if we have to keep supporting the old ones?

Professor Zuber addresses this issue for the coal industry.  What is particularly impressive to me is that she has a very personal perspective on the coal industry, as she grew up in coal country and her grandfathers were coal miners (and were afflicted with black lung disease).  Therefore, she does not see this as an us-versus-them or an either-or situation.  She argues that we need to reduce the emissions that burning coal produces, but at the same time, she has empathy for the people whose jobs are at risk.  The solution she describes is multi-pronged:  develop and deploy carbon capture technology, develop other uses for coal, and most of all, develop and support a plan to assist workers in transitioning from the coal industry to other industries.

All this is easy to say, but harder to implement, especially if it has to be scaled up to other industries and other parts of the country.  Nevertheless, as we move forward, I think we have to avoid the knee-jerk reaction of saying that the jobs justify the existence of a factory or a mine or a power plant.  We must instead look at the bigger picture and look at all the options.  Professor Zuber's suggestions for the coal industry provide a good model for how we might start to approach such decisions. 


Thursday, March 9, 2017

The Dilemma of Regulation:

Is it Good or Evil?

After I reported on the death of Harold Denton last week, I couldn't shake the feeling that his career and his role in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident had some larger implications that I should have addressed--namely, the importance of a good regulator.

When I lecture to students on regulation, I always start by saying that, in a perfect world, there would be no need for regulation.  Everyone would be capable and ethical and honest--no one would cut corners to save time or money, no one would cheat anyone else, no one would be careless or irresponsible or would handle equipment they weren't trained to handle.  We wouldn't need stoplights that end up making us stop even when we can see that no traffic is coming the other way.  We wouldn't need to have policemen giving us speeding tickets when, most of the time, you can drive a little over the speed limit perfectly safely.

I also like to give two examples of the value that regulation--and regulators--sometimes have.  In particular, I point out that before the present era of occupational, environmental, and other regulation, the death rate from accidents was astounding by today's standards.  Quoting from David Von Drehle in Time magazine, May 2, 2013, who was talking about what happened after the infamous Triangle Factory fire in New York City in 1911:

A little more than a century ago, in the rapidly developing United States of America, nearly 1,000 workers died on the job every week, on average. Collapsed mines buried them alive. Bursting steam engines scalded them to death. Pots of molten steel poured over their heads. Whirling saw blades worked loose in lumber mills and turned to shrapnel. Railroad engines crashed. Merchant ships and fishing boats sank in trackless seas.

In the years since then, the number of workplace fatalities has been cut by more than 90%, even as the population of the country has more than tripled. The risk of death on the job today is but a tiny fraction — less than 1/30th — what it was on the warm spring day in 1911 when 146 garment workers died in New York's notorious Triangle fire.

The fact is that most regulation today was introduced in an effort to prevent a repetition of disasters that were killing and maiming people in the early days of industrialization.  Even today, as Von Drehle points out, in countries with lower regulatory standards and higher levels of corruption, we still see factories collapsing and killing hundreds of workers.

My other favorite example is the Thalidomide scare of the 1950s.  Thalidomide was legal in Europe while the FDA appeared to dither and delay approval for use in the U.S.  In the meantime, women using the drug in Europe started to give birth to deformed babies.  In the end, it was a single person on the FDA staff who kept asking for more information that saved the American public from the same fate.  Until the risks of Thalidomide were revealed, this woman had been widely criticized for causing regulatory delay.  

Does every regulatory delay save lives?  Of course not.  Is every search for more information merited?  No.  Can regulators make an effort to speed up their reviews?  Certainly.  But it is a difficult challenge to determine how to speed up reviews without risking missing some important potential problem.  It is not a problem that can be solved by imposing an arbitrary restrictions on regulations.

I do not want to be an apologist for regulation.  Regulations do have some inherent shortcomings:  they are sometimes made in reaction to a problem, so they are implemented in a hurry and may not fully consider all possible situations and implications; regulators tend to use some conservatisms to try to counter anything they may not have thought of; they tend not to be updated as fast as new technology develops or as our knowledge evolves, so can be out of date.

Regulations, to serve their purpose, need to be continually reviewed and modified to reflect new technology, new science, new social developments, and new concerns.  Some regulations may even become obsolete and should be eliminated.  But evaluating regulations is complex.  Regulations exist in a complex world--they have costs, but they also have benefits.  Decisions to eliminate or modify existing regulations or to develop new regulations need to be based on objective reviews of the entire picture: the needs, the options, the costs, and the benefits.

There is a lot that can and should be done to improve regulation.  Regulators should seek to find the least burdensome ways of implementing regulations.  The NRC has attempted to encourage this through its Principles of Good Regulation.  The paperwork and reporting requirements of regulations are often considerable and should be streamlined where possible.

All of this, however, should not be done with a view that regulation is evil and the less we have the better.  This should be done with a view toward addressing the kinds of needs that led to the regulations in the first place, whether they were health and safety regulations, economic regulations, or any other kind of regulation.  They should be done with a perspective on what has been good about regulation as well as what has been flawed--of the factory accidents that were prevented because of the lessons learned from the Triangle Factory fire, the medical problems that were prevented because of the kinds of regulators that evaluated Thalidomide and other drugs, and all the other benefits, often unrecognized, of things that didn't go wrong because of regulation.


Sunday, February 26, 2017

A Tribute to Harold Denton:

A Man for the Moment

 Harold Denton, left, is shown in the control room at Three Mile Island 
with President Jimmy Carter and a power plant technician on April 1, 1979. (AP)

Sadly, this is one of two posts this week of the deaths of two icons of the technical community, and of my professional career--Harold Denton, who was the face of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the time of Three Mile Island (TMI), and Mildred Dresselhaus, an MIT professor who did pioneering work in the field of nanotubes, and so much more.  Both have achieved a kind of "rock star" status during the course of their careers. 

I only learned of the death of Harold Denton about a week after his February 13, 2017 death, when I saw an obituary for him in the Washington Post.  Although Harold Denton had a long and distinguished career at NRC and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the article focuses almost exclusively on Harold Denton's role in the aftermath of the TMI accident.  This is fitting, as the accident was a pivotal moment for NRC and the nuclear industry.  As the obituary makes clear, Harold Denton exuded an air of calmness and competence that was critical in reassuring the public--and in beginning what would be a long process of analyzing and responding to the accident.

I did not join the NRC until a few years later, and I never worked directly for Harold, but while I was at NRC, I had many opportunities to see him in action in meetings and to speak to him.  By this time, the "rock star" status was past history--the Post reports that Harold was profiled in People magazine, he was awarded honorary degrees by several Pennsylvania colleges, and his likeness even appeared on T-shirts--but he still was held in high esteem at NRC.  Even when the issues were contentious, he never seemed to lose his cool.  The same calm manner that reassured the public gave him an air of authority among his peers.  

It is interesting to reflect on the importance of the competence he brought to a frightening situation.  While many people criticize regulatory overreach, regulators often play a key role in averting crisis in the first place, and when the unimaginable happens, of working to assure the safety of the public.  The Post comments that, "He was that oft-maligned figure, a $50,000-a-year federal regulator, who managed to be the voice of competence and reason at a time of peril."

Not every regulator is a Harold Denton, of course, and most of the time--fortunately--we are not dealing with events as extraordinary as TMI.  Had TMI never happened, Harold would have had a very successful career at NRC and would, undoubtedly, have made significant contributions to nuclear power regulation, but except among his colleagues, these contributions would have been largely unnoticed.  

It shouldn't take a TMI to bring to the public attention the kinds of skills and talents that reside in the bowls of our government agencies and the importance and value of those skills and talents for the American public.  Harold Denton would have been a remarkable public servant even if he had never been in the public eye.  The world has truly lost someone who probably never expected to be in the limelight, but who, when the need arose, stepped up to the plate and did a remarkable job.



A Tribute to Mildred Dresselhaus:

Note to readers:  The URL title of this post was intended to be "A Tribute to Mildred Dresselhaus."  In attempting to add the YouTube video of the Super Bowl ad, my control over the title has somehow been overridden.  Although the right title appears in the post, the URL is not the same.  I am not sure whether to blame YouTube or the blog host, but given that this is a tribute in memory of her, I feel the original title of the video is inappropriate, and just wanted readers to be aware that this was not my choice.

A Pioneer on Many Fronts

Sadly, this is one of two posts this week on the deaths of two icons of the technical community, and of my professional career--Harold Denton, who was the face of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the time of Three Mile Island (TMI), and Mildred Dresselhaus, an MIT professor who did pioneering work in the field of nanotubes, and so much more.  Both have achieved a kind of "rock star" status during the course of their careers. 

When I heard the news about Mildred Dresselhaus' death early this week, I was doubly sad.  First, I had known her for a long time, and I knew about her work and her accomplishments.  But second, she had been slated to speak to the Washington, DC area alumni/ae on March 9, and I had been looking forward to attending and to seeing her again. 

My earliest encounter with Mildred Dresselhaus, or "Millie," as we all knew her, was in the early days of my freshman year at MIT.  This was at a time when there were very few women in science or engineering, so it probably makes her the first female scientist I met.  She had a great interest in helping and mentoring the small number of women at MIT, and had come to our dorm to talk to us about careers--and about combining careers and a personal life.  This is a subject that still gets attention today.  

Even then, her energy and devotion to both her work and her family were clear.  The fact that, as a young professor, she took the time from her work to help mentor us was telling.  This was a time when mentoring was not as common, and did not help a junior professor in advancing through the ranks.  In fact, as she said repeatedly throughout her career, she took only a day or two off for the birth of each of her children, which was undoubtedly a reaction to the fact that, in those days, her career would have been doomed had she taken much more time off.  In fact, although I haven't seen it reported in the obituaries, I recall her telling us that, when her babysitter was unavailable, she took her babies to work with her at the MIT Magnet Lab.

After I left MIT, I didn't see much of Millie for many years, although I periodically heard about some of her many achievements.  (Since these are detailed in the obituary, I won't repeat them here.)  But to my delight, our paths crossed again while I was at the Department of Energy (DOE), as my tenure there overlapped with her appointment as head of the DOE Office of Science.  We were in different offices, so our paths didn't cross every day, but our offices had some common interests, and I was able to meet with her a number of times and to get to work with her as a professional.  

Following that, our paths crossed less often, although I met her several times at conferences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).  Therefore, I had been very excited when I saw that, even in her mid-80s, she was scheduled to come to Washington, DC, and I was looking forward to hearing her speak and to seeing her once more.

It is particularly bittersweet that her death comes just as she assumed real "rock star" status, with the General Electric ad at the last Super Bowl designed to encourage women to study science and engineering, and having been dubbed the "Queen of Carbon" for her nanotube work.  My only consolation is that she will live on in all she has done in her career, both in her technical work and in her support and assistance to so many women in their careers.   


Wednesday, February 15, 2017

Term Limits at DNFSB:

Good or Bad?

My last blog on my experiences in the Presidential appointment process as a candidate for a position on the board of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) elicited several comments about the undesirability of Board members staying on after their terms have expired if they are not immediately replaced.

Since this is an issue I have had occasion to think about in the past, I thought I'd follow up the comment with a little history of practices in several different agencies.

First, a primer on boards and commissions versus single administrator agencies.  Basically, boards and commissions operate very differently from single administrator agencies.  In the latter, once an administrator is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, they serve "at the will of the President."  That is, they are able to stay in their position until either the end of the President's term of office or until the President replaces them.  The President can replace any such individual at any time and for any reason.  If there is a gap between when one administrator leaves and another is nominated and confirmed, that position is filled on an acting basis by the most senior civil service employee of the agency. 

On the other hand, boards and commissions have several members who are co-equal in status (in terms of their votes on agency decisions), although one is designated by the President as the chairman.  Boards and commissions generally have an odd number of members (usually 5 or 7) in order to minimize tie votes, and since they are required to represent a spectrum of views, no more than 3 (in the case of a 5-member commission or board) or 4 (in the case of a 7-member one) can be from the party in power.  The other members are from the opposite party, or may be Independents.

The members of boards and commissions are appointed for staggered terms.   The terms are fixed in that, if a new board member or commissioner is appointed in the middle of a term, the official end of the term, they do not get a full 5-year (or 7-year for larger boards) term.  These terms are independent of the presidential cycle, so some appointed members may continue to serve into the next Administration.  They cannot be removed, except for "cause" (doing something illegal), so their term cannot be terminated for political reasons.  

However, for most boards and commissions, a commissioner or board member whose term has expired is permitted to stay in the position until a replacement is appointed.  That is the situation for the DNFSB.  There have been cases, where either the President has not nominated a replacement or the Senate has not confirmed the replacement, where an individual has been able to stay in their position for several years, even though their term had expired.

On the surface, it might appear that this has one advantage--a board or commission could continue to have a full, or nearly full, complement of members even if the President or the Senate failed to act.  However, as the comments I've received suggest, this has undesirable aspects as well.  It appears to remove the pressure for the President and the Senate to act, and depending on the politics, it could encourage a Senate that is hostile to the President to stall a confirmation to maintain the status quo.

Another feature of commissions and boards is that, if a vacancy develops, there is no provision for someone to serve as an acting member.  Therefore, there can be cases where the board is evenly split between parties and tie votes can occur; alternatively, there can be cases where the board split is 3 to 1 (for a 5-member board missing one member).  If a chairman leaves, one of the other board or commission members does fill in as the acting chair, but there are no acting board members or commissioners.  

It turns out that there are some variants to the rules for commissions and boards.  One notable example is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  I recall a discussion many years ago with the late Manning Muntzing, who headed a prestigious law firm in Washington prior to his death.  Earlier in his career, Mr. Muntzing had worked as an attorney for the local telephone company.  In that capacity, he dealt with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and observed the effects of this practice.

Later, he worked as a lawyer at the Atomic Energy Commission and was there at the time that the AEC was split up and the NRC was created.  In this capacity, he helped draft the legislation establishing the NRC.  He claimed responsibility for inserting the language into the authorizing legislation for the NRC that require an NRC commissioner to leave his or her position the day his or her term expires.  I recall that he was very proud of this provision.  He felt it would hold the President's and the Senate's feet to the fire and assure that they made timely appointments to the NRC.

How did that work?  Well, over the history of the NRC, it has frequently operated with four, or even three, members instead of the full complement of five, either because the President did not nominate someone to fill a seat that was expired or about to expire, or because the Senate did not act to confirm a nomination.  On one occasion, the NRC was down to two members, leading to concerns about the legal standing of any significant actions taken when there was less than a quorum of members.  Fortunately, that period was brief and the Commission managed to avoid any critical decisions.

Conceptually, this could happen again, since the NRC only has three members at present, and Chairman Svinicki's term ends this June 30.  Presumably, since the President just named her as Chair of the Commission, I would expect that he will reappoint her, and since the Senate has a Republican majority, I would expect her to have an easy reconfirmation.  Therefore, in this case, it is NOT likely that the Commission would go down to two members.  However, in other circumstances, a three-member Commission with 4-1/2 months to go on the term of one of them could be a cause for concern.

During the last few months, I became aware of yet another nuance in the rules, at least at one agency.  At the FCC, I recently learned, commissioners can stay on after their terms have expired, but only until the end of the session of Congress during which their term expires.  What the reasons are for this particular variant of the rules, I don't know, nor have I been able to find any other agencies that have a similar requirement, or that have any other variants.  What this does show is that, while most agencies operate under the same rules as the DNFSB, there are other models.

It is not clear that any one of these models is better than the others.  As the examples above illustrate, there is a downside in each case.  While a board that operates with 3 of its 5 members holding expired terms--as I believe has been the case at DNFSB since October 30--leaves something to be desired, the alternative model under which the NRC operates introduces other potential problems.

In any event, the only way of changing the rules for board members or commissioners of such agencies would be to modify the authorizing legislation of the agency.  That is probably a measure most agencies would not want to take for an action that might only substitute one set of problems for another. 


Saturday, February 11, 2017

Presidential Appointments:

So You Want to be a Presidential Appointee?

About a year and a half ago, I was contacted by the White House asking if I would be willing to be nominated for a Presidential appointment.  In the scheme of things, the position was a very low-profile one, but with the current spotlight on the nominees for major positions in the new Administration, I thought it might be instructive to some to outline what can happen, even if the case of much lower-level positions.

Here is an abbreviated timeline:

August 11, 2015:  I receive an e-mail from someone in the White House personnel office asking me if I would have an interest in serving on the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB).  

For those who do not know it, DNFSB is a small "independent organization within the executive branch of the United States Government, chartered with the responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities."

I had not been seeking a full-time position of any sort, but as soon as I am asked, I realize that this is a real honor and I decide to pursue it.  I speak to her by phone that day and meet with her two weeks later.

October 13, 2015:  I learn that they sent my name to President Obama and he authorized them to start the "vetting" process. 

The vetting process involves the collection and review of an extensive dossier on the individual--financial information, memberships, foreign travel, etc.  I have to fill out several lengthy forms, get some information from my accountant, and have two-hour telephone interview with someone from the White House to go over all the details in the forms.  I wish I'd kept a record of how many hours I spent on the forms.  It was substantial.  I had to report every stock I owned, every foreign consulting assignment my husband or I had, and every foreign trip I'd taken, whether for business or pleasure, for the past 10 years.  I had worked for DOE and OECD in that period.  I'd lived in two countries in the last 10 years and had traveled a lot.

I begin working with several people, one in the White House, and one at DNFSB.  In the course of this review, they ask for all my financial information.  This includes the investments in a family trust for which I am a trustee.  They identify 4 very small amounts of stock that are not in energy-related companies but with which, for some reason, the Department of Energy has some sort of contractual connection.  As a condition of my taking a position as a Board member of DNFSB, I have to sign a form saying I will either resign as a trustee or sell the stocks in question.  This requires my getting the consent of family members involved.

I also have to agree to resign as from any board or committee positions, including committees of the American Nuclear Society and of my local alumni association, both non-profit organizations.

The vetting process also requires interviews by the FBI and others.  They interview me, they interview several of my neighbors, and they send people from the US Embassy in Paris to interview several of my former colleagues and friends in France from the period that I worked for the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.   I always wondered how much that all cost.

During the course of this process, I am contacted by a headhunter about a possible position on a corporate board of directors.  If I were to be selected for this position, it would be more money for less work than the DNFSB position.  Still, I decide the DNFSB position would be for the greater good, and I decline to pursue the position.

The process spins out over several months, and there are changes in my contacts, both in the White House and in DNFSB.

April 26, 2016:  The White House issues a press release nominating me to the position.  

I then discover there is more paperwork to be filled out, and I work with DNFSB people on the additional forms.  These forms are to be sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), which has jurisdiction over the DNFSB.  One form turns out to be the same form I'd already completed for the White House.  However, it had been so long since I'd filled it out that I fill out half of it again before I realize it!  Another form turns out to be the wrong form from the Committee and needs to be redone.

During this period, I am contacted by someone who wants me to write an article (for no pay) for a publication of the OECD, my former employer, and an international organization of which the U.S. is a member.  I am advised not to accept this assignment out of concern that it could cause problems for the confirmation process.  No details are given.

June 29, 2016:  The last of the paperwork is sent to the SASC.

July 12, 2016:  The SASC reports my nomination out of Committee along with 141 military promotions and 2 other civilian nominations.

This is an exciting moment--they moved quickly, and I am only one step away from completing the process!  I need only a vote by the full Senate to confirm me.  But summer recess looms.

July 14, 2016:  Congress recesses for the summer without acting on my nomination and one other.  (They do act on the 141 military promotions and one of the civilian nominations.)

I am told that they may act on it when they reconvene in September 6. 

December 10, 2016:  The Senate adjourns without acting on my nomination, effectively killing it.

My White House contact tells me that there is some chance that this could still be acted on before the end of the Administration.  Technically, the White House has to renominate me (along with others who are in the same position). 

January 17, 2017:  I get a message from the White House telling me that I was not renominated.

The message tells me that this is the sender's last day.  In fact, when I reply to him an hour after receiving the message, I get an automatic reply that he is already gone!
Reflections:  Why tell this story?  My experience was certainly not unique.  Hundreds of appointments have dragged on for a long time, some for longer than mine.  While I was under consideration, an Obama nominee for an Ambassadorship died while she was awaiting confirmation.  I am not writing to lay blame on any institution or political party.  Each step of the process (except the SASC action) took longer than I expected it to.   

Many appointments are delayed for political reasons or because of controversies about the individuals. Since this was not the case for me, I had hopes that my appointment might move faster.  But there may have been factors that were never shared with me.  The position I was to fill was being held by a Board member whose term had expired.  Officially, this was not a factor.  As soon as someone new is appointed, the person in the position leaves.  This is technically the rule, but did it delay progress?   That is possible, but with other appointments also delayed, it is impossible to tell for sure what the reason was in my case.

There are, of course, cases where appointments move very quickly.  One former NRC Commissioner told me his appointment--which was years ago--had no delays at all.  A number of the nominations made by the new Administration in recent weeks have also moved quickly, even in some cases where they are controversial.  I have even wondered how all the paperwork and other vetting that I went through could possibly be taking place for some of these nominations.

I should also emphasize that, in some ways, I am luckier than other nominees who get caught in this process.

I had spent most of my career in the Federal government in positions requiring a security clearance, so I'd been through similar reviews before.  I was already keeping the kinds of records that might be difficult for others to assemble, like my past foreign travel.  This review was more detailed than past security clearances, but I had most of the basic information.  

I live in the Washington area.  I did not have to start preparing to relocate quickly in anticipation of suddenly being confirmed.

While I did turn down some consulting assignments, they were fairly minor.  I am aware of other nominees who find that they are unable to conduct their business at all while they are under consideration.

I felt it was useful to share this story because I think most people do not fully understand the Presidential appointment process.  Since I work in Washington and have worked with a number of Presidential appointees, I thought I knew more than most about the process, but I still encountered a number of surprises along the way--the number of people I dealt with, the amount of paperwork, the number of colleagues and acquaintances who were interviewed, the surprise findings about some minor amounts of stock, the restrictions on my personal activities, both during the process and if confirmed, the long-term ramifications for an individual when opportunities arise during this period, and the details of what happens to pending nominations during the final month of an Administration.

This is not intended to discourage people from accepting invitations to be nominated in the future.  Some nominations, as I have said, do move more quickly.  It is an honor to be nominated by the President for any position, and I, for one, felt it was my duty accept, and, if confirmed, to serve.  I would probably agree to be nominated again, if asked, and I would encourage others to accept such offers as well.  However, anyone starting this process should be fully aware that it can be a long and tortuous road, even for positions that are not in the limelight and for individuals who believe that no controversy surrounds their nomination, and it can have impacts on one's investments and activities.


Tuesday, January 17, 2017

Worker Productivity:

A Look at the Numbers

While this is not strictly a nuclear issue, the issue of worker productivity affects all enterprises, so I will take some liberty with the theme of this blog and report on a recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study of worker productivity in a number of countries, as reported by Time magazine.

With the recent attention focused on the French law restricting e-mails to employees after work hours, there has been increased focus on issues of overwork and burnout.  The OECD report looks at the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per hour worked, and concludes that working more hours does not result in more productivity (as measured by the GDP).  The measure of hours worked is the average for all employed citizens, including full- and part-time work.

In particular, the U.S. came in 5th out of 35 countries in productivity, behind Luxembourg, Ireland, Norway, and Belgium.  France, which is famous for its short work week, came in 7th, while Japan, which is famous for its extremely long hours, came in 20th.  What was particularly striking to me was that, with the exception of the U.S. and Ireland, most of the countries in the top 10 group in productivity had an average work week of about 30 hours or less.  Germany, had the lowest average work week (26.3 hours), while the U.S. and Ireland weighed in well above, at 33.6 and 33.5 hours, respectively.  (Remember that all the numbers include part-time workers; hence we don't see the famous 40-hour work week.)  By contrast, the 25 countries following the "top 10" had average work weeks ranging from 30.9 hours (Austria) to 41.2 hours (Mexico).  

Of course, this is one statistic, and I am sure that other statistics might present a different picture.  In particular, I personally wonder how the productivity numbers stack up when one compares particular sectors of the economy.  And one can wonder how much of the difference in hours worked is due to cultural behavior.  I know from my time in Japan that workers felt a kind of social obligation to stay at their desks long into the evening, whether or not they really had something urgent to do.

Still, it is an important indication, particularly in this era of 24/7 connectivity, that we need to rethink some of the assumptions many employees and employers have had about the importance of working longer hours than the nominal work week.

With that off my mind, I promise to get back to discussing nuclear- and other energy-related issues.


Sunday, January 8, 2017

Nuclear History:

A New Addition to the Library

I was pleased to get a message a couple of weeks ago from a friend and colleague in France, Dominique Greneche, reporting on the publication of his book on the history of nuclear reactors.  In the past decade, it seems to me that there have been a number of new books on various aspects of nuclear history (including my own on "Nuclear Firsts"). 

This most recent addition to the nuclear history library looks like one of the most comprehensive of the genre.  Unfortunately for some of us, it is presently available only in French, but it looks like it would be a wonderful addition to the collection of anyone who is a Francophone.  And, given the interest in the book, Dominique hopes to have the book translated into English in the future.

I will let the author describe the book in his own words:
I am delighted to announce you that my book on the history and technique of nuclear reactors and their fuels has just been published (with the French editor “EDP-Sciences”).

This 766-pages book is the result of a long and patient work that lasted about five years.

It is the fruit of a vast professional experience which allowed me to enrich the text of numerous personal testimonies. It is also the result of several decades of teaching in engineering schools and French universities as well as in some international institutions. Finally, it is the product of a careful examination of an abundant literature (more than 400 references are cited) including rare documents or materials taken from my extensive personal library constituted during my long career.

The first two chapters (almost 70 pages) are devoted to a retrospective of the great discoveries on atoms and nuclear energy for 2,500 years (Lucretius, Democritus) until the first chain reaction on 2/12/1942 in Chicago (CP-1). I devote a second part to the operation of nuclear reactors, with some reminders of nuclear physics and a concise description of the physics of the cores of nuclear reactors. In a third part (which constitutes the "heart of the book"), I develop all the genesis of nuclear reactors, explaining in detail their structure, especially regarding all possible choices for their main three components that are the fuel, the heat transfer fluids and the moderator. I also explain the history of nuclear power in the major countries (France, of course, but also USA, GB, and former USSR), with paragraphs dedicated to the development of various reactor lines in each country (chapter 14). I describe the major industrial nuclear reactor types: UNGG, MAGNOX, AGR, HTR, RBMK, heavy water (different subclasses), light water (with a direct comparison between PWRs and BWRs and finally the FNRs (chapter in which I examine in particular the "secrets" of FNR physics). I also describe "other reactors" such as naval propulsion reactors (especially submarines) or reactors for space applications (space rockets or spacecraft), again combining the technical and historical aspects. In this part I evoke of course the reactors of the future. Finally, the fourth part is devoted to fuel cycle technologies (including a historical chapter for uranium, for enrichment and for reprocessing) with a special chapter dedicated to thorium.

In short, this book is a broad technical-historical portrayal on nuclear energy and nuclear reactors. It explains in particular the choice of reactor lines and especially the reasons for the dominance of light water reactors today in the world. It has no equivalent in France (and abroad I think), by the extent of the subjects treated and the very close ties that are established between history and the discoveries or founding inventions as well as the development of the nuclear reactors themselves. So I consider that it will be a solid and unique reference in the field of nuclear energy.

It is very successful and is extremely appreciated by those who have started to read it. Besides, I have received praises from several high-level persons in nuclear sector in France.

The book is available from the publisher.

This comprehensive volume looks like an outstanding addition to the growing set of books on the history of nuclear power, and I certainly hope it is successful enough to merit a future edition in English.