Nuke Power Talk

Nuclear Internships for Students:

2012-01-24T14:47:00.000-08:00

A Word to the WISE

A reader contacted me recently and told me he was a nuclear engineering student seeking advice on summer internships. Instead of replying privately, I thought this subject might make a good column, and perhaps that others might weigh in and offer suggestions beyond what I can offer.

First of all, I'd like to take this opportunity to make a pitch for students to use at least one summer during their college years to try to learn something about public policy in the science and engineering area. Everything in nuclear energy is profoundly affected by decisions made in Washington, DC and in state capitals around the country, yet very few policy makers have any training in science or engineering, and very few scientists and engineers are willing to engage in the public policy debate.

Over the years, I've tried to do my small part to change this equation. One activity in which I was personally involved for a long time is called the Washington Internships for Students of Engineering--or WISE. In this program, outstanding engineering students are selected to spend 9 weeks in Washington, DC during the summer to learn how government officials make decisions on complex technological issues and how engineers can contribute to legislative and regulatory public policy decisions.

The WISE program has been ranked by the Princeton Review as one of the best student internship opportunities in the US (although I couldn't find it on their current website). The program is sponsored by a number of engineering societies, and I'm proud to say that ANS has consistently been a strong supporter, sponsoring two students each year. The students select a topic, meet with government and other officials to gather ideas on the legislative and regulatory issues associated with that topic, and prepare a paper on it. Some of them have had their papers published. In addition, they participate in a series of talks by various government officials on a wide range of science policy topics.

Unfortunately for the student who wrote to me, it appears from the WISE website that the deadline for applications for 2012 has recently passed. I do not know if there would be any latitude for the coming year. Anyone interested would have to inquire, but I suspect the WISE group will be reluctant to make an exception, as they are probably already reviewing the applications they have received. Therefore, the WISE program is probably more of an opportunity for students to consider for 2013. I should note that most students participating in the WISE program are rising seniors, but exceptions have occasionally been made to that rule.

Of course, there are many other summer internships in science policy available in Washington. Many government agencies and congressional offices accept students for short term programs in the summer. Arrangements would have to be made either through a student's congressional representatives (for a Capitol Hill experience) or with the specific agency of interest. A number of universities have their own programs designed to expose science and engineering students to the Washington public policy arena and even offer academic credit for the experience. Some state governments also have opportunities for students to serve in internships.

I have been focusing on internships in the science policy area, but for students who want to stick to more traditional engineering experiences, many companies in the nuclear industry offer students opportunities for summer positions. These opportunities are specific to each company, and would need to be explored individually with each company.

I would welcome comments on this blog from readers who can recommend other internship opportunities to the student who raised this question.

***

Radiation from Fossil Fuels:

2012-01-11T14:10:00.000-08:00

The Forgotten Problem

Given the widespread concern about the risk of radiation exposure from nuclear power plants--which those of us in the field know is very low--I have always been amused (if that is the right word) by the fact that routine emissions from coal plants expose the public to far greater doses of radiation than nuclear power plants do.

Therefore, as "fracking" has become a focus of attention, I've been even more amused (again, if this is the right word) by reports about "fracking" and radioactive emissions. It seems that fracking, a procedure designed to help extract more natural gas from formations containing natural gas, has now been identified with increased releases of radioactive emissions.

I guess I question whether amused is the right word because the whole situation isn't really funny. First, we need all the energy sources available to us. I do not believe that it will help the US and the world to try to tear down coal or natural gas for their radioactive emissions. Second, the news suggests that we have been putting our attention and our resources in the wrong place. (Surprise, surprise.)

We can probably address the problems of radioactive emissions from coal and natural gas, but not if we are misdirecting resources at lesser problems.

This news illustrates once again how very complicated the tradeoffs are between different energy resources, and identifies the need to begin to look at the energy sphere from the broadest possible perspective.

***

Nuclear Power and the Press:

2012-01-06T05:58:00.000-08:00

Getting it Right vs. Making a Splash

Last year (actually a couple of months ago), someone shared an article on a Columbia Journalism Review critique of an Associated Press article on possible cancer risks from Fukushima. The review points out that the article gets the facts right, but spins the message. For example, the title of the article is "Future cancers from Fukushima plant may be hidden." The first line of the article says, "Even if the worst nuclear accident in 25 years leads to many people developing cancer, we may never find out."

So, not only may people get cancer from Fukushima, we won't even know they are getting cancer from Fukushima. Scary, right? The CJR review continues by saying that is just the point. The article itself refutes the title, citing one expert saying, "The cancer risk may be absent...," another as saying that the 2 million residents of Fukushima Prefecture probably got too little radiation to have a noticeable effect on cancer rates, and yet a third who said that, from what he'd seen, nobody in Fukushima except for some plant workers has been exposed to harmful levels of radiation.

OK, I'm cherry picking here, too, as several quotes talk about risk levels too small to detect--and that is where the authors have picked up their headline. However, my very point is that the headline and the lead-in to the article don't promote the idea that the cancer risk may be very low or even non-existent. Rather, they just say it will be "hidden." That actually sounds more ominous than a specific, but small, number. By contrast, as I read the quotes, I would probably have titled the article "Few if any cancers expected from Fukushima accident." But that wouldn't sell newspapers. And that is probably why I went into engineering, and not journalism.

But the story reminded me of several other news items I'd come across in the same vein--that is, articles that slant the coverage in one way or another. The Nuclear Energy Institute did a great analysis of a series in the Associated Press a few months ago on safety at US nuclear power plants. (It should be noted that the CJR, at NEI's request, looked into that series. While it largely agreed with NEI's criticism of the reporting, it also critiqued NEI's response.)

Some more specific examples, especially of headlines, are also of interest. For example, Reuters came out with a story at around that same time on the post-Fukushima review of the nuclear reactors in France. The title of the Reuters article was "France needs to upgrade all nuclear reactors." The first paragraph of the article states that the head of the French nuclear safety agency [IRSN] said that France "needs to upgrade the protection of vital functions in all its nuclear reactors to avoid a disaster in the event of a natural calamity," but goes on to say--in that first paragraph--that there is no need to close any plants. Other media that picked up this story entitled it "Are all of France's nuclear power plants unsafe?" and in their first paragraphs, stated (without citing a source) that French nuclear power plants are "unsafe and need a massive overhaul."

For the final example I want to highlight today, it is Reuters that goes for the sensational title. In this case, it is a report on the release of a draft of the International Energy Agency's 2011 World Energy Outlook. The title reads "Exclusive: IEA draft: Nuclear to fall as power demand." I'd say that sounds like a prediction, right? Reading the article, we see that this was the low nuclear case, and there is a specific quote in the report that the low nuclear case is not a forecast but "is intended to illustrate what a pessimistic view of the prospects for the nuclear power industry might entail."

I also note that the IEA later slammed the press for jumping to publish its story based on a partial draft that IEA said had been revised and updated, and its own press release when the report was later published makes it clear that this was intended to illustrate the significant consequences of a major reduction in the use of nuclear energy. In fact, the primary scenario shows a significant growth in nuclear power, even with the consequences of the Fukushima accident factored in. The WEO-2011 report is available for purchase from IAE, but a very good summary has been posted on-line by the World Nuclear Association. Furthermore, in the wake of the publication of the report, the IAE has been vocal on the need for nuclear power, both in general and for specific countries such as Japan.

All the above is not intended as a rant against journalism, or against hard-hitting reporting. However, I do feel justified in complaining about one-sided reporting, or about misleading reporting. I realize that a sensational headline sells newspapers (or whatever media is being used), and that we are unlikely to see these kinds of practices ending anytime soon. Nevertheless, just as the press ideally helps keep our institutions honest, I feel a duty to call the press out when it is less than completely honest.

***

Nuclear Power after Fukushima:

2011-12-29T14:02:00.001-08:00

New Directions?

At the end of each year, I like to take stock of the past year and to try to guess what it may mean for the year ahead. This year is a complex year for doing that. While there have been many good signs this year--the start of construction of the first UAE reactor, a variety of licensing actions in the U.S., and progress in several other countries--the year has, of course, been dominated by the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Japan.

Much of the discussion so far has focused on what the implications of Fukushima are in the near term. I have been trying to read the tea leaves as to what the accident might mean for the longer term future of nuclear power--that is, after we have implemented any modifications to existing reactors and to reactors currently under construction or in the planning pipeline. I have written and spoken on this subject in several venues in the last few months. Most recently, an article I wrote for the ASME Mechanical Engineering journal on "Nuclear Power After Fukushima" was published. (I understand the link to the ASME website may not be maintained, so if clicking on the title fails to bring up the article, as an alternative, I have posted a PDF of the article on my personal website.)

While I have no reliable way to predict the future, I have seen repeated references to the fact that some of the more advanced designs now on the drawing board would not have been vulnerable to the main problems that plagued the Fukushima reactors. This has led me to believe that the accident could give additional impetus to what was already a growing interest in advanced reactor technologies and/or small modular reactor (SMR--also sometimes "small and medium reactor") designs.

Some of the characteristics that seem to be of particular relevance include the use of coolants other than water and the ability of some reactors to continue to be cooled by natural circulation. These two factors alone would make the long-term loss of cooling water and offsite power much less important, and could also allow siting away from tsunami--or flood--prone coastlines or river shorelines. (I mention non-water-cooled technologies only to illustrate a point, and note that there are water-cooled SMR design concepts that should also have less vulnerability to Fukushima-type events.)

On the other hand, of course, these reactors are still on the drawing board, and I am very mindful of Admiral Rickover's famous quote about paper reactors vs. real reactors. To paraphrase: a reactor (or, for that matter, any other complex technological device) that is still under development always looks perfect; it is when you start to build it that all the problems materialize. (But do look up the original quote--it's so much better!) Much more work remains to be done to demonstrate that the advanced reactors will perform as anticipated--and even more importantly, that we do not introduce new vulnerabilities. The Mechanical Engineering article discusses some of the issues in greater detail for those who are interested.

One interesting side note about the issue of the journal in which the article appears is that this is a special issue, and the topics for the articles in the issue were selected by "crowd sourcing." Using that process, the subject of advanced reactors was identified as one topic of reader interest. I was pleased to learn of that interest and to contribute my thoughts on the subject, and particularly on how the Fukushima events might shape the development of such designs.

With that, I'd like to wish everyone all the best for the New Year! See you back here next year!

***

The NRC in Happier Days:

2011-12-23T13:08:00.001-08:00

My Personal Experience

As we continue to hear of the dysfunction within the NRC, some may wonder about how the agency has operated in the past. Indeed, so far, the only comparisons I have seen to the past are of other times when the agency did not work at its best. This tends to leave the impression that the agency's performance ranges from poor to miserable. That is not the case! Since I worked as a technical assistant to a Commissioner for 4-1/2 years in what, in retrospect, was a very good time, I thought it might be useful to recount how well the NRC can function.

I began working for Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers in late 1987, a few months after he became a Commissioner, and continued to work for him until mid-1992, around the time his first term ended. During that period, there were 3 different Chairmen:

• Lando Zech (chairman from 7/1/86 to 6/30/89),
• Kenneth Carr (chairman from 7/1/89-6/30/91), and
• Ivan Selin (chairman for his whole tenure, from 7/1/91 to 6/30/95).

Also during this time, there were a total of 5 other Commissioners:

• Tom Roberts (8/3/81 to 6/30/90),
• Fred Bernthal (8/4/83 to 6/30/88),
• Jim Curtiss (10/20/88 to 6/30/93),
• Forrest Remick (12/1/89 to 6/30/94), and
• Gail de Planque (12/16/91 to 6/30/95).

(Official bios for all the past Commissioners can be found on the NRC website. The extra link to Commissioner de Planque was my tribute to her after her death last year.)

In a career that has included several jobs truly exceptional positions, I can honestly say that working in the office of an NRC Commissioner was one of the best jobs I've held. Part of this, of course, was because Commissioner Rogers was a great boss. But environment is also always important, and part of what made the job such fun was that the atmosphere among the Commissioners at the time was generally co-operative and respectful.

Looking back, I am almost amazed to recall how little party affiliation mattered in our day-to-day activities. I could go into the office of any of the other Commissioners and feel they were open and honest in sharing information and viewpoints. The Commissioners did not always vote the same way, but we did not have the number of 4-1 splits that we have recently seen. And when the Commissioners disagreed, it was not necessarily along party lines and there was no animosity. As a technical assistant, I spent a fair amount of my time working with the other offices to try to assure that we understood their viewpoints and they understood ours, and to look for ways, when possible, to accommodate all the critical interests. Even when we couldn't work everything out, the discussions were always based on solid technical grounds, and the interactions were always civil.

It is true that the atmosphere among the Commissioners has changed over time, and I don't want to mislead anyone into thinking that I'm saying that everything used to be perfect. I think there was a time before I joined the Commission staff that things hadn't been as good. I know there was a time in the late 1990s when things deteriorated pretty badly. That history keeps coming up as a comparison to the present Commission. But most other times, and certainly most of the time between the late 1990s and the present Commission, my understanding is that the Commission functioned very much as I experienced it.

I do not know for sure what characteristics help lead to a co-operative Commission versus a dysfunctional one. During most of my tenure as a Commissioner's assistant, the Chairmen were ex-Admirals. Admirals clearly know how to lead and how to get people to work together for a common goal. That kind of background has to be helpful. Commissioner Rogers was a former university President. If anyone has to deal with a diverse assortment of individuals with strong views and a sense of independence, it is probably a university president. But other successful NRC Chairmen and Commissioners have come from diverse backgrounds.

So there is no one formula for success, and I would be hard put to be able to recommend how to "fix" the current problem. A commitment to change among the present Chairman and Commissioners may be enough to turn the tide. However, that will be difficult. There is clearly a lot of ill will to overcome, and it will be a long time before all the parties will really trust that any change will last.

My main concern at the moment is that the important work of the NRC not be compromised by the internal conflicts that have come to light among the present Commissioners. I hope that, whatever decisions are made, that is the foremost consideration.

***

Nuclear Power History:

2011-12-21T12:19:00.000-08:00

A Major Anniversary

Yesterday and today, we celebrate the 60th anniversary of one of the very biggest milestones in nuclear power history--the dates the EBR-I produced the first usable quantities of electricity ever generated from a nuclear fission reactor. I already noted this event in my blog on other December milestones in nuclear history, and many news items and blogs in the last 24 hours have been covering the milestone events of December 20 and 21, 1951.

To recap the events briefly, on December 20, 1951, the EBR-I was hooked up to a steam engine which was used to light four 200-watt light bulbs. The iconic photograph of the four light bulbs graces many a story of nuclear power history. Arguably, though, it is the event of the next day, December 21, 1951, that really launched nuclear power generation as a practical energy source--the reactor output was used to supply power to all the electrical equipment in the entire reactor building. While this achievement could not be captured in as convenient a visual image as could the four light bulbs, it truly raised the demonstration to a practical level.

In my mind, this transition to the realm of practical application is what makes today's anniversary such a big milestone in nuclear power history. The demonstration of the fission reaction at CP-1 at Stagg Field in 1942, the other milestone that looms large on the nuclear power landscape was, after all, "simply" proof of a scientific principle, not in itself a practical application. In fact, it had been spurred by a wartime effort to develop a weapon, and the earliest applications, as we all know, were weapons. A large infrastructure had been created in that process, but it had remained largely focused on military needs, and it operated largely in secret. The generation of electricity by a nuclear reactor 60 years ago this week first opened the door to civilian applications.

But we should not forget all the developments that took place between 1942 and 1951. A number of small reactors of different types were built and operated in an all-out research effort, and multiple enrichment and reprocessing technologies were tested.

I have already spoken of some of these other milestones in my book, Nuclear Firsts: Milestones on the Road to Nuclear Power Development and in other blog posts. The purpose of raising the subject of history once again here is to remind readers of one of the most fascinating things I learned from writing that book--the EBR-I, important though it is, was not the first attempt of the nascent nuclear community to use, or to try to use, the new-found fission process for civilian applications.

There were, in fact, two important efforts that preceded the events at EBR-I, both of which took place at the X-10 Graphite Reactor at Oak Ridge. The first of these was the use, on August 2, 1946, of a nuclear fission reactor to generate radioisotopes for peaceful applications. The second was the generation of a very, very small amount of electricity from the reactor on September 3, 1948. It was just enough power to light a flashlight bulb, so did not have the practical significance of the EBR-I demonstration. Nevertheless, it was the first proof-of-principle of the use of a reactor to generate electricity.

(A third civilian development that preceded the EBR-I was the use of a reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory, sometime in 1951, to demonstrate the principle of boron-neutron capture therapy. However, this technology never achieved the practical use that radioisotope production and electricity generation achieved.)

The purpose of highlighting these earlier achievements is not intended in any way to diminish the significance of the EBR-I achievement. Rather, it is to point out how many people and institutions contributed to the early development of nuclear power, and the number of small steps--and missteps--that it took to get us where we are today. It is something to think about as we celebrate this important milestone in history.

***

Japanese Nuclear Regulation:

2011-12-21T08:13:00.001-08:00

A Growing Chorus of Concern

[I am reposting this blog entry, which was originally posted about December 2, 2011, with apologies to those who have already read it. I just discovered that Blogspot somehow lost the original post, and further, that this material was posted on another site under someone else's name.]

I was pleased to receive a message a few days ago from a long-time Japanese friend, Professor Yoshiaki Oka, pointing me to an article he’d posted on ” Building a Mechanism for Regulation of Nuclear Power” in Japan.

I had seen Professor Oka in early November at the American Nuclear Society conference in Washington, DC, and I knew then that he was preparing some material on this issue. During the course of that meeting, he spoke to a number of conference attendees, including me, to discuss the way the Nuclear Regulatory Commission operates and other related matters.

In my discussions over the past few months with Professor Oka, as well as with a number of other people in the Japanese nuclear establishment (both government and industry), it has become clear that the Fukushima accident had raised concerns about the way nuclear power was regulated in Japan. In a past blog, I had reported on the earliest expressions of concern I had seen emerging from Japan following the accident.

Now the chorus of voices seems to be growing. Professor Oka has written a very comprehensive and eloquent argument for profound change to the Japanese system. He has made a number of the same observations that I have discussed in previous blogs, fingering concerns such as the lack of technical expertise in the nuclear regulatory organization, and the influence of what he calls the highly integrated “nuclear power village” over the regulatory structure in Japan. He also points to the heavy reliance in Japan on the expertise of external groups, and contrasts that with the high level of technical expertise on the staff of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He has identified some 170 such external commissions!

Professor Oka notes that these characteristics are not unique to the nuclear power area. Rather, they are “deeply rooted” in Japanese culture and in the way the government-industry interface operates in all areas. As such, the kinds of change he is calling for will clearly be difficult. Nevertheless, he sees a compelling need to make such changes and, in particular, outlines some of the characteristics of the way the NRC operates that he would like to see adopted in Japan.

On a personal level, I was particularly pleased that Professor Oka cited the 5 NRC Principles of Good Regulation (independence, openness, effectiveness, transparency, and reliability) in his article. As I have previously noted in a blog on the history of the Principles of Good Regulation, when I worked for Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers, he pressed NRC to adopt such a set of principles, and I was assigned to help develop them.

Professor Oka’s publication joins a growing number of experts in Japan and around the world who are looking at the broader issues arising from the accident and trying to address those issues. A recent news item reported that an independent commission looking into the accident is due to release its interim findings on December 26. The report aims to go beyond explaining how the accident happened. It is expected “to explore the social and historical background to how Japan reacted to the crisis and offer insights into how else the disaster could have been handled.” The hope is to start a national debate on how Japan should deal with nuclear technology. It is also noteworthy that the report will be reviewed prior to publication by a group of international experts. These include Dr. Richard Meserve, former chairman of the NRC and now president of Carnegie Institution.

While that report is not yet out, it is clear from the description that a significant focus will likely be on issues like Japanese nuclear power regulation. It is a hopeful sign to see that so many prominent experts appear to be identifying some of the same issues regarding the nuclear power enterprise in Japan. Although there is a large distance to be traveled between identifying a problem and solving it, widespread agreement on what the issues are is a very crucial step. Therefore, it is encouraging to hear the rising chorus of voices in Japan pointing to the same concerns.

[Regular readers of this blog may wish to know that I amended 2 recent posts that discussed the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency to add a mention of a review draft of a document I produced several years ago documenting the first 50 years of the history of that agency.]

***

Energy and Wildlife:

2011-12-17T05:05:00.001-08:00

A Complicated Relationship

This week has seen more than the usual number of news items about energy and the the animal kingdom, and I thought it would be fun to put them together.

The first and by far most unusual story comes from Japan, where wild monkeys are being outfitted with special collars containing radiation meters, GPS receivers, and data recorders to allow for more detailed data collection on the radiation levels from Fukushima fallout in remote mountainous and forested areas.

Take away message: Wildlife is helping assessing the impact of the Fukushima accident.

The second story is similar to ones I'd heard before. The cooling water from nuclear power plants has been beneficial to a number of species. In the past, most of the stories I'd heard were of species, like shrimp, that are food sources. But in this case, the Turkey Point nuclear power plant in Florida has proved a haven for an endangered crocodile species. In particular, the cooling canals have been adopted by crocodiles as nesting sites, and Florida Power's management of its cooling canals has been credited with a significant rebound in the population of crocodiles in South Florida.

Take away message: Nuclear energy is helping wildlife.

The third story is not as cheerful. Again, it is not a new story. As the idea of wind power has captured the imagination of the public, stories have begun to emerge that wind turbines are detrimental to a lot of the airborne segment of the animal kingdom. While it's not new, the latest article I've read on the dangers of wind power to wildlife points out that new guidelines about to be issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service could "create another challenge" for the wind industry.

Take away message: Wind energy and wildlife have a fraught relationship--wind turbines kill birds and bats, and rules to reduce these kills may hamper wind power development.

Perhaps my "take away" messages are an oversimplification. There are cases of fish being sucked up into the intakes of nuclear plant cooling systems and being killed, but there are, as noted, cases where the outlet water has supported aquaculture. I have heard of no such plus-minus for wind turbines. There are said to be some promising ways that wind farm operators can reduce fatalities, but they are still speculative. In the meantime, the role of the monkeys in assisting with radiation monitoring in Japan and the role of Turkey Point in helping rebuild the crocodile population in Florida are real.

***

The Meltdown at NRC:

2011-12-14T10:51:00.000-08:00

Contemplating the Outcome

This week, like so many others, I watched two important hearings: the hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on the rift between the Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Gregory Jaczko, and the other four NRC Commissioners; and the hearing of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, which had been scheduled to address the NRC's task force report on the Fukushima accident, but which also ended up addressing the issues between the Commissioners.

Whatever anyone may think of any of these individuals, it is a sad day for the Commission and the nuclear industry that the situation has deteriorated to the level that the four Commissioners felt compelled to bring their concerns about the Chairman's leadership to the White House, and that the Congress had to hold hearings to air this topic.

I'm sure there will be many reports on this hearing, so I will not cover the hearing itself. Rather, in the last few days leading up to the hearing, I've observed that everyone in the nuclear industry has become a political pundit, so without analyzing every single claim, I will just try to list all the viewpoints circulating about the situation, the individuals involved, and what President Obama will/won't/should/shouldn't do in the wake of the revelations.

These comments come from private correspondence, private conversations, mainstream publications, and to some extent, from the hearings. Some of the statements are factual, some are opinions. Of the latter, I agree with some and disagree with others, but since I don't want to assume the mantle of political pundit myself, will offer only a few factual comments, and let the reader decide on the statements.

• Chairman Jaczko is way out of line and should step down or be forced down.

• Chairman Jaczko is the only Commissioner protecting the American public and should stay on as Chairman.

• The four Commissioners who sent a letter to the White House outlining their concerns are dragging their feet on safety and engaging in a witch hunt against Chairman Jaczko.

• The four Commissioners who sent a letter to the White House outlining their concerns are exposing a serious risk to public health and safety from the continued renegade actions of Chairman Jaczko.

• Sending a letter to the White House was a timid gesture. All four Commissioners should threaten President Obama that they will resign if Chairman Jaczko is not removed as Chairman immediately.

• The President should move Chairman Jaczko to a position in another agency and replace him with one of the current commissioners. [Note that the President can remove Jaczko as chairman, but cannot remove him as a commissioner.]

• Even if Chairman Jaczko were to leave the Commission altogether, in the current environment, it would be difficult for President Obama to get a nominee confirmed by the Senate for the vacant position. [Probably true.]

• All 5 commissioners have degrees in some field of physics or engineering and have previous experience working on various kinds of nuclear issues from different perspectives.

• Of the 5 commissioners, only Commissioners Magwood and Ostendorff have management experience.

• Of the 5 commissioners, only Commissioner Ostendorff has operated nuclear facilities.

• Commissioner Magwood is the leader of the "coup" against Chairman Jaczko. [In the Senate hearing, Commissioner Magwood said that he didn't know how that allegation had arisen.]

• Commissioner Magwood is the heir apparent for the chairmanship. [In the Senate hearing, Commissioner Magwood said that he had no designs on the chairmanship.]

• Environmental groups opposed Commissioner Magwood's original appointment because he has strong and long-standing ties with industry--including his previous employment and his close relationship with industry during his tenure at the DOE. [Commissioner Magwood denies having close ties with industry and points out that the work of the DOE office he headed is mainly focused on advanced nuclear technologies.]

• Commissioner Magwood worked as a consultant for TEPCO (licensee for the Fukushima plants) prior to joining the NRC. [This is true, but the last time I checked, the NRC doesn't license or oversee plants in Japan, so it's hard to see the relevance of this.]

• The President would not appoint a Republican as Chairman. [While it's not done frequently, the President certainly can appoint a Republican, and from time to time, Presidents do appoint individuals from the opposite party.]

• The President will not do anything until after the election because he doesn't want to lose the Nevada vote.

• The President will not remove Jaczko as Chairman because Senator Reid is making Jaczko's continued tenure as the NRC Chairman a condition for supporting President Obama's initiatives in the Senate.

• Since the Yucca Mountain issue is now off the table, removing the Chairman won't affect the Nevada vote.

• The President doesn't need the Nevada vote anyway.

• Things will be smoothed over for now and the status quo will be maintained, but things won't really change and there will be another flare up soon.

• The system is broken and can't be permitted to stay as it is.

If I've learned anything at all about politics from living "inside the Beltway" for lo, these many years, it is that decisions are often made for reasons that fall completely outside the sphere I follow. This decision may well be influenced by election politics, the situation in another agency, or any of a number of other considerations. Therefore, I will not venture my own guess. But I will be watching eagerly to see how this is handled, and how the Commission operates in the weeks and months ahead. And whether one or more of the above predictions come to pass.

***

Nuclear Power Anniversaries:

2011-12-07T13:16:00.001-08:00

Celebrating Many Milestones in December

Last Friday, December 2, Will Davis, who blogs at Atomic Power Review, reminded all of us that December 2 was a very important anniversary in the history of nuclear power. December 2, 1942, after all, was the date that controlled fission was first achieved at Chicago Pile 1. Will also noted the curious fact that December is a month with many other nuclear anniversaries as well. Indeed, I had noticed that myself when I was writing my book, "Nuclear Firsts: Milestones on the Road to Nuclear Power Development," so I thought I might be able to add something to the story, even though I'm a few days late for the December 2 anniversary.

As Will notes, and as the ANS Nuclear Cafe also observes, the 3 events we probably cite the most in the development of nuclear power all occurred in December. In addition to CP-1, on December 2, 1942, the other key events include the first generation of usable quantities of electricity at the Experimental Breeder Reactor 1 on December 20-21, 1951 (making this upcoming December 20 the 60th anniversary), and the start-up of Shippingport on December 28, 2957. Will's blog on the historical December events has some fascinating old illustrations of Shippingport and of Fermi-1.

What many people don't know, and what I discovered learned only in writing the book, was that there were a number of other important milestones that occurred in the month of December. The full list of early milestones profiled in the book that occurred in December (with the previously mentioned ones highlighted in red) are:

• December 2, 1942: First controlled nuclear fission (at CP-1 in Chicago)
• December 19, 1942: First demonstration of reprocessing (bismuth phosphate process at Oak Ridge)
• December 26, 1944: First industrial scale reprocessing (bismuth phosphate process at Hanford)
• December 25, 1946: First reactor outside North America (F-1 in the Soviet Union)
• December 1950: First "swimming pool" type reactor (Bulk Shielding Reactor at Oak Ridge)
• December 20-21, 1951: First generation of useful quantities of electricity (at EBR-1 in Idaho)
• December 3, 1956: First use of thorium in a reactor (BORAX-IV in Idaho)
• December 23, 1956: First purpose-built reactor to provide electricity for a site (EBWR at Argonne)
• December 18, 1957: First peaceful commercial reactor (Shippingport in Pennsylvania)
• December 20, 1957: First peaceful multinational project (Eurochemic for reprocessing, in Belgium)
• December 17, 1967, First electricity from a pebble bed reactor (AVR in West Germany)

Will also identifies the first criticality of the N.S. Savannah as being in December 1961. These are certainly not all of equal importance, and of course, there are important events that happened in other months of the year. Still, it is striking that so many key events took place in the waning days of the year. I do not know why this seems to be the case. Perhaps some conscious, or even unconscious, effort to reach certain goals before the year was out. Whatever the case, I would echo Will and others in recognizing that this month

***

Energy Planning:

2011-11-26T04:42:00.000-08:00

What's Reasonable?

I was startled to see an article recently about Japan's plans to revise the country's energy policy. I knew that Japan had stated its intent to revise its energy plans. The surprise was not that fact, but rather, the time period proposed. Japan's new Trade Minister, Yukio Edano, stated that they would form a panel under the energy advisory committee to "probe a road Japan will take over the next 100 or 200 years."

One or two hundred years??? I have seen 5-year plans, and 10-year plans, and in certain areas of endeavor, I have seen plans 10- or 20- or even 50-year plans. But 100 or 200 years?

Two-hundred years ago, 1811, I'm not sure everyone thought the United States would exist in 10 years, let alone 200 years. And none of the technology we take for granted today was even remotely near to being developed.

One-hundred years ago, early automobiles were on the road and the Wright brothers had demonstrated flight, but I don't think too many people would have believed that either automobiles or airplanes would become major modes of transportation. And nuclear power? The use of the word nucleus to refer to the center of an atom hadn't even become standard terminology yet.

A little more than 60 years ago, my father tells me he built a TV from an RCA kit, and it was the very first one in his neighborhood. People used to crowd around our kitchen table to watch with fascination whatever limited programming was available on the small, flickering black-and-white screen. Who would have guessed that a TV would come to be considered practically a requirement for modern living, and that most households would have multiple TVs, and that they would have large, color images and hundreds of channels of programming?

It was just 60 years ago that the EBR-I put electricity onto the grid. Look what's happened to that technology in 60 years.

And just think of all the gadgets that we now can't live without and how they have evolved, even in just the last couple of decades: the telephone--and then the cell phone, and then the smart phone; large computers in laboratories--and then the computer on every desk at home and at work, and laptops and tablets in every briefcase; etc.

So, had we made a 200-year plan in 1811 or a 100-year plan in 1911, what would we have assumed for our energy sources and our energy demands in 2011?

I know that a country like Japan can't completely shift its energy patterns in a very short time-frame, and therefore that a 20-year plan, or even a 50-year plan, won't show the "final" outcome that some may wish to see. Nevertheless, it is really not meaningful to present the public and the decision-makers with a plan that spans such long periods of time. Even if such a plan is reviewed and readjusted periodically, it does not contribute any more certainty to have a 200-year plan than it does to have a good 20-year plan.

I would urge Japan to adopt a shorter-term plan that can be adjusted to respond to new developments and new issues. What if some new consumer technology ramps up electricity demand a lot more than we anticipate today? What if rare earth limitations restrict today's plans to build windmills? What if climate change significantly alters wind patterns, or cloud cover, or river flows, or sea level? What if fusion is developed in the next 50 years?

The panel may not be able to show the complete transition they would like to show in a period of a few decades, but whatever they do propose is likely to be more realistic and achievable. It seems to me that it is far better to have a short term plan that is realistic for the period it covers and that is periodically revisited to look ahead to the next few decades and extend as the potential needs and opportunities become clear, rather than presenting the public with a long-term plan that can only be regarded as pure fiction after the initial couple of decades.

While this may seem like a distinction without a difference--after all, in either case, the plans need to be revisited--the difference is that it is dishonest to tell the public that the problem is solved by a plan that extends such a long time and I expect that such dishonesty will eventually cause the public to lose faith in the plan altogether. A short-term plan can have an aspirational goal, but it should not be in terms of specific technologies so much as it should be in terms of broader objectives, such as reduced CO2 emissions. More importantly, the initial plan should acknowledge that it addresses only the first increment of the process of getting there.

I realize it is tempting to be able to show the public that the government has a plan that provides a complete transition. But such a plan would not, in the long run, provide Japan any better prospects than a shorter-term plan with a solid basis.

***

Support for Nuclear Power:

2011-11-24T12:21:00.000-08:00

The Bright Spots in the News

While the negative news always gets the most attention, several recent news items suggest that opinion on nuclear power is not as bleak as the headlines sometimes suggest. As we celebrate Thanksgiving this year, it is nice to reflect on some recent positive news items.

A couple of months ago, the Japan Times conducted a post-Fukushima on-line survey asking which route is the most viable for Japan: sticking with nuclear power, solar, geothermal, wind, hydropower, biomass, or a mix of these, but with reduced reliance on nuclear energy. The survey has now closed, but the results are available (at least temporarily) on line.

Out of the 4149 votes cast, the percentage saying to stick with nuclear power (16%) is actually higher than solar (10%), geothermal (10%), wind (3%), hydropower (3%), or biomass (1%). The highest response (58%) is for a mix of the above, but with reduced reliance on nuclear energy. In light of the events in Japan this year, I would regard this response as a strong indication that the public recognizes the issues. While they are understandably shaky about nuclear power at the moment, they are realistic enough to understand that it needs to be a part of the energy mix for the foreseeable future. What is particularly interesting is that they place sticking with nuclear power significantly above any single alternative. This response seems far removed from the news items that focus on the small numbers of protesters.

I do recognize that there are questions they did not ask in the survey. They did not ask whether Japan should rely on a mix of those other alternatives, but without nuclear energy; they did not ask whether Japan should rely on a mix that included more fossil fuels (or, in fact, that included any fossil fuels). I don't know why they didn't ask such questions, and I will not speculate on what the answers to such questions might have been. Whatever the flaws of the survey, I still find it compelling that nuclear power received a significantly higher vote than solar or wind power, which are so often touted as total solutions to our energy needs, or to geothermal power or biomass in a country that has a lot of both.

(To see the actual numbers, click on the hot-link above, then click on the beginning of the survey question described as: "As outlined in a recent series, Japan is being forced to weigh its options for sources of energy. Which route do think is the most viable?", dated 2011-09-30 - 2011-10-21. Clicking after the first 3 words takes you to the series they cite. I do not know how long the Japan Times leaves the surveys up.)

Several prominent individuals have also spoken out, either in favor of nuclear power, or against the uncritical acceptance of renewables.

A couple of weeks ago, the Dalai Lama toured the area of Japan affected by the earthquake and tsunami. To the surprise of many, the Dalai Lama said that nuclear power needed to be considered in the future. To me, the most important part of his message was that people should look at the issue "holistically." “Just to look at it from one side then to make a decision is not right,” he said. He recognized the role of nuclear power in helping address the needs of people in developing countries, and the fact that solar and wind energy are too inefficient to meet these needs. His message was very balanced, as he noted that the nuclear industry needed to look at the potential risks holistically as well.

More recently, Britain's Prince Philip blasted wind farms as being a "fairy tale." This comment, of course, was not about nuclear power, but about a technology that is often cast as a viable alternative to nuclear energy. While his history of outspoken remarks may make some wonder how seriously his comments will be taken, it was clear that his opinion was based on the need for back-up capacity. I should also note that his remarks were apparently targeted towards land-based wind turbines.

Even discounting the remarks of Prince Philip--after all, they are at odds with the official policy of the UK government, which has committed to building more wind farms--the news holds a message for me. The positive results of a public opinion survey, even in Japan, and the rational voice of the Dalai Lama, who is often considered a source of moral judgment, suggest to me that there is growing recognition of the continued need for nuclear power.

With that, happy Thanksgiving to all!

***

IAEA and NEA:

2011-11-20T09:42:00.001-08:00

Are Both Needed?

Shortly after I published my post on Russia announcing its intent to join the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, I received the following message from a friend who follows my blog:

Gail,

Your argument for the positive aspects of the NEA is persuasive. However, you have not addressed the separate issue as to why is is necessary to have both organizations, the NEA and the IAEA. The NEA seems too closely allied with OECD, which, despite the membership of South Korea, is still seen as a European-only organization with all the "old (read irrelevant) Europe" baggage associated therewith.

-[name removed]

P.S.: Even though I am an non-Nuc, I still love your stuff.

Since he has chosen not to post his comment directly to my blog, I have respected his apparent wish for anonymity and removed his name, but left the rest of the comment intact.

First, I want to assure him that his comments are always welcome, either privately or to the blog. I am delighted to have readers with a variety of perspectives--including readers who are outside the nuclear field, and readers who are from outside the US. The real purpose of a blog is to try to share perspectives with a variety of people, and I'm pleased that he is a regular reader.

Second, I want him to know that he asked an excellent question. It is a question that has been debated from time to time in capitals of several of the member countries, the United States among them. And I am sure it is an issue that will continue to be debated. The question is a very perceptive one. He should not feel that he is a second-class citizen in this venue simply because he works in a different field.

There is, indeed, overlap between the two agencies. My friend is far from the first to wonder if the functions couldn't be consolidated into one organization. Naturally, whenever that question has been raised, the assumption has always been that any consolidation would absorb the activities of the NEA into the IAEA, which is much larger and has a much broader mission. After all, all members of the NEA are already members of the IAEA.

So far, every time the issue has been considered by the government of one of the NEA members, the outcome has been to decide to continue funding that country's membership in the NEA. There are several reasons for this:

• The IAEA was founded as an organization to help assure the peaceful use of nuclear energy by helping support countries in their efforts to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, a large portion of the IAEA's resources is spent on efforts aimed at emerging countries. This is important, but it tends to create a different focus than exists in the NEA, where the emphasis is more on mutual support among equals to assure the safe use of nuclear energy.

• Because of the different focus, the work of the NEA is not as affected by political posturing as is the work of the IAEA. (I hasten to add that this is not to say that the NEA membership is in agreement on everything. In particular, several countries within the NEA are against nuclear power. However, this is a very targeted difference of opinion. Fundamentally, the countries of NEA are not seeking to wipe each other off the face of the earth, as is the case for some of the IAEA countries.)

• Because of the much smaller membership of the NEA, it is easier to come to consensus, and therefore, projects can often move forward faster.

Obviously, having two organizations involved in the same area of effort is not an ideal situation. It creates a strong risk of duplication, and pressure within each organization to grab any new "turf." There have, over time, been cases where the co-operation between the organizations has been less than perfect. They never get too far out of line, however, because the government accountants in each country have sharp pencils (excuse the slightly old-fashioned image here) and are eager to ferret out any duplication and use it as justification for wielding the budget axe. One of my on-going jobs when I was at NEA, in fact, was to negotiate with IAEA over areas where there was common interest in order to carve out logical and non-duplicative niches for both agencies.

As to the Euro-centric focus, you've hit another nail on the head there. That is an issue with which the OECD is currently struggling. However, I must note that the OECD is not completely Euro-centric. Non-European members include Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand (a member of OECD, but not of NEA), Canada, Mexico, the United States, and in the last year or so, Chile and Israel (both have joined the OECD, but not NEA, at least as of now). There are also several former Iron Curtain countries in the membership. It is true that the expansion from 30 to 34 countries was was a painful compromise for OECD, with Estonia and Slovenia added to assure that the addition of countries outside Europe did not appreciably dilute the European influence. So it is true that the European influence within OECD, while not absolute, is carefully being maintained at about current levels.

What is more important than geography, for both the OECD and the NEA, is the significance of non-OECD countries in the spheres within which each organization operates. (Note: NEA is part of the OECD, but we can discuss it separately because it is funded separately by the member countries and operates as a "semi-autonomous" agency.) Until recently, the OECD nations held most of the world's wealth, and were responsible for most of the world's commerce. Until recently, the NEA nations operated most of the world's nuclear power plants. Therefore, the perspective of the OECD and NEA memberships in their respective areas were indeed the perspectives of the dominant countries. Today, the OECD and NEA predominance in both of these areas is diminishing rapidly. That is why it is so important for these two organizations to find a way to include some of the most important "emerging nations" in their deliberations.

Membership is always the most difficult hurdle, especially for the OECD, which considers its members to be "market-oriented democracies" and wishes to limit new members to the relatively small circle of countries that could make such a claim. While that characterization could be debated for some OECD countries, both in the past and even today, a further valid point is that both organizations benefit by remaining relatively small. Therefore, instead of increasing membership, both organizations have long-standing practices of including selected non-member countries in activities of their committees, in meetings, and in other activities as an alternative means of accommodating other important viewpoints.

In addition to the kind of past involvement by Russia and other countries that I mentioned in my previous post, NEA serves as the Secretariat for several dozen research projects. Many of these include non-NEA member countries as participants and have done so for years.

So, as a somewhat long answer to your question, I would say that most people who have worked with the two organizations have come to see the different values each brings to the table. Is having two organizations a perfect system? No, of course not. It requires on-going attention by the management of both organizations. Would something be lost if the two organizations merged? Yes, most close observers think so, but it is an important question, and one that I am sure will continue to be debated.

[For anyone interested in the history of the NEA, I prepared a document, available as a review draft, covering the first 50 years of the agency as background for the celebration of that event several years ago.]

***

Russia to Join NEA:

2011-11-18T06:54:00.001-08:00

An Important Step

Recent news articles have highlighted Russia's intention to join the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since I used to work at the NEA as the Deputy Director-General, I have more than a passing interest in this development.

In fact, one of my last assignments in that position was to head the NEA delegation to Moscow in 2006 to negotiate a joint cooperation declaration that was signed just before I left the agency in 2007. I was very proud to learn that this declaration was cited in one article as being a precursor to the current move to membership. (Alas, the article in which this information appeared is a subscription publication.

During my tenure at the NEA, and in the years since then, concern has been raised about the continued relevance of the NEA in a world where an increasing number of nuclear power plants will be built in countries outside the NEA's membership. At one point, OECD/NEA countries accounted for 85% of the world's nuclear power capacity. That percentage is expected to drop rapidly in the future.

Having Russia join the NEA as a member helps address this concern. Obviously though, the concern will remain, because the biggest builders by far of new nuclear power plants are expected to be China and India, neither of which are NEA members. However, China was also beginning to participate in some NEA activities by the time I left the agency.

Those who are not too familiar with the differences between the NEA and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may wonder why it is important for NEA to continue to exist. Yes, IAEA membership does include Russia, China, and India--as well as the many smaller countries who are beginning to consider building nuclear power plants. It is difficult to go into all the differences in a short space.

Suffice it to say that the smaller membership of NEA, including, as it now does, most of the countries that have significant nuclear research and development activities, and that have years of experience operating nuclear fleets, is able to work efficiently and effectively on common issues associated with nuclear power. The NEA and IAEA have developed a generally co-operative pattern of working together that has, a number of times, facilitated the incubation of new products within the smaller membership of the NEA, then disseminated them to the larger membership of the IAEA.

Therefore, it is a significant move forward to have Russia join the NEA as a fully participating member. In the longer term, it will be valuable for NEA to increase the involvement of other major players on the nuclear stage, but for a variety of reasons, I expect that other relationships will prove harder and will take a longer time to mature.

Given my background in the NEA, I can't resist making one correction to the subscription article that reported on this development. The article said that Russia would be the first country to join the NEA without first being a member of its parent body, the OECD. This assertion is not true. It is a little-known fact that South Korea joined the NEA before joining the OECD. South Korea joined the NEA in 1993 and did not become a member of the OECD until 1996.

In fact, although it is unusual (South Korea, until now, was the only country that had joined the NEA before joining the OECD), the NEA charter does not require countries to hold membership in the OECD in order to join. This flexibility may stand it in good stead as it seeks to remain a body that includes most of the world's nuclear power operators.

For those who are interested in more about this matter or other matters of NEA history, I have produced a short history and accomplishments of the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency. A review draft of my findings is available.

[For anyone interested in the history of the NEA, I prepared a document, available as a review draft, covering the first 50 years of the agency as background for the celebration of that event several years ago.]

Note: Following the original publication of this post, I wrote a followup post in response to a question on the need for both the IAEA and the NEA.

***

The Lighter Side:

2011-11-16T09:21:00.000-08:00

Cartoons and Odd Statistics

A couple of items crossed my desk in the past week or so (or more accurately, crossed my computer screen) that I cannot resist mentioning, although both are a little off my usual themes.

The first item is a wonderful cartoon by Tim Newcomb that a fellow blogger, Meredith Angwin, has gotten permission from the artist to publish. I just recently met Meredith in person for the first time at the recent American Nuclear Society meeting in Washington, DC, although I have been following her blog on Vermont Yankee for some time. Rather than copy her and get permission to publish the cartoon myself, I thought I'd simply refer readers to her excellent blog. The cartoon picks up on one of my pet peeves--that is, the fact that people who don't want nuclear power because of its perceived risk also don't want fossil fuels because they are polluting, or windmills because they despoil the natural landscape, or solar power because it is too expensive. And yet, they want all the benefits of ample, reliable supplies of affordable energy, and they don't want to give up any nice-to-have "toys" that use energy. A picture is worth a thousand words, and Tim's cartoon is far better than my narrative. You gotta see this one!

The second item is a report on a study that shows that, in highly industrialized countries like the US, on average we generate less CO2 per capita as we get older! As a baby boomer myself, my first thought was, "Now there's a benefit of aging that I'd never thought about!" It makes some sense, of course. Initially, as people become empty nesters, many of them indulge in personal travel they'd put off while raising a family and paying college tuitions--and their per capita energy use rises temporarily. However, in the longer term, many of them drive less and move into smaller residences. This finding points out that we cannot simply multiply a single rate of energy use by the entire size of the population. That may make some difference from a policy and planning standpoint. However, the reduction was not that dramatic, and it strikes me this could change over time as people stay healthier and more active to older ages (I hope!), or as modern, energy-consuming technology is used more and more to maintain the lives and activities of an aging population. So I don't want to make too much of this fact. Perhaps the greatest message is that the study shows--once again--how complicated the supply and demand picture really is.

***

Japanese Nuclear Power Regulation:

2011-11-12T09:36:00.000-08:00

Addressing "Sloppy Inspection Procedures"

I haven't blogged about the situation in Japan in some time now. The situation at the Fukushima site has somewhat stabilized, and Japan has begun the long and painful process of recovery. Along with so many others, I have been watching this process. It has reached a stage where there is not as much, day to day, where I feel I can add some special insight.

Recently, however, some new revelations published about the Japanese inspection process have spurred me to return again to the post-Fukushima issue. The article in question, entitled, "Sloppy inspection procedures threaten Japan's nuclear safety regulations," was a very interesting analysis in the Mainichi Daily News detailing differences between Japanese inspection procedures and practices and those of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The article indicates that Japanese inspectors have had a practice of essentially copying material for their inspection reports from the companies they are inspecting. It includes a somewhat frightening quote by someone at the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), which operates under the jurisdiction of the government's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). The quote essentially rationalized that it didn't matter that the JNES inspectors essentially just repeated the same steps the plant operators had developed.

The article also cites the observations of a Japanese visiting professor at the University of Tokyo who had worked for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI--now called the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, or METI) in the early 1990s and had been assigned for almost two years to the NRC.

(As an aside, his assignment is part of an excellent program run by the NRC. In addition to bringing Japanese government officials to the NRC, this program has also brought a number of government engineers from emerging nuclear countries to the NRC to participate actively in NRC inspections and technical reviews, and in so doing, to learn practices that they can bring back to their own countries.)

It is very telling that a junior Japanese government employee saw and recognized the differences between US and Japanese procedures and practices. Other Japanese employees were assigned to NRC and must have made similar observations. Nevertheless, the system did not change. I have previously speculated on some of the differences that I believe are responsible for the way the Japanese nuclear regulatory system has worked, and will not repeat those discussions here. Suffice it to say that there are no real surprises in what is now being publicized so widely. These were issues that were known for a long time, both by outsiders and by insiders.

While I am sorry that it took an accident of this magnitude to spur a serious effort to change, one should view the past practices in context. These deficiencies are not unique to the Japanese nuclear program, but rather, as I have previously discussed, are strongly embedded in the culture and institutions of the country. Changing culture and long-standing institutional practices is neither easy nor painless. Clearly, when things were going well, it was impossible to generate any pressure to make the necessary changes.

The task ahead is no easier now, but by the same token, it is no longer possible to deny that the deficiencies exist and must be addressed. A number of initiatives are being started that appear to be serious efforts to raise the bar on how nuclear power is managed and regulated in Japan. This is as challenging a task, in its own way, as are the physical tasks of stabilizing the reactor and decontaminating the surrounding communities. While success at this point is not a given, the concerted efforts being started look promising.

***

Google's Latest Doodle:

2011-11-07T07:33:00.001-08:00

Recognition of Marie Curie

Although today is a busy day for me and I had not intended to divert my attention to my blog, I couldn't resist noting that Google has recognized Marie Curie's accomplishments in a "Google Doodle" today, on the 144th anniversary of her birthday on November 7, 1867.

As the earliest and still most preeminent woman scientist in the nuclear field, she certainly was an inspiration to me in choosing my career, and I know she has similarly inspired other women as well. There are many articles and books that cover her stellar career, as well as the challenges she faced at a time when women were not accepted in the professional world. I will not try to write my own summary here, but rather will refer the reader to the summary of her career on the Nobel Prize page, the site referenced above, the Wikipedia site, and others.

For me, what is most important is the model she provided for all those who followed her. The fact that she managed not only to succeed, but to excel, in the academic and professional environment that prevailed in her day continues to awe me. Despite the fact that I faced some challenges in my career, they pale in comparison to what Dr. Curie and other early female scientists faced. I can't even begin to contemplate how I would have fared in the world and times in which she lived.

Therefore, I am particularly pleased at Google's choice of today's doodle--and I am charmed by their choice of the 144th year (12 x 12) instead of waiting for something more "traditional," like the 150th.

One reason for the urgency of producing this blog is that the Doodle will grace Google's search page only today. For those who read this entry today, enjoy the doodle as you look for more history of this icon of nuclear science. For those who read this entry too late to see the doodle in its original setting, I have copied it above.

***

Could Wind Energy Increase Global Warming?--

2011-11-04T19:22:00.001-07:00

The Startling Results of a New Study

An e-mail a few days ago from a long-time friend (I don't say "old friend" anymore!) alerted me to some new work he's done that I think has the potential to stir up a firestorm. Herb Inhaber has made a career of investigating conventional wisdom and poking holes in it--some may remember his past work on the comparative risk assessment of different energy sources--and now, it looks like he's done it again!

Herb's latest work looks at wind generation and comes to the counter-intuitive conclusion that increasing the use of wind energy could actually increase carbon dioxide emissions instead of decreasing them! The logic behind his analysis is the same as the reason automobiles get better mileage when driven on highways than in stop-and-go city traffic.

If the wind blew all the time and back-up power was not needed, of course the carbon emissions would be reduced. But according to Herb's analysis, every time back-up gas turbines are ramped up and down, they generate more CO2 than when they are operated alone at full power. The result is that much of the expected environmental benefit of wind power is lost.

The same logic applies for solar generation, although my own experience is that the wind usually varies more than solar insolation does, so I would expect the effect to be smaller for solar energy.

I should make it clear that I have not personally tried to analyze every step of his analysis. I'm certainly not an expert on the performance of gas turbines, so am unable to comment on the relative efficiency of gas turbines in different modes of operation. Nevertheless, it is significant that Herb cites data from the United States and several other countries that appears to support his argument.

Therefore, it appears there is enough evidence in this study to spur a very close look at the growing assumption in the minds of the public and many policymakers that global warming can be significantly reduced by converting to a greater use of solar and wind power.

Herb's full article on his research is available for purchase from Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. A good summary of the Inhaber study has been published in the blog, Brave New Climate.

***

US Industry Response to Fukushima:

2011-10-29T08:37:00.001-07:00

A Status Report

On October 12, 2011, Anthony Pietrangelo, Senior VP and CNO of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), made a presentation to the Washington, DC Section of the American Nuclear Society (ANS). The talk was entitled "US Industry Leadership in Response to Events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant." I have tried to make it a practice to provide summaries of nuclear- and energy-related events in the Washington, DC area that I attended--at least when I find something worth reporting--and I want to continue that practice by providing some highlights of Tony's talk. (I should note that part of my delay in publishing this post was that I waited until the ANS Section posted the viewgraphs. This is the first chance I've had to publish my post since the viewgraphs went up.)

Tony started the meeting by noting that, even outside the concerns about Fukushima, nuclear plants in the US have faced an unusual number of natural challenges this year. He mentioned the tornadoes in the path of Browns Ferry and Surry, the flooding at Ft. Calhoun, the earthquake near North Anna, and the hurricane that swept past a number of nuclear plants.

He also provided some statistics on NEI's outreach in the aftermath of Fukushima. Among their activities were a conference call with hundreds of financial people and a hundred-fold increase in the number of hits on their website.

The bulk of his talk discussed some of the activities and plans of 3 key industry groups: NEI, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Key facts about the activities of these groups are highlighted in his viewgraphs.

To me, some of his most interesting comments were his relatively positive views of the response from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the public. Among his observations were the following:

• Since March 11, 2011, there have been 5 license renewals at US plants, including Vermont Yankee, Palo Verde, Prairie Island, and Hope Creek

• There have been 2 power uprates (increases in the maximum power level at which the reactor is licensed to operate)--Limerick and Point Beach

• Final Environmental Impact Statements (FEIS) have been completed on 7 new reactors in Georgie, South Carolina, Texas and Maryland

• The Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) has been issued for the ESBWR

• Construction-related activities are taking place at Watts Bar, Vogtle, and V.C. Summer

• Public opinion, while down somewhat, is still favorable to nuclear power.

One interesting observation he made is that the NEI has shifted the focus of its public relations efforts. Early on, they focused on safety, but more recently, had been focusing on the environment, cost, and jobs. They have now shifted back to a focus on safety.

Tony fielded a lot of questions during the Q&A session that followed his talk. I can't go into all of them, but he pointed out some of the differences in procedures and requirements for hardened vents for US BWRs versus for those in Japan. Some of the questioners were particularly concerned that the industry initiative could get ahead of the NRC and that NRC might later impose additional, or different, requirements. Tony indicated that they were working closely with the NRC and wouldn't be getting too far ahead.

Tony also noted lessons learned that have been implemented in the industry in response to past events that he thinks will serve us well in responding to the Fukushima experience. In particular, he noted that some of the equipment intended to respond to a 9/11 type event could also be used for natural disasters. He referred to the current approach as "symptom-based and event-informed," in contrast with the historic event-based approach. The symptom-based approach facilitates such actions as using "9/11 equipment" to respond to, for example, a station blackout triggered by some other type of event.

I'm sure we will be hearing much more about the industry activities in the weeks and months ahead. From what was presented at this meeting, it looks like the industry is off to a very good start.

***

Energy Resource Wars:

2011-10-20T07:44:00.001-07:00

Is a New Round Emerging?

I was never very good at history in high school. I much preferred the physical sciences, where I could derive most of the answers to test questions, as opposed to subjects like history, which required a lot of rote memorization of names and dates. I survived only by learning a few tricks. For example, I noticed that my teacher always had a question on the causes of each war we studied, and I noticed that disputes over resources were almost always among the top causes. Thus, every time the question came up on the cause of any war, my first answer was always resource disputes. It never failed!

Thus, I suppose I should not be surprised to notice that the countries of the world are still bickering over resources today. While the disputes have not yet led to open warfare--and I sincerely hope they don't--the saber-rattling should alert us to the risks the world faces by relying on energy sources which are limited in supply and unevenly concentrated around the world.

There are not one, but two, such conflicts brewing around the world. Both have been developing over the past few months and both involve disputed claims of sovereignty over offshore gas and oil fields. One involves the new offshore gas fields discovered in the Middle East. The dispute threatens to exacerbate already existing tensions between Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriots. The second involves the offshore oil fields in the South China Sea. This one has India and Vietnam pitted against China, with the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia also making claims. China is clearly staking out its territory in the South China Sea, and Israel is doing the same in the Mediterranean.

At one point a couple of months ago, articles on both disputes hit the press on the same day. While I'd seen other news items on each dispute, seeing them both in the news the same day really drove home for me the fact that, as we focus on the relatively recent concern about global warming from fossil fuels, we have tended to forget the long and painful history of international conflict over access to critical oil and gas resources.

These disputes make it painfully clear that the historical battles over fossil fuels have not disappeared. In fact, they may be reaching a new and dangerous phase. Admittedly, some of the reasons for the rising conflicts between countries in these areas go beyond oil and gas resources. They including fishing rights and shipping lanes in Asia, and both recent and long-standing political issues in the Middle East. But oil and/or gas deposits are growing factors in each case.

Unfortunately, these kinds of spats are likely to continue for a very long time. There is no way to replace existing and future demand for fossil fuels quickly. However, the more slowly we move to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, the more such international conflicts will escalate.

***

Radium in the Basement:

2011-10-14T15:51:00.000-07:00

Unexpected Finds from Fukushima Radiation Searches

It was almost a moment of comic relief to me. After all the stories from Fukushima, especially the stories about pockets of high radiation levels being found far from the plant site, I read a story about an anomalously high radiation reading in Tokyo that turned out to be Radium-226 for luminous paint!

And the story hit somewhat close to home for me! The material was found in an abandoned home in Setagaya Ward, which is the part of Tokyo in which I lived when I spent a year there in 1998-1999. It was not in my immediate neighborhood, but close enough to get my attention. The material was found under the floorboards of an unoccupied house. The owner, a 90-year-old widow who vacated the house early this year, has no idea how it got there. Her deceased husband was an office worker and had nothing to do with radioactive materials. (Storage under the floorboards does not have the somewhat sinister implications it often has in US culture. Japanese houses have no basements and are built with crawl spaces under them. In small buildings with limited storage space, the space under the floorboards is often used for storage.)

The source of the material and the reason it's there is still a mystery. So far, no one is implying the house was broken into while vacant. The bottles are old, and the authorities are busy estimating the dose the woman would have received assuming they had been there a long time.

Of course, the comic relief was temporary. Like other cases where radioactive materials have found their way into the public domain, this could have had much more harmful consequences. What if someone had bought the house and had children sleeping just above the material? It is an accidental piece of luck that a search for radiation hot spots from Fukushima turned up this stash and possibly prevented the exposure of innocent people.

But after all the stories of radioactive contamination, and hot spots unexpectedly far from the reactors, it was a nice piece of news to hear that the search led to a discovery that might have prevented a smaller tragedy, but a tragedy nonetheless.

***

Coal versus Gas:

2011-10-07T06:33:00.001-07:00

No Clear Cut Winner

In the past few years, the "conventional wisdom" has been that switching from coal to natural gas for power production would benefit the environment. Not only does burning gas reduce particulate emissions, it also reduces CO2 emissions. Most sources acknowledge that natural gas is not as clean as nuclear power and renewables in terms of CO2 emissions, but having been promoting that option as an interim step, allowing the faster draw down of coal power plants.

Now, a report has come out that says "it ain't necessarily so"--switching from coal to natural gas would actually do very little to reduce global climate change. This report takes me back to a point of view I've expressed several times in this blog and elsewhere--the chemical and physical interactions involved in all our power sources and their interactions with the environment are incredibly complicated, and we cannot make long-term policy decisions based on simplistic models of the world.

I'm not a climatologist, so I can't say for sure if someone is going to come along in the next day, or week, or year and debunk this entire analysis. However, my point remains the same. Simply measuring the amount of CO2 generated in a bench-scale test of coal versus natural gas doesn't take into account all the emissions of both energy sources and all their interactions with the environment.

In a similar vein, I just ran across a letter in a recent issue of Science that challenged claims that electric-powered automobiles wouldn't reduce emissions because of the need to generate more power from electric power plants. The letter claimed that there was still a net savings because electric motors are more efficient than internal combustion engines and because electric vehicles obtain some of their power from regenerative braking. Again, I haven't done the math, but it makes sense to me that one can't project the net emissions without taking such factors into account.

So, what does this mean for energy policy and planning? I think we need to keep pointing out the following:

• There are no perfect solutions. Every option has some benefits and some drawbacks.

• Simple comparisons are apt to miss important factors.

• What your mother told you at the dinner table is right--"Everything in moderation."

In short, we need a mix of energy sources. We can't simply replace coal with natural gas so we can wait it out for renewables to be perfected, as some recommend.

***

These Plants Are Your Plants:

2011-10-03T13:16:00.000-07:00

A Nuclear Song

Some time ago, I wrote a blog about a nuclear song called Neutron Doodle. In it, I alluded to an earlier set of lyrics I had written, but the only link I gave for the lyrics was to a member-only American Nuclear Society site.

Recently, I was reminded of both songs by a thread I was following in a LinkedIn group I belong to that was talking about the potential value of a nuclear song in helping shape the image of nuclear power.

That reminded me of the old posting, and when I provided it to them, I realized I ought to make the lyrics of my song more publicly available as well. So here they are:

These Plants are Your Plants
(sung to the tune of "This Land is Your Land," by Woodie Guthrie)
Lyrics by Gail H. Marcus

These plants are your plants
These plants are my plants
From their cooling towers
To their nuclear islands
From the U.S. Heartland
To its coastal waters
These plants were made for you and me.

As I was walking
That ribbon of highway
I saw before me
A smogless skyway
And sparkling waters
Were flowing my way
These plants are good for you and me.

The children were laughing
And people were singing
At all the wonders
The power was bringing
The lights were shining
And the bells were ringing
These atoms split for you and me.

And at the plant sites
The workers labored
To use the atom
To help their neighbors
With clean safe power
To fuel all nations
These plants bring joy to you and me.

These plants are your plants
These plants are my plants
From their cooling towers
To their nuclear islands
From Europe's vineyard
To Asia's water
These plants were made for you and me.

***

Solyndra:

2011-09-28T06:56:00.001-07:00

What it May Mean for Nuclear Loan Guarantees

In the immediate aftermath of the Solyndra bankruptcy, I had the sense that nuclear proponents saw the disaster in the solar industry as a vindication of the nuclear industry.

Not so fast! The fact that one solar project tanked is not going to convince die-hard fans of renewables that anything is wrong with renewable projects, and it is certainly not going to cause a rush to the nuclear side. There will be reasons cited by solar proponents (there already are) why this is an exception, one small blip in an otherwise sterling record.

And maybe it is an exception. I actually hope it is, because the other possible trend I see emerging from this meltdown is that is will give a black eye to all loan guarantees. Particularly in the current budget environment, where everyone is looking for easy places to cut, it will be very tempting to put loan guarantees on the budgetary chopping block. If a nice, safe solar project went bust, some may say, a big, complex nuclear project may be even more risky.

I am already seeing some possible fallout from the Solyndra failure. Although Sen. Lisa Murkowski is a supporter of loan guarantees (as well as a supporter of both the nuclear and renewable industries), she has reportedly told the renewable industry to expect greatly restricted federal funding. It's not clear just how much of this restriction is a consequence of the bankruptcy and how much is a general consequence of the budget discussions, but I think it will be difficult for Congress to cut loan guarantees for one industry without also cutting others. She is recommending to the renewable energy industry that they and other industry sectors work together to form a broad coalition.

While it is too soon to panic, the nuclear industry should not have its head in the sand either. In fact, the terms of the loan guarantee program for nuclear projects (in the form of large up-front fees) has caused some to reject the option anyway. If the nuclear renaissance is to continue in the United States, it is not too soon to begin to consider other options.

***

Blogs about Fukushima:

2011-09-26T12:40:00.001-07:00

A Look at the Past 6 Months

It has occurred to me that I have reached a bit of a hiatus in blogging about the Fukushima accident and its aftermath. No doubt there will be more issues that arise in the future that will get my attention again, but for now, I thought it might be convenient to list the dozen and a half or so posts I have written in the first 6 months since the accident and to provide a very brief summary of each.

The Japanese Government and Transparency: Another Issue for Nuclear Reactor Regulation August 30, 2011. This post looks at the different rules that govern Japan and the United States with respect to keeping records of meetings between regulators and licensees and making these records available to the public.

Observations on Japan and its Nuclear Program: Not Anti-Japanese! August 18, 2011. In response to criticism from a friend that my posted seemed anti-Japanese, I tried to point out what I do admire about the Japanese, and to explain why it is important to note the features of the Japanese system that may have contributed to how the Fukushima events unfolded.

Japanese Regulation: The Elements of Independence August 11, 2011. In this blog, I recognize that, as Japan strives to create a more independent regulator, they need to be aware that there are really several different types of independence that are important in nuclear regulation.

Suggested Changes to the Japanese Nuclear Program: Guidelines versus Requirements August 5, 2011. This blog reflects the fact that the Japanese can't just take the existing model of another country and adopt it whole cloth. A new regulatory authority will have to operate within the Japanese system, and therefore any model used must be adapted to work in that system.

Nuclear Regulatory Independence in Japan: The Role of Technical Capability July 24, 2011. In this post, I note that the Japanese government tends to be staffed primarily with generalists, and that it would be desirable to try to increase the number of technical specialists in the Japanese regulatory agency.

Fukushima and Coverups: Eraser Society July 22, 2011. When I lived in Japan, on several occasions, I saw people erasing or whiting out minor errors and I realized that it was an attempt to hide a mistake. I speculate that some of the reports we saw coming from the Fukushima accident may have represented a similar attempt to hide mistakes.

Considering the Fukushima Accident: Does Culture Matter? July 18, 2011. One famous homily that children learn in Japan is that "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down." I raise a question about whether some engineers in Japan didn't stand up to authority when they should have because they were so carefully taught not to "stick out."

Post-Fukushima Findings: The Origins of the Problem begin to Emerge July 15, 2011. This post reports on news items about how some of the original construction decisions made for Fukushima Dai-ichi may have exacerbated the effects of the tsunami.

Nuclear Regulation: Finding the Right Balance June 17, 2011. While this blog was not explicityly about Fukushima, it was probably spurred by all the thinking I was doing about Fukushima at the time. It reflects on how difficult it is for the regulator to find the right balance between too little regulation and too much regulation.

Replacing Nuclear Power: And Other Fantasies June 11, 2011. Although this post was about whether or not nuclear power could be replaced, it was spurred by the post-Fukushima demands by citizens in some countries that seem to suggest the citizenry thinks that it will be simple and quick to replace nuclear power with other sources of energy.

Nuclear Revival: A Scientific American View May 29, 2011. This blog mainly covers an article published by Scientific American prior to Fukushima, but also discusses a post-Fukushima editorial in the publication that proposes that reactor designs and regulatory processes should be improved in the wake of Fukushima.

Japanese Nuclear Regulation: A Call for Change May 13, 2011. I was pleased to see that some of my colleagues in Japan who are active in the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) were the first to propose that the Japanese regulatory system needed fixing, and I summarized their first announcements on the issue.

Fukushima and Amakudari: A Problem with a Long History May 6, 2011. In this blog, I discuss the fact that Japan has a system called amakudari, whereby government employees often move into positions in the industries they control. This system makes it very difficult to maintain the regulatory independence that is required for nuclear power.

Post-Fukushima: Some New Directions? April 23, 2011. This post provides a summary of two of the early discussions of some of the specific changes that the United States might want to make to reflect the lessons learned from Fukushima.

Positive Views on Nuclear Power: A Small Bright Light in a Difficult Time April 14, 2011. In the early days after Fukushima, I was pleased to see that the coverage of the accident was, in many places, more positive than I thought it might be, and this blog lists several articles that had appeared in the first few weeks after the accident.

Fukushima: The Devil is in the Details March 27, 2011. In the first days and weeks after the accident, there was much concern about US reactors of similar design and vintage. Thus, I was happy to report on an article that identified some differences between the Fukushima reactors and the ones at TVA.

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Some Observations March 19, 2011. This was my first post about the Fukushima accident, and it covers my earliest observations.

Also: Nuclear Regulation in Japan after Fukushima August 2011, in the JANUS "Toward Post-Fukushima" Series. This blog was written for Japan NUS (JANUS) for a series of essays from various experts around the world on different aspects of the accident and what it might mean in the future. I was pleased and proud to be asked to contribute to this series and used the essay to summarize my thoughts on nuclear regulation. Other essays in the series provide the insights of experts from around the globe.

(Finally, while not related to the Fukushima situation, I should note that I've also done a series of a dozen blogs on other nuclear topics for JANUS in the last year or so, all of which can be found at "Dr. Marcus' Room" on their website.)

***

EIA International Energy Outlook 2011:

2011-09-22T10:55:00.001-07:00

The Nuclear Perspective

On September 19, 2011, the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA) rolled out its latest International Energy Outlook, IEO 2011 at a briefing presented by the deputy director and acting director of EIA, Dr. Harold Gruenspecht, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. The report makes projections about the global supply and demand of different energy resources between now and 2035. I attended the event, so heard the overview of the report as well as the Q&A session that followed. I will not try to summarize the whole report, as much of it deals with oil and gas, and in any event, is available on the EIA website, as is a video of the presentation. However, I thought I could augment the report by making a couple of general observations about the IEOs in general, and also by highlighting a couple of comments Dr. Gruenspecht made that are not in the report itself.

I first want to recognize that the nuclear community has a long-standing ambivalence with past versions of this report. Over the years, many have complained that it is too pessimistic about the prospects for nuclear power. Indeed, when I worked at DOE, the projections of the Office of Nuclear Energy, where I worked, and the projections of EIA, which is an independent arm of the DOE, often differed significantly.

One fundamental reason for these differences is that the EIA makes its predictions based on existing policies and programs. In that sense, while their projection is not literally a straight-line projection, it has some of the characteristics of a straight-line projection. The projection does recognize population impacts and price impacts, but it doesn't assume that policies will change or that long-range plans will necessarily materialize, so it ends up off the mark when some of these plans actually come to pass. On the other hand, the Office of Nuclear Energy, the industry, and others often include anticipated policy changes and long-range plans in their projections, so their projections end up overestimating nuclear power growth when some of these plans and policies do not materialize.

Leaving aside the philosophical discussion about what anticipated changes one should or should not include when making projections, I found this year's report, and the discussion at the briefing, particularly interesting from a nuclear perspective.

In particular, the report has been a year in the making, and some of the information in it is already dated. The report shows the penetration of nuclear power increasing from 5% to 7% of total energy demand globally by 2035. However, Dr. Gruenspecht pointed out that the nuclear portion of the report was developed prior to the Fukushima event, and was not adjusted to reflect the decisions several countries have made following that event.

Dr. Gruenspecht did not attempt to quantify what he thought this effect might be, but he mentioned several countries whose changed nuclear stance would likely affect the projection. The countries he named were Germany, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, and China.

Now, I'm not disagreeing that the projected percentage is down--IAEA is making similar predictions (in terms of percent of global electricity demand). However, I found his list of countries a little puzzling. These countries have all announced very different decisions, and I would think their impacts on the 2035 IEO projection would range from significant to almost no change.

In the case of Germany, the change does indeed seem pretty clear. Japan is also certainly on a downward trend for the near future. In the case of Italy, Italy was only at the very beginning of their nuclear "revival" when Fukushima occurred, and since EIA doesn't factor in "plans" lightly, I have to wonder if Italy was even considered in arriving at the 2035 estimate, and therefore, if the Italian decision will affect the projection at all. Switzerland has already modified its initial statements, and I'm not sure that what it is saying now will lead to a significant change in the IEO projection. China has reportedly scaled back its new reactor plans somewhat, but many (myself included) always doubted whether their stated plans could be realized, so I seriously doubt whether the IEO projection for 2035 was based on the original Chinese plans anyway.

It will be useful to see a realistic projection, by country, taking into account 1) how optimistic or pessimistic the previous estimates were in the first place, and 2) seeing how the recent announcements by different countries have been factored in.

In that regard, however, the future of the IEO is unclear. Dr. Gruenspecht alluded to budget constraints possibly limiting EIA's ability to produce this report in the future. While some in the nuclear community will not mourn its loss, it has proved to be a useful report for many purposes. It does pull together a lot of useful information on resource estimates, price trends, population changes, and other factors.

***

The Future of Nuclear Power:

2011-09-15T06:47:00.001-07:00

Making Predictions

With the IAEA General Conference going on in Vienna this week, we are hearing a lot about the effects of Fukushima, both on current nuclear power operations and on the future of nuclear power. Given all the uncertainties in the aftermath of that event, it was very encouraging to hear the Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, predict that there is still likely to be significant growth in the number of operating nuclear power plants in the future. Amano's prediction was that IAEA expected between 90 and 350 new units by 2030. The higher prediction would represent nearly a doubling of the current number of reactors operating worldwide.

Now, I must confess I am very leery of predictions. If I were speaking to Mr. Amano, I would advise him of the statement of America's most famous philosopher, Yogi Berra, who said, "It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future." The same news items that reported IAEA's predictions also reported that they are lower than projections IAEA had made prior to the March 11 events.

Nevertheless, the reasons Amano cites for the continued growth of nuclear power--increasing demand around the world for clean energy--are solid, and the early signs are certainly clear that the countries with the largest nuclear power development programs are continuing to pursue nuclear power. Therefore, IAEA's prediction is based on strong evidence. While I probably wouldn't hazard a quantitative guess, I do think the signs point toward continued nuclear power development in a number of nations. Then again, IAEA has information on national plans that I don't have, so they are in a better position to place a number on their projections!

Yogi Berra still has a point, of course. Just as Fukushima changed IAEA's earlier projections, another serious incident could cut into the current prediction. But short of that, I think the nuclear renaissance that everyone was predicting a few years ago has been slowed, but not derailed.

***

Uranium:

2011-09-08T07:50:00.001-07:00

Not Just for Reactors

With this blogpost, I take a little break from the weighty issues of the day. A trip to my local Post Office the other day brought me face to face with the USPS's latest stamp offerings focusing on "pioneers of American industrial design." The set features, as one might guess, designers of things like telephones and typewriters and table lamps and clocks and radios and cameras. But there among them was one that especially resonated with me. A picture of two Fiestaware pitchers, one in a familiar brilliant orange-red glaze. A glaze made possible by the use of uranium.

Yes, uranium. Long, long ago, boys and girls, in the days before nuclear reactors, uranium was a by-product of mining for silver and other minerals. Enterprising people of the day, looking for uses for this material, found it did wondrous things in pottery and glassware. The orange-red glaze used a uranium oxide and was a signature feature of the Fiestaware product line starting in the 1930s. So much so that when the US government commandeered all supplies of uranium as part of its effort to develop the bomb, the company went into decline.

Actually, Fiestaware was not the first product to use uranium. Glass containing uranium oxide has been found in archeological sites dating from Roman times. More recently, so-called uranium glass (also sometimes called Vaseline glass because of its yellow-green color) was popular from the late 1800s to the early 1900s. Uranium glass has an interesting property that makes for a fun parlor trick. When exposed to ultraviolet light, it fluoresces. Of course, that characteristic is a consequence of the electrons, not the nucleus, but it is fun to demonstrate just the same.

I probably first became aware of Fiestaware when I attended the opening session of an ANS meeting over 20 years ago. With all due respect to the many distinguished people who have made presentations at the opening plenaries of ANS meetings over the years, the one I most enjoyed was by James Acord, an artist who gave a highly entertaining presentation about his desire to use Fiestaware in his sculptures, and his long battle with the NRC to obtain a license (yes, really!) to possess the uranium in the large quantities of Fiestaware he was acquiring. I am pleased to report that he was ultimately successful in that endeavor. I am less happy to report that, in the course of looking up some things for this blogpost, I learned that he died this past January.

I'm not an avid antique collector, but after hearing his presentation, I started to keep an eye out for pieces of original Fiestaware in the characteristic color. (Fiestaware is in production again, but doesn't use uranium glaze.) I more recently branched out and acquired a piece of uranium glass. I figure it is only fitting to use a piece or two when I entertain guests.

It's been interesting to watch people's reactions. One woman who has a good technical education surprised me by visibly backing away from a Fiestaware platter on the table. Most people, however, are just curious. Since the colors and the fluorescence are more in the realm of chemistry than nuclear science, even nuclear engineers are perplexed by why the color of the glaze is orange-red and the color of the glass is yellow-green, and why the glass fluoresces but the glaze does not.

Now admittedly, the Post Office series was not meant to honor Fiestaware per se, but rather to honor the man who designed the Fiestaware line (Frederick Hurten Rhead). Nevertheless, I thought the fact that one of 12 stamps on American industrial design features an early use of uranium was significant. So, although the Post Office's stamps would not ordinarily be a subject for one of my blogposts, I felt I could take a late summer break from the more serious stuff and write about Fiestaware and uranium glass.

***

The Japanese Government and Transparency:

2011-08-30T11:00:00.001-07:00

Another Issue for Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Left: Damaged reactors at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Japan. Right: President Jimmy Carter arriving at Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant after accident.

Just when I thought I'd said about all I could say on aspects of the Japanese government organization and operation, two excellent articles come to my attention. One addresses an issue that I have not directly covered in my previous posts. The second provides more background on an issue I did cover before. I will spend most of this post talking about the first issue, which is the lack of transparency in the way the Japanese government has acted in the past.

An interesting article in the Japan Times in the past week highlights differences in transparency in the US and Japan, using TMI and Fukushima as examples. It looks at both similarities and differences. Journalists covering both events described information coming from the respective government agencies as the events unfolded as "chaotic," "confusing" and "contradictory." Part of the real-time problems in both cases may be the almost inevitable confusion that seems to arise when information is coming in piecemeal and being redistributed the same way. In the case of Japan, however, the problems the journalists observed may have been exacerbated by the fact that it now appears that some information was withheld.

But what the article observes is the real difference between the two incidents is in the ability to reconstruct after the event what happened and what was discussed as the incident unfolded. In the US, even in the midst of the crisis, and I might add, at a time when the technical options were more limited, the NRC continued to follow the requirement to make records of all discussions that occur when a majority of the Commissioners meet. Because some of these meetings took place at odd times and places, the article reports that NRC staff carried tape recorders that they could turn on any time three Commissioners were present. Later, transcripts were made which provided a valuable record of what the NRC did and did not know.

By contrast, the rules in Japan are different. While important decisions must be recorded, until recently, the discussions leading up to those decisions did not necessarily have to be recorded. In particular, transcripts are required for formal meetings but not for impromptu meetings. The legal standing of the group holding the meeting also has allowed many meetings to take place without a record of them being made.

The good news is that a new law went into effect at the beginning of the Japanese fiscal year in April that establishes the same recording requirements for all government agencies, and extends recording requirements to cover the whole decision-making process. The bad news is that this law was not in effect in the immediate aftermath of Fukushima. Therefore, many critical meetings were held following Fukushima for which no records exist, and it may prove impossible to fully figure out what did happen in the interactions between the government and TEPCO. As a result, it will be more difficult to assure that any shortcomings are corrected in the future.

Japan does have an equivalent to the US Freedom of Information Act--the Information Disclosure Law which has been in effect since 2001. Under this law, citizens can request whatever governmental records do exist regarding the accident. However, the record will clearly have major gaps due to the lack of complete records relating to decisions, and some critics cited in the article believe that government officials will take a bureaucratic anti-disclosure stance. The fact that the world's eyes are upon them may make this more difficult. Time will tell.

The second article of interest to me this past week, also in the Japan Times, was about a reformist bureaucrat. Of particular relevance were his views on amakudari, which I addressed in an earlier blog post. The article covers much of what I covered before--that is, the Japanese government is an "up or out" system, so many bureaucrats must leave the government with inadequate pensions and years of productive working life left. The system that has evolved has them outplaced into government-affiliated organizations or private companies that are connected in some way with the ministry where they worked. Therefore, they have a powerful self-interest in protecting and supporting the industries they are supposed to be regulating. The article adds some further details and examples. It also observes that private sector workers may have the same inclination to manipulate systems to their own benefit, but the competition between their firm and other firms helps keep this tendency in check. There are no such "checks and balances" within the government.

At present, there is a bill in the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) that would institute some government reforms. However, the article says that the prospects for the success of this bill are uncertain, and in any event, it does not address the system of amakudari at all.

***

ANS and Women:

2011-08-24T09:44:00.001-07:00

My Early Days in ANS

This posting will be a little off the usual topics of this blog. It is spurred by an upcoming blog in the ANS Nuclear Cafe that will feature the personal stories of several women in the nuclear field. I am pleased to be one of the women asked to share my thoughts there. I wanted to use my allotment of the space on the ANS page to explain why I think volunteer work for one's professional society is important, and not to take up that valuable space with personal stories. Nevertheless, the exercise got me to reminiscing, so I will tell more of the back story here.

My story is not a typical one, and I am not presenting it as a model to follow. Part of this story (along with more than you really need to know about the rest of my career) has already been recounted in the July 2001 issue of Nuclear News, but there is more that I am telling here for the first time.

Most people get involved in their technical societies through their technical work. They present a couple of papers, maybe organize a session--and then later, perhaps, go into governance. My path was a little different.

When I joined the ANS in 1969, I was a grad student at MIT. I really had very little idea of what a professional society did, but I was told I should join, and the student rate was cheap, so I did. But I did not get involved at all in any student section activities.

I finished my doctorate and moved to the Washington, DC area in 1972. The November meeting was in Washington that year, so I prepared and submitted a paper on my thesis, which had been on radiation damage studies using proton channeling. This would be my first paper presented at a professional meeting, and since it was in my local area, I wanted my husband, Mike, to come lend some moral support.

I duly registered him for the meeting, and when we picked up the registration material, we noticed something odd. The badge was pink! In those days, the non-technical program for guests of attendees was called the "Wives' Program." My husband turned to me and said, "You ought to do something about this." And so I did. I complained to the management, and the "Wives' Program" became the "Guest Program" shortly thereafter.

But that incident started me thinking. I had always assumed that the nuclear field was different from all other fields with respect to gender equality. After all, one of the earliest leaders of the field, Marie Curie, was a woman. Somehow, I hypothesized that this should mean that the men in the field recognized the equal capability of women. I decided to ask ANS if I could test that hypothesis by doing a survey of the female members of ANS.

This, of course, required me to ask for approval--and support--for such a survey, and was my first real brush with Society governance. If I would do the work, they agreed to authorize the activity and cover the postage. (There was no e-mail in those pre-historic days, let alone LinkedIn, Google + or Facebook!) In due course, I prepared a survey, ANS sent it out, and I received and analyzed the answers. To my surprise (really!), the results did not support my hypothesis at all. Women in the ANS suffered all the problems that women in other fields were experiencing at that time. There was even one added issue. Because of the effects of radiation on unborn children, some companies were effectively barring all women of child-bearing age from all activities that might expose them to radiation, just in case.

My involvement with the ANS might well have ended there, except that I received a phone call from a stranger one day. She introduced herself on the phone. It was Gail de Planque. She was one of the women who had received and responded to the survey, and now she had a question for me. "What are you going to do next?" "Next?" I replied. I hadn't thought that far ahead. "What you need to do," she told me, "is to put together a special session on women's issues for the upcoming ANS meeting." "How do you do that?" I asked. I hadn't a clue. So she and I partnered and co-chaired a very successful session that covered my survey and a number of other issues of interest to women.

In the course of developing and running the session, Gail introduced me to a number of other active members of the Society, and I was getting to know the ropes. Octave du Temple, the Executive Director of the ANS at the time, made it a point to seek me out at meetings and ask how I was doing. A few years later, Clyde Jupiter asked me to serve as Assistant Technical Program Chair for the November meeting when it was again in Washington, DC. I knew nothing about organizing technical sessions, but he was a patient teacher, and being on the conference committee helped me meet other people in the local nuclear community. Shortly after that, I was asked to serve on the Honors and Awards Committee. I knew nothing about honors and awards either, but I realized that being on a committee helped me get approval from my boss to attend meetings, so I said yes. At the time, I worked for a company whose work was mostly classified, and in any event, was outside the mainstream of ANS activity, so presenting papers on my work was not an option.

Following that, one committee assignment led to another. I used to joke to my husband that the ANS management noticed I had a lot of energy, and was trying to channel my energy where they wanted it and not leave me to my own devices. Perhaps there was some truth to that, but by the time I started chairing subcommittees, then committees, I realized that managing a volunteer activity was a bit tricky. There is no stick, and there is very little carrot! So you really need someone who has ideas, energy, and follow through. You always do professional society work in addition to your day job, so it's nice to work with people who deliver without a lot of nagging. And someone who can produce a good product and meet deadlines is worth his or her weight in gold. Or maybe in uranium!

So pretty soon, I found myself involved in a number of different aspects of ANS. The work was interesting and I got to know a lot of fascinating people I would not otherwise have met. I was awed that I was rubbing elbows with people who were real movers and shakers in the field. Over time, I also learned a lot from side conversations about parts of the nuclear field outside my own. So whenever someone asked me to participate in something new, I always found it hard to say no. I got to know many different facets of the Society--honors and awards, scholarship, planning, program, finance, international. I always started out with very little knowledge of an area, but I invariably developed a strong interest in each area. Although I put a lot of time into ANS, I felt I got a lot out of it, too. I had a chance to do things like prepare proposals and lead activities that I later was able to draw upon when I was faced with doing these types of things in my paying job.

For me, involvement in my technical division (nuclear installations safety) and my local section came after service on a number of the governance committees and on the ANS Board of Directors. That is perhaps the opposite of how most ANS members get involved in ANS, and while I wouldn't particularly recommend that approach as the optimal one, it certainly worked well in my case, leading ultimately to my serving as president of ANS (2001-2). And the skills I gained, the knowledge I picked up, and the connections I made served me in good stead throughout my career as well.

Sometimes, when I reflect back on my service in ANS, the contacts I made there, and the progression of my career, I wonder what would have happened if ANS had not handed my husband a pink badge in 1972!

***

Good News in the Nuclear World:

2011-08-22T19:59:00.000-07:00

Reflecting on a Good Week

Left: Tomari Nuclear Power Station, Hokkaido, Japan; Right: Indian Point Energy Center, Buchanan, New York

For a change, most of the news on the nuclear front this past week seemed to be good:

- One reactor in Japan that had been down for repairs was permitted to restart by the local authorities. Under the Japanese system, approval from the local government is a step in the restart process after outages at nuclear power plants. It had been expected that local opposition might make it difficult for local government officials to give such approval, so getting that first approval is a positive sign. Of course, other regions and other government officials may respond differently, and any further hiccups at Fukushima could continue to erode public confidence, but for now, there is at least one sign that cooler heads can still prevail in Japan.

- The Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) approved the completion of the Bellefonte nuclear power plant. No board members voted against the move. There had been some vocal local opposition, which included demonstrators costumed as zombies, but they did not sway a single member of the board. Bellefonte had been under construction when it was cancelled in the late 1980s, so its resurrection is a welcome sign.

- NRC has completed its safety evaluation for two reactors, Summer 2 and 3, proposed for construction by SCANA Corp's South Carolina Electric &Gas and has found no safety issues that would preclude issuing a license for the construction and operation of the plant. A mandatory hearing is still required, but this is a major milestone for that project.

- Despite all the rhetoric from New York's state capital, a poll showed that 49% of the residents near the Indian Point nuclear power plant want it to remain open. While some might not find that terribly impressive--after all, it is technically less than half--there is always an undecided group, so this 49% is actually more than the 40% in favor of shutting the plant down.

Individually, these are small steps, and clearly, this is no time to rest on our laurels. There is much, much more to be done in all these cases, as well as on many other nuclear matters. Still, having four positive events occur in close succession gives some hope that people are getting past the news of the past few months. That, to me, is a very hopeful sign.

***

Observations on Japan and its Nuclear Program:

2011-08-18T13:16:00.001-07:00

Not Anti-Japanese!

A reader said to me recently that it sounded like my recent posts on the Japanese situation were anti-Japanese. I was surprised to hear that, because nothing could be further from the truth. But if he thought that, others might also have the same impression, so I thought I should set the record straight.

First, my husband and I have a long-standing love and affection for all things Japanese. We have visited Japan numerous times, have lived and worked there twice, have seen more of Japan's famous sights than many Japanese (climbed Mount Fuji, traveled to Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and Okinawa, etc.), and have many, many good friends in Japan.

Having lived and worked there, I do feel I have more of an inside view of both its strengths and weaknesses. And truly, every personal trait or national characteristic has both a plus and a minus.

On the plus side, as we all saw in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, the Japanese people--as a whole--are more cooperative, more patient, and more polite, even in the face of unspeakable calamity, than many other nationalities. (I say "as a whole" because I realize that any population exhibits the whole spectrum of human behavior, just in different proportions.) I'll leave it to sociologists to explain why, but I have encountered the kindness and helpfulness of strangers many times in Japan. Also on the plus side, I have never seen a more diligent and dedicated workforce.

On the minus side, maybe the same communal perspective that encourages people to help each other and to share scarce resources also causes organizations to tend to close ranks and protect each other in the face of a revelation of wrongdoing or misconduct. Maybe the well-known horror at the thought of losing face causes people to try to hide mistakes instead of acknowledging them and fixing them.

Since my last posting, new revelations have come to light about attempts by the Japanese nuclear regulatory authority to "stack the deck" at public meetings, so I think I can stand by my previous observations. I suspect I could draw up a similar set of pluses and minuses for American workers, but the U.S. is not as much in the spotlight at the moment.

The point of bringing these things up is not to try to trash the Japanese character. It is just to try to share my perspective on why events have unfolded as they have, and to point out some of the behaviors that should be considered closely in making decisions about how to revamp the Japanese nuclear industry and its regulators. Just as an individual can train him- or herself to suppress certain behaviors and to emphasize others, or to exercise somewhat different behaviors in different situations, so can an organization.

As the Japanese are grappling with the aftermath of the Fukushima incident, I hope the insights I have offered and may continue to offer can provide some suggestions about what to do in the future.

***

Japanese Regulation:

2011-08-11T11:56:00.001-07:00

The Elements of Independence

The discussions that have been going on in Japan regarding the need for greater independence of the nuclear regulatory organization have, to date, focused mainly on the organizational independence. There are really at least three types of independence that are important--organizational independence, independence from the licensee, and ability of staff to assess the technical situation independently. While these have been discussed separately, it is worth considering them together. This blog post will look at the role each of these characteristics plays in creating an independent agency.

Organizational Independence

Organizational independence is, indeed, important. I have addressed this issue previously, as have others. The placement of the organization within a government's structure does matter because of both the perception and the real possibility that a regulatory organization that is subordinate to other government functions could be subject to pressures to slant its judgments to help support the other missions of the parent body. For example, there could be concerns that a safety issue is dismissed to help assure that power demands can be met. Many other countries originally had regulatory organizations buried within promotional ministries or departments, much as Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) is buried in the Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry (METI). Most have now separated these functions.

Independence from the Licensee

I have previously written about my concern that the Japanese system of amakudari makes it difficult for the regulator to maintain true independence from its licensees. This system, which I believe is unique to Japan, institutionalizes the movement of government employees from an agency into companies regulated by the same agency. People often counter this concern by noting that people move between the government and industry in other countries as well. This is true, and some movement between sectors is probably even a good thing. We all need to understand the issues, constraints, difficulties, and concerns faced by the people and organizations with which we interface. However, in other countries, such movement between sectors occurs in both directions and is based on individual initiative. In fact, there are often even some temporary restrictions on the activities of government officials who move into the private sector. But most importantly, such moves are not managed by the personnel department and do not depend on coordination between government and private organizations as is the case in Japan.

Technical Ability of Staff

Another characteristic of the Japanese government is that the majority of the government employees are generalists. Although the Japanese government does employ some specialists in different fields, the majority of staff, even in highly technical areas, do not have technical degrees or experience in technical fields. Furthermore, the government employment system operates much like the US military and diplomatic personnel systems operate--that is, individuals are rotated to positions throughout their agency, and sometimes to other agencies. Because of this, they do not become specialists in a single area, even after a career in one agency. As a result, government agencies have come to rely heavily on committees of outside experts. Japanese government staff is overly reliant on the advice and is unable to develop any of their own independent assessments. Therefore, they may not be able to recognize it in the hopefully rare case where an expert adviser makes an error. Of course, regulatory agencies in other countries use expert advisers and expert contractors as well. The difference is that the staffers in other countries are capable of reviewing the technical materials developed by others and making independent judgments.

***

Suggested Changes to the Japanese Nuclear Program:

2011-08-05T06:32:00.000-07:00

Guidelines versus Requirements

It has occurred to me that some of my previous posts may sound too much like I think I have a neat set of answers to "fix" the Japanese nuclear program. In trying to make certain points--and to keep my word count under some control!--I have sometimes not gone into all the ifs, ands, and buts to some of my observations.

In particular, I want to step back slightly from any impression that I have tried to present a "how to" for the Japanese government or the Japanese nuclear industry. Most especially, I want to make sure no one thinks that citing a model in the United States or Europe is intended to imply that the model should be copied completely.

The ways in which the nuclear industry and government structures have evolved in each country are a complex blend of the history of nuclear power development in that country, the legal structure, and the typical government organization and staffing. Therefore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to simply duplicate the institutions and practices of one country in another. In fact, I would go farther and say that, even if certain things could be duplicated, they might have unintended negative consequences of their own, simply because a forced fit is probably a bad fit.

To be specific, many have criticized the Japanese government practices of amakudari (early "retirements" from the government to positions in the industries the government agencies control) and of staffing government organizations with highly technical missions with staff who are generalists. In some cases, I have expressed by personal view that some of these practices (particularly the practice of amakudari) need to be changed throughout the Japanese government. Obviously, that is a tall order and may not be the fastest or most practical way to implement the needed change in the nuclear regulatory agency.

If the practices of concern cannot be changed completely, the message is that the underlying weakness of the practice should be addressed. In the case of the practice of amakudari, perhaps the weakness could be overcome by placing government retirees from the regulatory agency in positions in non-nuclear industries. Or, perhaps restrictions could be imposed on what the individuals are able to do. (This latter measure does have a possible model in US practice, but the requirements might have to be even more stringent if there is widespread movement from the government to the private sector.)

In the case of the use of generalists in technical positions, clearly the Japanese practice of using expert committees was an effort to overcome the deficiency of technical talent in the agencies. However, it is my view that this has not proved sufficient. The government does hire some specialists, so it would seem that an alternative solution would be to increase the fraction of specialists. Possibly some better career paths would have to be developed. This would not necessarily follow US or any other national practice, but could be structured to accomplish the same goal--that of assuring that there are staffers within the government who have an independent capability to understand the technical arguments presented to them, whether these are arguments made by the regulated industry, outside technical researchers, or expert committees.

One thing that is very different in the United States is that our nuclear power program is a product of our World War II weapons development program. Part of the legacy of this program is an extensive infrastructure of national laboratories with numerous experimental and test facilities and a large staff of highly trained technical people. Thus, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the US Department of Energy have access to a unique repository of experimental and analytical capabilities and use them on a regular basis to contribute to policy deliberations. In addition, of course, the US government agencies have access to a large academic reservoir of talent.

Even with all this capability, the United States is turning more and more to collaborative arrangements with other countries for research. In part, this is because many research facilities in the US have shut down over the years, and other nations, in some cases, have newer facilities. In part, many countries have come to realize the benefits of sharing the costs of expensive research efforts and of pooling the top talents of several countries.

Therefore, the fact that other countries may not have the equivalent of the US national laboratory infrastructure does not mean that they cannot participate in cutting-edge research activities, and does not mean that they have to try to reproduce a US-style set of national laboratories. Where I have cited the US national laboratory infrastructure, the message should be that there is a need for strong technical support. The ways in which this support can be developed and provided will vary from country to country.

It would be far neater and more satisfying, I suppose, if I could come up with an exact recipe for what the Japanese should do. However, I can't. I may have developed a pretty good understanding of some areas of Japanese activity related to my own interests, but I'm not sufficiently expert in all the ramifications of the Japanese government personnel system or the entire spectrum of the research community to give precise formulas for anyone to follow. Specific measures need to be developed with inputs from experts in all these areas.

What I hope my previous posts have done is to outline what I see as some fundamental concerns that I have had, and that others may share. My hope is that these insights can be useful at this time, when the Japanese are making many changes as a consequence of the events triggered by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

***

Nuclear Regulatory Independence in Japan:

2011-07-24T15:55:00.001-07:00

The Role of Technical Capability

One area that has been somewhat neglected in the discussions of regulatory independence in Japan is the role of the technical capability of the regulatory staff. In the long run, this factor is probably as important as the other factors that have been discussed, including the organizational independence and the implications of amakudari, and deserves more attention. I will try to make a few observations here.

One fundamental characteristic of the Japanese government is that the majority of the government employees are generalists. Although the Japanese government does employ some specialists in different fields, the majority of staff, even in highly technical areas, do not have technical degrees or experience in technical fields.

Furthermore, the government employment system operates much like the US military and diplomatic personnel systems operate--that is, over the course of their careers, individuals are rotated to positions throughout their agency, and sometimes to other agencies, in a deliberate career-building process managed by personnel departments. As in the US military and diplomatic systems, individuals "belong" to/have a lifetime employment promise from the agencies that hired them originally and a permanent transfer to a new agency, e.g. the independent regulator, raises complex career questions. (This helps explain why Japanese government reorganizations are very infrequent.)

One of the objectives of the process is for senior employees to have achieved a broad understanding of the full range of activities of their organization, rather than to have an in-depth understanding of any single part of the agency's activity. Thus, for an agency like NISA's parent agency, the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), which has a large scope of responsibility, an individual may move from positions dealing with the oil sector to the nuclear sector to the manufacturing sector to international trade to economic development, without ever becoming a qualified expert in any single areas.

As a result of this process, government agencies have come to rely heavily on committees of experts, mostly drawn from universities and sometimes including retirees from industry. These experts have in-depth technical training and are able to review technical matters and provide advice to government agencies. As far as I can tell, the advice is usually good. The problem is that the staff is overly reliant on the advice and is unable to develop any of their own independent assessments. Therefore, they may not be able to recognize it in the hopefully rare cases where an expert adviser makes an error. There is also a danger that accidental biases in committee selection could bias results and give less attention to certain issues.

In 1992, I was working at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and I was assigned to spend 6 months at the regulatory organization in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the predecessor to NISA in METI. My assignment was to monitor the Japanese efforts to license the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR), which NRC was then gearing up to do. I remember once asking a staff member at MITI what the basis was for a decision they were making on the licensing of the ABWR. The answer I got was that an advisory committee member said so. When I asked how the advisory committee member had come to that conclusion, the MITI staffer did not know. It was sufficient that he had the word of the advisory committee member. I found it troubling at the time that he had absolute confidence in something that he could not, and did not try to, verify for himself. After all, anyone can make a mistake, even an expert.

Once again, as always, such technical independence is a matter of degree. People could point to the US NRC, and I suppose to every other nuclear regulatory organization in the world, and note that it gets a lot of technical input from outside. The NRC, in particular, has a statutory standing advisory committee, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as well as other advisory groups. In addition, it contracts with the national laboratories, universities, and other organizations to conduct experimental research and to provide technical reports on a number of subjects.

Nevertheless, there is a critical difference--the staff at the NRC, which has about the highest percentage of advanced degrees of any agency in the US government--is capable of independently reviewing and understanding the advice and reports it receives. When an NRC staffer stands up before the Commission or other body to discuss a study produced under a contract he or she managed, that staffer can explain the technical basis for the conclusions of the study.

Like amakudari, the practice of staffing government agencies with generalists is embedded deeply within the Japanese government system and will be a difficult one to overcome. However, the government does employ a small number of technical specialists, so there is some recognition that people with such capabilities are necessary. It seems to me that, along with the the other reforms to the nuclear regulatory system that the Japanese is considering, provisions should be developed to increase the percentage of technically trained staff in the new regulatory organization. Such a change will go a long way toward addressing one fundamental barrier to true regulatory independence in Japan.

***

Fukushima and Coverups:

2011-07-22T14:46:00.001-07:00

Eraser Society

I am now going to risk compounding the error of working outside my area of expertise. In a recent blogpost, I talked about the revelation that TEPCO engineers were concerned about a GE decision on the placement of the diesel generators at Fukushima, but that nothing was apparently done about their concern. I attributed this to a social tendency no to want to make waves. I can't tell whether the engineers are to be "blamed" for not raising the issue, or whether the issue was raised, but TEPCO management is to be "blamed" for not challenging GE. Whatever the case, I noted that the behavior fits with the fact that I have learned that children in Japan are taught that "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down."

This started me thinking about whether there are other character traits that may influence safety at nuclear facilities, and I recalled the several instances of coverups that have been revealed over the years at different nuclear facilities. The most well known may be the Monju coverup, but there have been others, including one at Fukushima in 2002. Now, no one from any culture really wants to acknowledge a mistake, and in this case, I don't know what Japanese children are taught, but I do recall several experiences when I lived in Japan that make me wonder if there is a different tolerance for error. I do know that I was always taught that we all make mistakes. The point is to learn from them. Maybe Japanese children are taught that. Maybe not.

What I do recall though, is several instances where I felt a Japanese person made an inordinate effort to "hide" an error, or even an apparent error. In one case, I was talking to an administrative person about arranging a trip. She was making notes in pencil as I laid out my plans. Several times, I started to propose one schedule, then changed my mind. It was my mistake, really. Each time, she industriously erased what she'd written and rewrote the corrected information. Finally, I asked what she was going to do with the paper. She was only going to use it to type out the travel authorization form. I was left wondering why she didn't just cross out the incorrect information.

I never got a satisfactory answer, but sometime later, someone left me a note telling me that the meeting room for an upcoming meeting had been changed. The note was written on yellow lined paper, but something had been whited out with a liquid erase product. You could see that a mistake had been made, but you couldn't see any more what the mistake was. Again, I wondered why not just cross it out? Why use this product, wait for it to dry, and rewrite over that.

Shortly after that, I was walking down a Tokyo street and a local gym was handing out a promotional product. Such handouts are a long-standing advertising commercial tradition in Japan, and the handouts include small useful items, such as packets of tissue, pencils, pens, and pads of sticky notes, all carrying the corporate name. In this case, I was handed what looked like a pencil, but when I got it home and looked more closely, it was an eraser encased in a plastic tube that could be pushed up as it was used up. I remember thinking at the time that pens and pencils would be good giveaways in the US, but I doubted that anyone would use an eraser. At that point, I jokingly started saying that the Japanese were an "eraser society."

(As an aside, one Japanese person to whom I'd made that statement retorted that their erasers were much better than ours! He was right. Their erasers never smeared the pencil lead. Which probably only reinforced my point.)

Now, perhaps I am blowing a few small observations out of proportion. Perhaps the admin person who erased her notes or the other person who whited out his mistake on a casual note were just a couple of unusually compulsive people. And as I already noted, no one likes to be caught making a mistake, and a lot of individuals will cover up mistakes if they think they can get away from it. I'm sure anyone can find dozens of instances in the US, in Europe, and everywhere else. But these small cases, and the eraser giveaway, and some of the well-publicized cases in the Japanese nuclear industry that went all the way to the top of their organizations, have made me wonder if there isn't something to my observation.

If there is, the response of the Japanese nuclear establishment should be to follow some of the examples outside Japan, where people are trained in the importance of not hiding problems, and there is a concerted effort to foster an environment where people are not punished for admitting errors. And, just as important, the Japanese nuclear establishment needs to see from the examples that the situation outside Japan is far from perfect in this regard. The importance of not covering up mistakes or errors is one that needs continual reinforcement, and maintaining an environment that allows people to come forward about mistakes without fear of retribution is a constant challenge.

***

Considering the Fukushima Accident:

2011-07-18T04:51:00.001-07:00

Does Culture Matter?

I have given some more thought to the article I cited in my last blog about the placement of the diesel generators being a GE decision. The article stated that some TEPCO engineers were concerned about the decision at the time. It is not clear whether they expressed this concern. Even if they had, it is not clear what TEPCO would have done.

It occurred to me that the incident may reveal some elements of what is said to be the Japanese character. I may be way out of my league here, as I'm not a sociologist. Furthermore, I fully believe every culture and nationality has a full range of personalities. Not every American behaves like a cowboy, and not every Japanese conforms to the socially cooperative behavior supposedly associated with an agriculturally-focused society. Still, we saw in the aftermath of Fukushima that many Japanese did cooperate, share, take their turn, exercise patience, not loot or steal (even when they'd lost everything), etc., much better than we tend to think Americans would do in a similar situation. So maybe there are some tendencies that can be explored.

And I did live in Japan, which I hope gives me a little more insight into matters of national character. I do know, because a number of people have told me, that Japanese children grow up being taught "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down." By contrast, I don't know if we are taught in terms of such a homily, but I know that part of my upbringing was the message that "I was only following orders" was not a good excuse.

So I'm not terribly surprised to see that part of the issue in Japan may have been that the Japanese engineers didn't stand up to authority when they should have. Or, more insidious still, that they did stand up, but were ignored.

Clearly, every personality characteristic has its pluses and minuses, the times where the trait shines and the times where the trait fails the individual or society. Cowboys are independent and self-sufficient, but going it alone doesn't always work--either at nuclear power plants or anywhere else. Social conformity makes for more harmonious interpersonal interactions, but can discourage independence of thought or action where it is needed. So the point is not to change things 180 degrees, but rather to establish the conditions that can enable the appropriate behavior for each situation.

Challenging authority is always a difficult proposition, and I won't pretend that the situation is perfect in the US. But the US government has had a law since 1989 that provides for the protection of Federal whistleblowers, and in addition, the NRC has a system for handling differing professional opinions (DPOs). Whistleblowers in industry are protected by a variety of laws that are administered by the US Office of Whistleblower Protection. In Japan, such measures seem to be much newer and more limited. The Japanese Whistleblower Protection Act, which became effective in 2006, applies to both government agencies and commercial enterprises.

I do know that many people who have challenged authority in the US would say that these provisions have not been completely effective here. And it is still true that many Americans would talk themselves out of standing up to authority, even with these provisions in place. How much more difficult it must be in a culture where children are trained from their earliest days not to challenge authority.

Nevertheless, having specific provisions in place does encourage some people to step up with concerns and put pressure on organizations to address them. Further development of such measures may be a necessary step at in Japan, and training regarding their provisions, could help change the culture in the organizations building, operating and regulating nuclear power plants in Japan.

***

Post-Fukushima Findings:

2011-07-15T08:31:00.000-07:00

The Origins of the Problem begin to Emerge

Ground zero: Bulldozers (top) take the top off a 35-meter bluff to prepare the site for the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant in the late 1960s in this image taken from the documentary "Reimei" ("Dawn"). Left: The construction site is seen after the leveling work. Right: An excavated area where the emergency diesel generators were installed is seen at the construction site.
Tokyo Electric Power Co. via Japan Times

Until now, our understanding of the Fukushima accident has been focused on information that was immediately available in its aftermath--the size of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the location of the emergency diesel generators, the loss of all onsite and offsite power, etc.

Recently, some new information has begun to emerge, information that may further inform what else needs to be examined at other nuclear power plants, especially in Japan, and what safeguards need to be put in place for the future.

One Japan Times article points to the huge irony that Fukushima Dai-ichi was built on a hill that had been cut down in an effort to make the plant more secure against earthquakes! It is a well accepted practice in earthquake areas to anchor building structures in bedrock in order to increase the stability of the building in case of a severe earthquake. Coupled with the facts that have already come out about how the potential magnitude of the maximum possible tsunami was grossly underestimated, it probably seemed like a reasonable engineering tradeoff at the time. And the subsequent cost tradeoffs also seem rational in that light. Although we cannot know for certain today what damage the plant might have suffered from the earthquake had it not been built in the bedrock, clearly, the decision to level the hill exacerbated the effects of the tsunami.

Like many others, I'm still puzzled that there was not earlier recognition of the earlier large tsunami in that region of the country, but I am not a seismologist, and only know by what I've been reading when and how such information was understood.

A second Japan Times article indicates that the decision on where to place the diesel generators was made by GE, and that some TEPCO engineers are now saying that they had concerns about this decision but that it was the long-standing policy at Japanese utilities (pre-dating nuclear power) not to make alterations to imported designs. What is not clear yet is if anyone at TEPCO or the regulatory authority at the time voiced these concerns.

Surely, this is the first of a lot more of the history of the design and construction of the Fukushima plant that will emerge in coming months. I hope that the outcome will not degenerate into finger pointing. The damage has been done. What is needed now is to learn from it so that no similar events ever happen again anywhere in the world.

***

Comm. Rogers on the Current NRC:

2011-07-02T14:53:00.000-07:00

Too much politicization?

I recently became aware that my former boss, Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers had published a guest column in the Seattle Times addressing what he sees as the politicization the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the current Chairman.

Since I know Japan is now considering how to change its regulatory approach, some of Commissioner Rogers' comments on this issue, and some of my recollections of my time at the NRC, may be useful.

Commissioner Rogers refers to the Principles of Good Regulation, which were developed under his leadership during his time on the Commission. The very first principle is independence. One of the main criticisms of the Japanese regulatory system was its lack of independence--from licensees, from the promotional parts of the government, and from politics. What Commissioner Rogers' guest column makes clear is that an organizational structure can help foster independence, but structure alone is not enough, and saying you are independent is not enough. The ongoing commitment of all parties to maintaining independence is required.

Commissioner Rogers identifies his concerns about some of what we are hearing is happening at the Commission now, and says that, in his 10 years on the Commission, he "even though there were policy disagreements between commissioners...I never identified any initiatives by a member as politically driven."

This is very true. The Commission of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I worked for him, was an excellent model for how a commission should act. The commissioners set the tone. Athough it was surely not perfect, as far as I could ever tell all information was shared, and all the commissioners' offices were invited to meetings where issues were discussed and views were exchanged. The commissioners didn't always agree on everything, but the tone was open and professional. And it was usually apolitical. I once commented to my husband that I usually couldn't tell by their votes what party each commissioner came from. Occasionally, yes. But often not.

By contrast, my husband worked, at the time, for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). There, every vote was strictly along party lines. There, every commissioner actually had either a donkey or an elephant after his name in the annual report! But communications issues are financial issues and nuclear issues are health issues, and therein lies the difference. Or so I thought at the time.

It is for just that reason that I think Commissioner Rogers' guest column is important. As he so eloquently said, the Commission must have "a status of independent, solidly based integrity in which broad public interests rather than narrow partisan interests must dominate. Dedicated adherence to The Principles of Good Regulation could provide the way to get there, if all commissioners shed the political attachments they entertained before joining the commission."

This also is the goal to which the new Japanese regulatory organization, whatever form it takes, must constantly strive.

***

Rosalyn Yalow:

2011-06-23T10:06:00.000-07:00

A Nuclear Pioneer

I was traveling when I learned of the death of Rosalyn Yalow, so this is my first opportunity to mention the passing of Rosalyn Yalow on May 30, 2011, and to pay tribute to someone I regard as a true nuclear pioneer. She is a pioneer not only for her professional contributions, but also because she succeeded in an era when women were largely barred from the laboratories and universities.

Perhaps the best account of her remarkable career is her own autobiography, written at the time she received her Nobel Prize in 1977. While her work had nothing to do with nuclear power plants, she made huge contributions to the use of radiation in medicine, so I feel it is appropriate to note her accomplishments in this blog. In particular, she was the co-developer of the radioimmunoassay technique, a technique that uses radioisotope tracing to measure various biological substances in human blood and in other fluids. This technique has been used in numerous medical areas, including among other things, diabetes research and screening of blood donors for hepatitis.

I feel privileged to have met Dr. Yalow in the early 1980s. I was, at the time, working for the Congressional Research Service (CRS). During that time, I covered a number of congressional hearings in areas of science and technology. Dr. Yalow testified at one of the hearings I had covered, and during a break, I was able to talk to her.

She was one of my role models, a Jewish woman and a civil servant--a rare combination in the upper echelons of the scientific community. And in this day and age, when civil servants are often vilified, she presented a stellar example of the kinds of contributions that a civil servant can make to the world.

My interaction with her confirmed something that I have observed a number of times--some of the most prominent people I know of, people who really have far more important things to do than to talk to me, often prove the nicest. With all that was going on in the hearing room, and all the other people clamoring to talk to her, she gave me a few minutes of her undivided attention.

Among other things, I just had to tell her that my mother was a Hunter College graduate, as Dr. Yalow was, and had attended college there at about the same time. I hoped one of the two of them would be able to tell me that their paths had crossed, but alas, neither of them remembered the other (and they were not in the same graduating class).

But their experiences bore some parallels. My mother started her college career interested in science, but decided that she would not be able to get a job in that field and turned to other areas. That was, at the time, the sane and sensible thing to do. Dr. Yalow took another path, one that at the time must have seemed risky at times. There have been many reports of the indignities she suffered early in her career, both as a woman and a Jew, and I won't repeat them here. Suffice it to say that the fact that she managed to overcome them seems nearly miraculous to me. When we won her Nobel Prize, I kind of wish someone had interviewed some of the people who belittled her and who shut her out and asked them what they thought now!

More relevant to me is that her persistence, and her success once some doors opened to her, helped clear the path for all the women who followed her into science and engineering careers. Even though her field was somewhat different, it was Dr. Yalow and women like her who helped make my own career possible, as well as the careers of many other women in the workforce today.

When we think of the women pioneers, we often go back to the very beginnings--to people like Marie Curie and Lise Meitner. We should not forget that obstacles remained for many years after them, obstacles that were slowly and painfully cleared by people like Dr. Yalow and many more whose names may not be household words.

So it is with special reverence that I mourn Rosalyn Yalow's passing, and honor her for her contributions, both to science and to female scientists everywhere.

***

Nuclear Regulation:

2011-06-17T09:11:00.000-07:00

Finding the Right Balance

The recent focus on nuclear reactor regulation, both in Japan and in the US, is a reminder of just how difficult it is to find the right balance. As the Japanese now move toward their stated goal of changing their regulatory system, they should be reminded by events in the US and elsewhere that this is only the first step in a continuing process. If they need no other evidence, they can look to the recent NRC meeting on the preliminary findings of the post-Fukushima review of their own regulation of US plants.

Indeed, the role of the regulator is often an uneasy one. Those against a technology or enterprise will always feel that the regulators are not exercising enough oversight, and those in favor of it will always feel that the regulators are exercising too much oversight. One of the most educational experiences I had in my 14 years at NRC was a meeting--I have forgotten the topic--at which the industry and its opponents could agree on only one thing: that the NRC was doing it all wrong!

At the time, my temptation was to conclude that, if the parties at both extremes were unhappy with us, and for opposite reasons, maybe we were doing just the right thing! Of course, once I enunciated that theory, someone pointed out that this conclusion did not necessarily follow from the evidence, and I have since been very careful about making such statements.

However, the observation that NRC is usually a convenient target for all sides of an issue is one that has recurred repeatedly in the years since that meeting. Perhaps it is usually not so dramatic as when all parties were in the same room, but nevertheless, on issue after issue, I will read one article that claims that the NRC is soft on industry, while another claims, with equal fervor, that the NRC is regulating nuclear power to death.

The other age-old problem of regulation that we have discovered time and again is that fixing one thing sometimes exacerbates another. There are a number of examples from the annals of nuclear regulation, and I'm sure some of my readers have their favorites. Perhaps one of the easiest for a lay person to understand is that making access to portions of the plant more difficult to improve security may also make it more difficult for people to move around the plant in case of an emergency.

Thus, more is not always better in regulatory space, and one of the perennial problems of regulation is to continually refine regulation in the light of new evidence. In fact, the balance exists on several planes. One is the balance between different regulatory objectives (such as the security vs. emergency access situations noted above). Another is the balance between absolute safety and practicality. A quote I once read said that the only absolutely safe vehicle is one that has so many safety features that it is too heavy to move. So it is with nuclear power plants. The trick is to find the right mix of features that provide the necessary assurance of safety and still allow the vehicle to operate.

Regulation must also continue to evolve. It is tempting to say that, after so many years of nuclear power plant operation, we should have figured everything out. However, nuclear plants operate in a world that isn't static. As noted, sometimes we make a change in the plants that have unexpected consequences. Other times, things outside the plant change. 9/11 is perhaps the biggest external change agent we have faced in recent years, but there have been others.

So perhaps the biggest message for the Japanese government is that changing the regulatory system, while a necessary step, will not alone solve the problem.

***

Replacing Nuclear Power:

2011-06-11T09:34:00.000-07:00

And Other Fantasies

Individuals who are anti-nuclear or just plain afraid of nuclear have long harbored the illusion that existing nuclear power is easy to replace. "Just build more solar arrays," I have heard, or "Just put up more windmills." Few are aware of how long it takes to build any new capacity in substantial quantities.

While individuals can, perhaps, be forgiven for not being able to "do the math" and figure out what is really involved in substituting for a substantial fraction of a nation's electricity supply, it is more troubling when countries start subscribing to the same myths, as several countries have done in the last couple of weeks.

Not surprisingly, given its history, Germany has led the way. "We'll just build more renewable energy sources and improve the grid," the government has said. Switzerland soon followed. Grudgingly, the governments are acknowledging that their move in this direction means that they will burn more fossil fuels, at least in the near future.

Actually, it will probably mean that they will build more fossil fuels for quite some time, as they are acknowledging that the shutdown of nuclear plants will require new fossil fuel capacity. It is hard to see them building new fossil-fueled power plants for just a few years of operation. Therefore, the first casualty of the German and Swiss decision is the effort to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases.

What Germany and Switzerland are not acknowledging is that they will actually not cut their effective use of nuclear power by very much. One advantage of the interconnected European grid is that they can draw on power produced by their neighbors. This allows them to self-righteously proclaim that they are leading the world to a newer, greener nirvana, while they conveniently block out the fact that their neighbors produce much of the electricity by means of nuclear power plants.

As an aside, I should say that I'm not completely sure that France and other neighbor countries can make up for the loss of this much nuclear power without having some negative effects for their own country. So, the second casualty of the German and Swiss decision may be some larger geopolitical consequences.

In any event, Japan doesn't have the luxury of drawing electricity from neighboring countries. Being an island, it is not interconnected to other sources of supply, nuclear or non-nuclear. Therefore, despite the magnitude of the accident, it is surprising and troubling to hear some people in Japan speculate that they may not restart reactors as they shut down for routine maintenance, and that all of Japan's reactors could be closed a year from now. While this may be an extreme view, even the less extreme views seem to be disconnected with reality.

It is true that there is a lot of local opposition to nuclear power at the moment, and the concern of the public is understandable. However, Japan is already suffering power shortages with the plants that are currently shut down. And it isn't even the height of summer there yet.

Even before the accident, Japan had a tight power supply by Western standards. Of course, I know that Americans use more energy than other industrialized nations, and that other countries maintain a standard of living similar to ours with a lower per capita energy expenditure. Still, having lived in both Japan and France, I can say from personal experience that not only are homes smaller in Japan than elsewhere, but the supply of electricity per household is also smaller.

Therefore, I am disappointed to see Japan appearing to retreat from reality. Germany and Switzerland may be able to survive with their heads in the sand, while others feed their thirst for electricity, but Japan has no such options. So a consequence of the directions Japan is beginning to take may have severe consequences on the Japanese economy.

In short, the rosy optimism countries seem to have that they will "just" replace nuclear power with other sources of electricity is likely to have some serious negative consequences, both within their own borders and around the world.

***

Nuclear Revival:

2011-05-29T06:08:00.000-07:00

A Scientific American View

After having reported a couple of months ago that Scientific American readers were not as positive about nuclear energy as I would have expected, I was pleased to see an article in a subsequent issue of Scientific American providing a very positive report on the US nuclear revival.

In particular, the article does not focus on the reactors of the future, which one might expect from a science-oriented publication, but rather reports on the current construction projects in the US, particularly the Southern Nuclear Operating Company project at Plant Vogtle and the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company project at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.

The Scientific American report is basically positive, touting the two projects as currently being on time and on budget. In addition, it mentions the Tennessee Valley Authority efforts to complete Watts Bar Unit 2, and the applications for 20 or so other reactors being reviewed by the NRC. It also summarizes a few of the factors aiding this revival--the lessons learned from construction projects abroad, the increased supply of large forgings, and the new fuel fabrication capabilities in the US.

On the other hand, it notes Constellation Energy's withdrawal from the Calvert Cliffs project, and notes that other US nuclear projects have been dropped or delayed, and it includes the usual statement about the lack of a waste disposal facility.

They quote Marvin Fertel, President of the Nuclear Energy Institute, several times in the article. Most notably, he says, "There will be a lot of [new] plants between now and 2050, just not a lot between now and 2020."

This article was written before Fukushima, but a later editorial in Scientific American, published after the March accident, addresses the potential impacts of the Fukushima accident. This article raises the concern that abandoning nuclear power would leave us with alternatives that are more harmful to people and the environment, or that are far from sufficient in availability. It does find fault with both the NRC and the nuclear industry, and some in the industry might take issue with particular statements. Yet, the overriding message I take from the article is that the problems it identifies are manageable, and it proposes that reactor designs and regulatory processes be improved rather than that nuclear power should be ditched.

While all the information in the two articles will be well known to most readers of this blog, I always find it interesting to know what other people are reading, and I was pleased to see this very fair and balanced article in the pages of a publication that is read by a broad spectrum of scientists and engineers.

***

Japanese Nuclear Regulation:

2011-05-13T10:11:00.000-07:00

A Call for Change

After writing a blogpost last week on the Japanese government and nuclear power activities, I realized I might have more insights to offer over time, based on my experiences living and working in Japan. However, I did not think I'd be writing again on that topic so soon.

A recent article in a Japanese publication has moved this topic back up the queue again. (On the other hand, Blogspot just lost a nearly complete draft of this blog, so if they screw up again, there's no telling when this post will see the light of day.)

Asahi (publisher of one of Japan's largest newspapers) recently reported that on May 9, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) recommended the consolidation of all regulatory activities in Japan under a single independent authority. I have felt for a long time that this would be a good idea, and I applaud their action in making this recommendation.

As the article reports, the current responsibility for nuclear regulation is divided among 3 different agencies in Japan:

• The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) operates out of the Prime Minister's Office and is responsible for the basic policy and philosophy of national nuclear safety regulations in Japan.

• The Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) is responsible for the general oversight and inspection of commercial nuclear power plants and other facilities, and for the enforcement of national regulations for nuclear power.

• The Nuclear Safety Division of the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology (MEXT) has similar responsibilities for experimental and research reactors and facilities using radioisotopes.

While these agencies do interact with each other, the fact that they operate under three different organizations inevitably makes coordination and consistency more difficult to achieve. Outside observers have long found the separation of functions confusing and difficult to track.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that NISA is under the same Ministry as the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), the agency responsible for the promotion of nuclear power (as well as of other energy sources).

In fact, in 1992, I served as a liaison from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to NRC's counterpart in what was then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The regulatory group at that time was actually a part of ANRE, and the offices of the regulatory group were directly across the hall from the offices of the ANRE group responsible for nuclear promotion.

Therefore, when NISA was separated from ANRE in 2001, I thought it was a move in the right direction. However, as the article indicates, the organizations have remained closely linked.

I hasten to say that I never saw any indication that the regulators were directly influenced by their proximity to the promoters, and I certainly cannot at this time attribute any specific elements of the Fukushima incident to the present government organizational structure. Nevertheless, the close day-to-day contact between the regulators and promoters does not generate confidence that the functions are truly separate.

AESJ, which is the nuclear professional society of Japan, has many members who are very familiar with regulatory structures in the United States and other countries, so they are in a good position to understand the strengths and weaknesses of different systems and to know what can work for Japan. Therefore, I consider it a significant step for them to make this recommendation.

Once again, in this time where all things nuclear are under review in Japan, it may be a good moment to achieve a long-needed reform.

***

Fukushima and Amakudari:

2011-05-06T07:29:00.001-07:00

A Problem with a Long History

A number of news articles have been published since the Fukushima accident pointing to the sometimes overly close relationship that exists between the nuclear industry in Japan and its regulators. Since I have lived and worked in Japan, I thought I might be able to help shed some light on these relationships and the reasons for them.

Before I even begin to address the specifics, however, I want to caution readers that some of the articles on "TEPCO" misconduct include some non-TEPCO incidents, specifically Monju and the criticality accident at Tokai-Mura, and do not make it clear that these are not TEPCO facilities or incidents. While the issues may be similar, I think TEPCO has enough to answer for at the moment without ascribing to them incidents in which they are not the principals.

But to get back to the issue of the "cozy" relationships between the regulators and regulated in Japan, I would first point out that the kinds of relationships that are being criticized are not unique to the nuclear power sector in Japan. In fact, the same kinds of relationships exist in many industrial/commercial sectors in Japan. Furthermore, they do not exist for nefarious reasons. That is, no industry in Japan deliberately set out to create a system to insulate itself from criticism. Rather, the kinds of relationships that exist today are a consequence of a military style "up or out" personnel system and an inadequate pension system that results in people in their early to mid-50s being retired from their agencies without a sufficient pension income.

In fact, some people suggest that the problem stems from incomplete reforms introduced during the post-WWII US occupation of Japan and the American attempt to transform an industrial system that was mainly government controlled into a market economy. At that time, ministries were responsible for the operation of industrial organizations in their spheres of control, so the movement of personnel "retiring" from the government agencies to the industries they ran was not unlike movements within branches of any large industrial organization. The US successfully privatized the industries, but did not reform the pension system at the same time.

As a result, the traditional movement of personnel from government agencies to the now-private industries they controlled continued. In fact, it is an institutionalized arrangement, and part of the responsibility of the personnel offices of government agencies is to arrange the outplacement of staffers reaching retirement age, with industries under some pressure to accept the individuals being placed.

Sometimes people will observe that individuals in the US and elsewhere may move from government to industry or vice versa and question why that is any different from the Japanese system. The answer is that it is very different. American civil servants leaving the government and getting positions in industry are not helped by their agencies and therefore do not "owe" their agencies anything. (In fact, US Federal government officials often have certain restrictions on their activities for a period of time after their government employment.)

The Japanese system, often called amakudari, or "descent from heaven" has long been criticized by outsiders. In earlier days, it undoubtedly helped foster the image that used to be called "Japan, Inc." At one time, that mode of operation had considerable benefit for Japan, as it seemed conducive to developing unified positions in confronting the global marketplace. Somewhere along the line, however, that benefit seems to have lessened, and people stopped using that term as much. In fact, at that point, some of the disadvantages of amakudari seemed to emerge, particularly the inefficiencies caused by sometimes force-fitting people into positions for which they were not well matched.

Now, perhaps, a more serious shortcoming of amakudari may have reared its head and it may become more imperative to alter the kinds of relationships that have existed between the regulators and the regulated community.

It would be far too simple to say that reform of the government pension system is the solution to any problem in Japan. Amakudari is certainly not the fundamental cause of the Fukushima crisis, and it is unclear at this time whether any of the problems at Fukushima will be traced to repetitions of the previous instances of TEPCO misconduct and regulatory "indulgence" that have been dredged up by the press. In fact, my guess at this time would be that amakudari is not a factor. Furthermore, there are other Japanese government and industry practices that might also merit scrutiny in the face of current events. Perhaps I might address them in a future blog.

However, getting rid of amakudari will be a giant step in the right direction for an industry that is now under siege, and should help restore the faith of the Japanese people and the world that the nuclear industry--as well as other industries in Japan--will be subject to the kind of regulatory scrutiny the world expects from one one of the most advanced countries in the world.

Many people feel that Chernobyl helped to topple the old Soviet Union. It would be fitting for Fukushima to topple amakudari.

***

Post-Fukushima:

2011-04-23T05:05:00.000-07:00

Some New Directions?

One clear outcome of the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station is that it will focus technology development and regulatory requirements towards the systems that seemed to contribute to the situation at the Japanese plant.

A number of these systems are obvious, of course: spent fuel pools and emergency diesel generators, for example. Others are extensions of some of these, most prominently, the whole issue of spent fuel storage.

Among those taking an early look ahead are Ernest Moniz, former Undersecretary of the US Department of Energy, and now a professor at MIT and director of MIT's Energy Initiative. An article in the Wall Street Journal's blog by Russell Garland covers Moniz's views on why Japan's accident could change US energy policy assumptions. His four top predictions are 1) higher costs, 2) an end-to-end review of waste-storage practices, 3) a revisiting of the 20-year license extensions in the US, and 4) a shift of R&D from advanced fuel systems to issues associated with cladding and other safety-related matters. He points out that US models of energy supply and demand in the coming decades all assume most license renewal applications will be approved, so any delays (or even retractions of licenses already granted) could affect the presumed availability of tens of thousands of megawatts of clean energy.

A paper by Akira Tokuhiro of the University of Idaho, submitted as a short communication to Nuclear Exchange this month, outlines some 14 technical measures that he has identified as an initial set of lessons learned. They start with the issue of cladding, noting that the hydrogen generation that caused so much trouble was produced by the cladding. His other observations relate to the issues mentioned above (such as back-up power, spent fuel pool) as well as to other issues (an offsite control room, valves for emergency core cooling, backup water supply, and more). In addition to looking at the plant itself, he highlights other areas for possible changes, including establishing alternate routes for access to nuclear plants in emergency, and establishing international teams of emergency responders.

A final push may well be enhanced interest in non-traditional reactor technologies. It has already been observed that a pebble-bed design, for example, would not need water for cooling. It is likely, however, that any look at alternative technologies will now give greater scrutiny to other types of accident sequences and their consequences, such as the possibility of pebbles jamming in an earthquake.

While a lot more remains to be learned about the accident before any such measures are adopted and implemented and all these proposals will need further examination, there will clearly be needs in these areas, and it is useful to see a dialogue developing around the question of what we can learn from the recent events.

***

Positive Views on Nuclear Power:

2011-04-14T06:55:00.001-07:00

A Small Bright Light in a Difficult Time

If I can find anything positive coming out of the events in Japan in the last few weeks, it is the number of articles I have seen in a variety of media that continue to speak of nuclear power in a balanced way. Surely, we all believe there are lessons to be learned and we can't be complacent, but increasing numbers of journalists and others appear to recognize that:

The options for a reliable energy supply to meet current and future needs are limited,
All forms of energy supply carry certain risks, and
Nuclear power is better than a lot of other options.

While I have not tried to track down every viewpoint on nuclear energy, here is a sampling that has crossed my computer screen in recent days:

• Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power, by George Monbiot, appearing in The Guardian. Most tellingly, Mr. Monbiot claims to have previously been against nuclear power, but the fact that such a large natural disaster visited upon old plants has still resulted in no public fatalities has persuaded him to support the technology. He goes on to recount some of the shortcomings of other technologies, including the inability of renewables to meet the demands of the United Kingdom. Although one can object to his characterization of nuclear industry leaders as "liars," my point is that he is able to sort the wheat from the chaff and recognize that every technology comes at a cost, and the cost of nuclear power is less than that of the alternatives. (This article is part of a pro-con, with a link to another article claiming that "Fukushima shows us the real cost of nuclear power" and that the economics doesn't add up.)

• Nuclear power is safest way to make electricity, according to study, by David Brown, appearing in the Washington Post. The title is pretty self-explanatory, but in brief, the article covers nuclear vs. other risks (mainly fossil), and even including Chernobyl in its calculus, shows that nuclear power is significantly safer.

• Another article in the Guardian, by Melanie Windridge, also concludes that Fear of nuclear power is out of all proportion to the actual risks. Like the other authors, Melanie Windridge does not dismiss or trivialize the Fukushima incident, but she puts it in the context of other risks to UK residents.

• Similarly, a Financial Post opinion piece by Lawrence Solomon concludes that Dams are Worse. The focus here, as the title suggests, is on dams, which the other articles do not cover. Since dams are also susceptible to earthquakes, this article helps complete the picture painted by the other authors.

• Likewise, another article by George Monbiot, also in the Guardian, points out The double standards of green anti-nuclear opponents. Here, he takes some of the same points, but weaves them in a different way to point out a number of double standards in the arguments of nuclear opponents who cloak themselves in a green mantle. (One small quibble: I think he means nuclear opponents, not anti-nuclear opponents.)

In addition to these, which all come from mainstream media, are some pieces I've seen on websites and blogs. Most surprising, perhaps, a piece on the Treehugger website is titled Nuclear Power's Bad Rap: Coal Is Far More Deadly. As the title suggests, it compares coal and nuclear and concludes nuclear power is the better alternative. Yet another article is a blog post co-authored by Mark Lynas and Chris Goodall entitled The dangers of nuclear power in light of Fukushima. While the title may seem ambiguous, the article goes on to conclude the dangers are not as great as the hype might suggest.

These are by no means all the articles and blogs that have come across my desk--or computer screen--in recent days. It is a representative sampling. Admittedly, I've seen articles from the opposite camp as well--extrapolating from this accident to conclude there are likely to be more accidents at every plant that is older, a BWR, in an area with any probability of earthquakes, or anywhere near a coast--or for that matter, near any body of water. Still, considering that the Fukushima accident was such a significant event and considering that it is still very much in the news, the fact that so many people from outside the discipline can step back and put things in perspective is one bit of positive news in an otherwise difficult time.

***

ANS Japan Relief Fund:

2011-03-28T13:05:00.000-07:00

Donations Welcomed

ANS has set up a mechanism to collect contributions to support our Japanese friends and colleagues who have been affected by the devastating earthquake and tsunami. I am pleased to support this worthwhile effort and have posted a link in the right-hand column of this blog.

***

Fukushima:

2011-03-27T06:51:00.000-07:00

The Devil is in the Details

As the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station continues to unfold, one question on everyone's mind is: Can such an accident happen elsewhere?

The question has several parts. One is the conditions that led to the accident. Clearly, most nuclear power plants are not located in earthquake zones, but some are. Even though the initial evidence is that the tsunami was the main cause of the problems, the earthquake could have been a contributing factor.

Clearly, also, most plants are not located in places where there could possibly be tsunamis, but some are. But are there other natural phenomena that could damage several units--flooding, perhaps, or hurricanes or typhoons?

The other part relates to the plant itself. I've seen a number of articles pointing a finger at plants in the United States that are similar in design to the ones at Fukushima--that is Mark 1 General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Some of these US plants happen to be ones that have been under attack anyway by groups wanting to see the plants shut down. The fact that a plant of similar design has suffered such an accident seems, on its surface, to help justify their arguments to close these other plants.

Those of us in the field know that all these plants are not truly identical, but it has been difficult to get information on the differences, and difficult to explain this point to people whose concerns about nuclear power plant safety have just been ratcheted up by the events in Japan. Indeed it is still unclear which of the many NRC-mandated upgrades to the Mark 1 design over the past decades were implemented in the Japanese units.

TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Thus, I was pleased to see an excellent article by Matthew Wald in today's NY Times that lays out some of the probable plant design differences for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Browns Ferry nuclear power plant. Kudos to TVA for opening their plant to the public eye and helping explain some of these differences.

The article also makes it clear that the TVA personnel are not complacent. Truly, the Fukushima accident has been an eye opener for everyone. We will need to confirm which of the upgrades Fukushima actually implemented and which they did not. Every plant in the world will have to be examined in light of this event, and in some cases, changes will have to be made.

In the meantime, it is very helpful to have a good explanation for some of the differences at other plants that might have helped make a difference at Fukushima--and that would likely make a difference if there were a similarly large external event at another plant.

***

The Fukushima Nuclear Accident:

2011-03-19T08:44:00.000-07:00

Some Observations

Along with the rest of the world, I have spent the past week watching in horror the incredible sequence of events unfold in Japan--a record-breaking earthquake followed by a tsunami, together triggering a series of malfunctions in several units of the Fukushima nuclear power station.

My interest in what is happening in Japan is both professional and personal. On the professional side, I am of course interested in what went wrong at the power plant and why, and on how we can learn from this experience. On the personal side, I have lived in Japan and have many friends there, so I am especially saddened by the multiple tragedies they have suffered. I have even visited Sendai, the city hardest hit by the earthquake and tsunami. It is difficult to imagine the pain so many people in that area are now experiencing, and my thoughts are with them as they face the challenges of rebuilding their shattered lives.

I have deliberately not written anything until now, while I tried to sort through my feelings and to figure out what was really happening. While I still don't feel that I can address the many technical issues, I can comment on some of what I have observed over the past week, and what it might mean in the months and years ahead.

First, it is truly inspirational to think of the bravery of those who have, and still are, been fighting to get the power station under control, all the while knowing they face possible death or disease.

Second, it was a little surprising to me how much misinformation circulated about the unfolding events. It seems that our advanced communications technology spreads disinformation ever more efficiently.

Third, public concerns raised by the accident were only heightened when overly optimistic predictions made by some experts repeatedly proved wrong. While well-meaning, when reassuring predictions turn out to be false, they tend to undermine the credibility of the entire profession.

Fourth, it was somewhat disappointing to observe how some traditional nuclear opponents used the accident as a chance to further their agendas, claiming it as "proof" of their claims about nuclear power, regardless of whether the plant or the circumstances were really relevant to their viewpoints at all.

Finally, it has been heartening to me to see a number of public figures, both in the US and abroad, speak up to say that nuclear power is still needed.

It will be months, and maybe even years before we know the whole story about this accident and assimilate the lessons learned from it. In the meantime, we are already seeing some of the consequences of the event. Some countries have announced that they are slowing or suspending plans to build more plants. Others are likely to follow. The reviews almost all countries are doing of their existing plants may lead to some needs for changes, and perhaps even to a few early plant closures.

Nevertheless, from what we can see today, nuclear power will continue to play an important role in meeting needs for clean energy around the globe. While we will certainly face some challenges, most existing nuclear power plants should be able to continue to operate, and many of the plans for new plants will also continue to move forward.

***

Energy Subsidies:

2011-03-03T06:35:00.000-08:00

A Matter of Perception?

The juxtaposition of events could not have been more timely--and more irritating. I had just gotten through reading my morning paper, the Washington Post, and learning that Martin O'Malley, the governor of my fair state of Maryland, is proposing that Maryland ratepayers pay several dollars more a month to subsidize an off-shore wind farm "at a price far above the market rate and at which its developers agree they could turn a profit." [emphasis added] The fee has been estimated at $1.44 a month for residential customers, but a legislative budget analysis puts the initial fee at more than double that--$3.61. Plus, they would tack on a state administrative fee of $0.15 a month to "study" and write offshore wind regulations. And that's just for starters.

I then walked over to my computer and read the day's newsclips there. Among them was a headline from Nuclear Power Daily stating that, "After 50 Years, Nuclear Power is Still Not Viable Without Subsidies." The article refers to a Union of Concerned Scientists report by almost the same name--"Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable Without Subsidies." [Now, I must point out that, at the time of this writing, is some glitch in the Nuclear Power Daily report, as the link to the UCS report goes to a UCS document with a totally different title: EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions. A brief search, however, revealed the right report, and the links in this blog are to the correct reports.] As expected, the UCS reports apply the term subsidy very broadly, labeling measures such as loan guarantees and Price-Anderson accident liability insurance subsidies, even though they are not funded by our electric bills or taxes.

Now, I'm not sure what UCS would call a $3.76/month direct surcharge on my electricity bill for wind that doesn't always blow, but in this case, I would use the "S-word."

***

Global Nuclear Power Developments:

2011-02-23T11:09:00.000-08:00

A Perspective from Ed Kee

About a week ago, I attended a very interesting ANS DC Section dinner presentation by Ed Kee, Vice President, NERA Consulting, on global nuclear energy developments and prospects. Ed has been making presentations of this type all over the world, and particularly in Asia. I thought it might be useful to highlight a few of the points Ed made that really struck me.

As we all know, most of the action these days is taking place in Asia, with China leading the way. (In fact, "China leads the way" was the subtitle of his talk.) Ed pointed to some good reasons why, namely the fact that their nuclear enterprise is a government enterprise and that they are building in multiples. He noted that government control yields much greater certainty than a free market does, and that the government has deeper pockets than private enterprise when it comes to making investments that do not pay back for years. Furthermore, the fact that the Chinese are building a number of similar reactors allows them to reap the benefits of economies of scale.

He contrasts this situation with the case of the United States, with an increasingly merchant plant approach to providing electricity and lower demand growth, and to developing countries, which generally need only one or two reactors. In addition to the fact that the current numbers of planned and proposed reactors in China are much greater than the number in the US, he notes that the prospects for the planned reactors in China are probably firmer than the prospects for those in the US.

He also provided a look at the export market. Here again, he notes that government-controlled programs often are able to offer better prices than corporations. He pointed particularly to the potential attractiveness of the Russian "build-own-operate" model. He also saw increasing competition from Korea, and possibly from China, in the future.

For developing countries, one interesting observation Ed offered is that most countries interested in nuclear power see reactors as more than a source of electricity. They also want some local content and local industrial development, and to become a part of the global nuclear supply chain.

For the future, he sees that most of the action will come from government-run programs, such as in China and Russia. He paints a bleaker picture for merchant plant projects, seeing them as subject to both project risks (first-of-a-kind risks, cost overruns, etc.) and long-term market risks (changes in demand, future carbon taxes and/or requirements for renewables, etc.), and believes that new merchant power plants will require some form of government assistance, such as the loan guarantee program in the US.

Among the comments I heard from other attendees on the way out were the thoughts that it was difficult to argue with much of what Ed had presented, but that it was not an optimistic picture as far as the US is concerned. The caveat, of course, is what will happen with loan guarantees, and in the longer run, carbon taxes. And in my mind, a lot depends on what happens with the first round of projects now underway.

***

Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy:

2011-02-17T08:46:00.000-08:00

Are People Finally Getting It...or Not?

I recently discovered several items I had squirreled away a couple of months ago for possible use in a future blog, along with notes on what I wanted to say. They related to the same subject--public opinion on nuclear energy. The only trouble is, the items led me to very different conclusions about whether the general public, and even the technically savvy general public, is "getting it."

On the one hand, I ran into was a couple of articles in the press that seemed to suggest that some people, at least, are finally starting to understand the issues that the nuclear industry has been struggling with in recent years. Two articles, in particular, struck me:

The first was a column by Christopher Booker published in The Telegraph on a new wind farm off the Kent coast. Billed as "the world's largest wind farm," the site opened to claims that the wind turbines had "the capacity" to produce 300 MW of electricity. "Not so," said Booker, citing the British government's own numbers that the load factor for Britain's offshore windmills was only about 1/4 of their capacity last year. Accounting for that, plus the substantial subsidies the wind farm will receive over its lifetime, Booker paints a far different picture.

The second piece I saw was an editorial entitled "Energy Roulette" in my own "local" newspaper, The Washington Post. The editorial explicitly calls for a technology-neutral carbon reduction standard, saying that, if "the government interest is in reducing climate change...why should government aid only wind and solar?" Why not nuclear power? And why not include natural gas "in some way"? The editorial takes on the usual counter claim--that nuclear power requires fuel and produces waste, so isn't truly renewable--saying "that's just the sort of thinking that leads to ever more distorted energy markets" and cites the complex and sometimes unwanted effects of the multiple government interventions. "Lawmakers should put their carbon-cutting policies in terms of carbon reduction and stop trying to decide who wins and who loses."

With more of this kind of enlightened assessment, I thought, maybe there is hope for the future!

Then I read an issue of Scientific American with a report on a survey of its readers on how they view a number of scientific issues. My first reaction on reading about this survey was that it just had to show positive results for nuclear power--after all, this was an audience of people who understood technology.

I was therefore surprised to find that the results were much more mixed than I had anticipated. A surprising 47% thought that nuclear power should be phased out, and only about 1/4 of Americans (and far fewer Europeans) were "totally comfortable" with nuclear power.

Now, I don't think we should make the mistake of assuming all readers of Scientific American are scientists. I remember subscribing to this publication when I was a kid. Still, the readership is one that has a strong interest in science, and hopefully, a reasonable level of scientific literacy.

Therefore, while I don't think too much importance should be attached to any one survey, these results make me wonder if attempts to educate the public on nuclear power need to start with the so-called scientifically literate population.

Nuclear Engineers and Marriage:

2011-02-09T02:10:00.000-08:00

At the Top of the List

I was intrigued by a report in the Washington Post a couple of months ago on divorce rates by profession. With Valentine's Day just ahead of us, I thought it would be a nice time to discuss the report. What startled me most was that the study actually called out "nuclear engineers" as a category. When you think about it, nuclear engineers are such a small number compared to other engineering disciplines--civil, mechanical, electrical, chemical--that we often get lost in the noise. I've read many a salary survey where I didn't find nuclear engineers identified and had to make a guess at which larger engineering group we most closely mirrored.

However, there it was. A study of divorce and separation rates for Americans in 449 job categories, and nuclear engineering was one of them.

The study used 2000 census data to identify Americans who listed themselves as divorced or separated, and categorized them by occupation. Three types of engineers--agricultural, sales, and nuclear engineers--were among the 10 occupations with the lowest divorce rates. While the news article did not give numbers for nuclear engineers, I dug a little further and found a briefing on the subject that lists nuclear engineers 9th with a divorce rate of 7.29%.

The article speculates that the numbers could be an artifact of the methodology. Someone who divorced and remarried quickly within the census period would show up as married and would not be counted in the divorced/separated statistic. However, I also recall one of my MIT reunions where someone did one of those usual surveys. The divorce question was included (and was worded such that any divorce would count, even if the classmate had remarried), and the class was below average in the number of divorces in a group that size. Now, in that case, the group was not just nuclear engineers, but it was mostly people with technical educations and careers, so I imagine there is a correlation.

I am not quite sure what to make of this. In the interests of full disclosure, I am a nuclear engineer still happily married to an electrical engineer, and being an old romantic, certainly like hearing about this statistic. However, I do realize this is a limited statistic. It doesn't say people are happier. Perhaps they're just more stubborn. I certainly know married people who are unhappy with their marriages and divorced people who are happy with their decisions to divorce. Therefore, I don't want to attribute too much significance to one measure. Still, as Valentine's Day approaches, it is nice to see nuclear engineers near the top of the list about marriage!

***

The Nuclear Lull:

2011-02-04T05:32:00.001-08:00

What Does it Mean?

The news in recent months has been full of discussions about the "lull" in the nuclear renaissance. As the articles indicate, a lot of factors are involved, so it may be hard to figure out the true meaning of the lull.

However, many of us have been skeptical of the most optimistic claims from the outset, both domestically and globally. Over the last few years, a strong bandwagon effect developed, and it seemed no one wanted to be left out. In fact, the joke in some circles was that, in the US, everyone wanted to be second. To be first would leave them too exposed. To be at the end of the queue would cut them out of expected government support to the first few plants. But to be second...ah, that was the sweet spot.

Other pressures to sign on early affected both domestic and foreign electricity suppliers. The concern over the limited global capability to supply large forgings made everyone feel they needed to get in line fast.

Those who looked a little deeper into some of the nuclear "plans" found little or no plan at all, and in some cases in emerging countries, it was clear that the lack of planning extends across the entire infrastructure that would be needed for the operation of nuclear power plants in the country.

Thus, in the best of times, people were privately saying that, at best, they expected to see 1/3 or 1/4 of the new nuclear power plant plans realized. Given the history of nuclear power development in recent decades, even that would be a very positive achievement, but I feared that, measured against the expectations, it would look like failure.

Now, we have the added factors of the economy and low natural gas prices, issues that have dampened new development plans in the past as well. Marv Fertel, head of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has proposed a more realistic goal for the United States of 4 to 8 new reactors starting up by 2020, far short of the 22 under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

I do not think we should regard the reduced goal as a failure. Despite the efforts of the anti-nuclear folks to characterize the time it takes to build nuclear power plants as "proof" that nuclear power cannot grow fast enough to have an impact on carbon emissions in the time frame said to be needed, the inconvenient truth is that no source of energy can grow that quickly. While the number of windmills that can be built may look impressive, if you look at the amount of electricity they can supply, the prospects for wind to have a major impact quickly dim.

Rather, we should use this time to make a solid start on a handful of new nuclear plants, and to systematically lay the groundwork, both in government actions and industry development, in anticipation of a continued ramp-up and a long-term effort.

***

The Change in Congress:

2011-01-17T12:08:00.001-08:00

What it Means for Nuclear Power

Many people in the nuclear industry are looking to the new Congress and hoping for action in some key areas to help jump-start the nuclear industry.

Having lived and worked inside the Beltway for more years than I care to admit to any more, I'd like to caution everyone that the Washington scene is extraordinarily complicated. There's an old saying around town that people who like sausage or the law should not watch either one being made. (In researching that saying, I see that a version of it was originally attributed to Bismarck, so it isn't only a Washington phenomena.) I am reminded of that saying whenever I try to assess the prospects for nuclear in the new Congress. Especially now.

Here are a few of the relevant factors in play right now:

• It is true that the Republicans have traditionally been more bullish on nuclear power, but the nuclear issue has never divided neatly along party lines, and today, the party lines are blurring even more on this issue.

• Even granting that the Republicans may be somewhat more favorable to nuclear power, there are at least two other traditional Republican positions that tend to push Republicans in other directions--first, they are not as convinced, as a group, of the connection between man-made carbon emissions and global warming, and they do not favor many of the policies, such as cap-and-trade, that have been proposed to reduce carbon emissions; and second, their commitment to less government interference in the marketplace makes them less favorable to some of the government support mechanisms that have been proposed for nuclear power, as well as for other energy technologies.

• Overlaid on all this is the concern about the Federal deficit, which will make new funding for anything even more difficult than otherwise.

• The Republicans have control only of the House of Representatives. They have gained seats in the Senate, but do not control it. Therefore, to the extent that issues do split along party lines, the Republicans are not necessarily going to be able to get the votes they need in the Senate to pass legislation they favor, nuclear or otherwise. And even if they can gain passage of some legislation, they certainly would have difficulty pulling together a veto-proof majority on most issues.

• At worst, this is likely to mean gridlock for 2 years. The best hope is that it will lead to compromise, but deals struck in smoke-filled rooms (even if they are now technically smoke-free) can sometimes take very unexpected turns. Many times, some totally unrelated issue will end up driving a decision on a nuclear issue. And frankly, outside a small cadre of people, the issue of nuclear power isn't first on very many people's lists. When it comes to compromise, even a pet nuclear project has sometimes been tossed for a bigger pet of some other type--a judgeship, an earmark, or whatever. Here's where the law is like sausage being made.

So, I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the prospects for nuclear power in the new Congress. Others, such as Matt Wald, have also indicated that the shift in power is only a part of the picture. The decisions that emerge will less likely reflect the shift in politics than it will the economy, the budget, the price of alternatives...and the bargains struck in the halls of Congress.

***

Grid Stability:

2011-01-10T14:04:00.001-08:00

First Evidence of Effects of Solar Arrays

This is another post in my occasional digressions into non-nuclear turf, done in the interest of trying to provide a full picture of the potential pluses and minuses of all energy supply technologies.

In this case, I am reporting on solar arrays and the issue of grid stability. Nuclear power proponents have long pointed out that our grids depend on a reliable source of baseload power, and that the irregularity and instability of wind and solar energy could result in serious problems. I have believed that, but to date had not seen reports of specific problems.

In the US, perhaps, we haven't reached that point. However, Germany apparently has reached that point. A report from Germany in recent weeks cites Stephan Kohler, an energy advisor to the German government, as saying that the generous feed-in tariffs have resulted in an "explosion" of new rooftop solar panels and large-scale photovoltaic plants, and that this is seriously stressing Germany's aging power grid. He is actually quoted as saying that "expansion of solar power has to be cut back quickly and drastically."

Now, like most stories, this one may not be quite so simple. Upgrading the grid may help solve the problem. This is not an inexpensive proposition in itself. Further, I have my own concerns that so-called "smart grids" may have their own vulnerabilities, but I don't want to end this post by crossing my arms and saying "told you so." The truth is never as simple as that.

Germany has apparently made the classic mistake of rushing full-tilt into a policy position on solar installations without considering what would happen if it was wildly successful. Of course, Germany isn't unique in its short-sightedness. So far, in my observation, every country keeps making the same mistake again and again. Just think about the effects of increasing ethanol on food crops and food prices.

My message is simply that the German experience is just the latest cautionary tale that we really need to learn to do a better job of anticipating the potential impacts of all technologies.

***

Waste Heat from Power Plants:

2011-01-03T11:31:00.001-08:00

Not a Waste to a Manatee!

A recent news item about manatees seeking out the warm-water discharges from Florida power plants during the recent cold weather reminded me that the thermal discharges from power plants (fossil and nuclear), which have gotten a bad rap most of the time, actually have some benefits. The manatees certainly seem to think so!

This news comes not long after the owners of Oyster Creek announced that they will shut down that unit, the oldest operating nuclear plant in the U.S., in 10 years rather than pay for cooling towers, as the state of New Jersey is demanding. Other plants are facing the same pressures.

Our friends the manatees remind us that one person's trash can be another person's treasure. Or more precisely, in this case, one creature's waste heat can be another creature's salvation. While plants in New Jersey and Florida are in very different climatic areas, it strikes me that, in any such situation, all parties involved should look for a win-win wherever possible. This has happened at plants in the south, where catfish and shrimp are raised commercially in power plant discharge canals, truly turning waste into income. (I was going to say turning waste into cold cash, but the metaphor doesn't quite work.)

Could that be done farther north? I don't know. Aquaculture isn't my specialty. And I am sure that some will argue that the waste heat still modifies the natural environment. (And that warming the manatees changes their natural lifestyle.) But the hard truth is that we need energy and we need food, and we have been modifying the environment ever since we learned to harness fire and farm the land. While we've made mistakes along the way, we've learned from them. Obviously, we need to consider what we displace, and one solution may not work everywhere, but if there are places where we can use plant discharges to save endangered animals or to feed the population, it sounds to me like we've got a win-win.

***

Year-End Reflections:

2010-12-29T13:48:00.000-08:00

A Quick Review

The end of the year is always a good time for stepping back to think about what has happened and what lies ahead, so at the risk of adding to lots of other reflections, wishes, and predictions, I will offer my own, both personal and on a broader level.

On a personal level, my really big accomplishment this year was the completion and publication of my book, Nuclear Firsts: Milestones on the Road to Nuclear Power Development, which I described in an earlier blog. I have never been one to have a list of 101 things to do before I die--perhaps I've been afraid I'd accomplish all 101 things, and then what?--but I have certainly had an unwritten and unnumbered wish list in the back of my mind, and writing a book was always one of the items on that virtual list. Over the course of the last few years, the nearly constant drumbeat of 50th anniversary celebrations made me think that this might be an appropriate topic. So for me, this book on nuclear milestones is a career milestone as well. In recent days, I've been gratified to see some very nice reviews on LinkedIn (accessible to members) and Amazon that suggest that other people agree that this is a timely topic--and that they like my treatment of the topic.

On a broader level, a lot has happened in the past year. I hesitate to try to write a list because I will inevitably leave out something important. Instead of trying to do that, I looked at my blogs over the past year to see if there were any patterns to what I'd covered. Now, my blog doesn't pretend to be a news publication, so there are certainly topics I didn't cover, and what I covered clearly reflects my personal interests. Still, in most cases, the items were spurred by one or more items in the news, so in a sense, my coverage may suggest some trends. Among them are the following:

Principles of Good Regulation: This one is both personal and broader. I have been very gratified to hear and read presentations by some of the current NRC Commissioners, especially Commissioners Svinicki and Ostendorff, highlighting the importance of NRC's Principles of Good Regulation. From the personal point of view, as I reported in an earlier post, I was heavily involved in the development of these Principles when I worked for Commissioner Kenneth Rogers at the NRC some years ago, so it is very gratifying to see that it is so highly regarded. I was also very pleased to discover that the "promotion" of the Principles by the Commissions is reaching audiences abroad, and I recently provided a summary of the Principles for a Japan NUS website.

Small modular reactors (SMRs): I had three or four blogs on SMRs during the past year. There is a growing interest in these reactors, both for small grids in developing countries or remote areas, and even for larger applications (in multiples). There are a number of designs being promoted and many claims being made, so much so that the anti-nuclear community, which had been rather silent on this issue, is waking up and beginning to realize that people may think a small reactor is just about as cute and cuddly as a windmill. (Yes, yes--I realize that not everyone thinks a windmill is cuddly--I mean my statement in both the serious and the sarcastic sense.) Some of the more thoughtful of the discussions on SMRs that I covered included one on an IEEE article and another on a CSIS meeting.

Nuclear waste: This certainly has been a significant year on the nuclear waste front, so I also blogged about this topic several times. Perhaps my most interesting post on this topic was on DOE's decision to withdraw its application for Yucca Mountain and NRC's initial response. I also covered the establishment of the Blue Ribbon Commission and some recommendations on how it should approach its assignment.

Global warming: With the Copenhagen conference having taken place in December 2009 and the continued concern and debate about global warming, I probably hit this topic in one way or another about half a dozen times. The blog on this topic that resonates most strongly at the moment is one on a conversation I had with Lew Branscomb in February where he bemoaned the use of the term global warming because of the doubt it raises in people's minds whenever we are blanketed in snow. Since this winter has already caused a number of snow-related disruptions, both in the U.S. and in Europe, it is timely to remember this discussion.

Other energy alternatives: If anything has surprised me about the topics I've covered in the last year, it is how many times my blogs have not been about nuclear power at all, but rather, about other energy alternatives. Sometimes my coverage has been spurred by articles that seem to compare nuclear power to other alternatives in overly simplistic ways, other times it is because I have been struck by how often decisions seem to be made without thinking ahead--i.e., where there are unintended negative consequences of what appeared to be good ideas. One example that stands out in my mind was on the use of LEDs in traffic lights. They were supposed to save energy, but because they were so efficient, they didn't emit much heat, and therefore, didn't melt the snow in winter, thus causing accidents and fatalities.

The most interesting thing I observed when I went back through my old posts--and which I have not previously commented on--is that I talked much more about wind power than about solar power. It seems to me that wind has emerged as the darling of the renewable movement. Solar power is beginning to be recognized as being land intensive, requiring a lot of water, and having several other drawbacks. Wind is regarded as having less of a footprint. Therefore, it kept recurring as a subject in the news, and I kept covering it. Still, as one of my posts noted, the jury is still out on the actual land requirements, and as another post noted, the comparison is not straightforward.

Between wind, other energy sources, and global warming, I spent a fair amount of time on topics that were not explicitly about nuclear energy. But we live in the bigger world, and as a practical matter, we must understand and react to the pros and cons of other energy technologies and of issues, such as global warming, that concern the public. Therefore, I felt and still feel that these topics were relevant to the readers of my blog. The comments I've received on several of these topics suggest that others feel the same way.

So much for looking back. Looking ahead is always harder. I can say with great confidence that I will not write another book in the coming year. (Not that I don't want to. It's just that it will take me time to gear up to do that again.) I can also say with great confidence that there will continue to be plenty to write about in my blog in the year ahead, both on nuclear power and on other related topics.

A lot of the nuclear-related topics are ones where the emotion has sometimes outweighed the reasoned discussion. One of the reasons I started this blog was that I was seeking complete, factual assessments of nuclear power and the alternatives--the kinds of analyses that tried to figure out the unintended consequences ahead of time, that tried to extrapolate the impacts as demand grows, etc. In that regard, I have appreciated the comments from readers who have helped provide a more complete perspective.

So much as I normally hate New Year's resolutions, I think this is one that I can keep: I resolve to continue to try to add a reasoned voice to the important discussions on nuclear power and other energy-related issues in the year ahead, and I hope to continue to discuss these issues with others who share that interest.

Until then, though, I want to wish everyone a happy, healthy New Year. See you next year!

***

More on Wind Farms:

2010-12-21T14:23:00.001-08:00

A Complex Picture

While I did not intend to have two consecutive posts on wind power, two things have happened since my last post that compel me to follow up. In the first place, I had more comments on this post in a shorter time than on most of my other posts, so there is clearly an interest in this topic. Furthermore, one point was raised in these comments to which I wanted to respond. Second, another news article came out since that posting claiming a positive effect of wind on cropland! As a result, I decided that I really do need to follow up on my last post.

All of the comments I received on my last post were of interest, but two raise a question in my mind that I cannot answer at this point. Both noted that the computations of land use for wind and nuclear power in my previous post neglected to include the land required for mining uranium. This point is well taken. A full comparison of technologies needs to account for all the impacts of both.

In trying to look more broadly, I see two points that need to be considered:

First, the windmills of today are not the romantic structures of old Holland. They are advanced, complex structures that use "exotic" materials. In particular, they use neodymium, a rare earth, to make a lightweight generator. Rare earths also need to be mined. At present, I have seen only a few statements about the amount of rare earths needed--it is of the order of one or two tons per wind turbine. The original context in which I saw this estimate focused on the supply issue, as China has about 95% of the world's output of neodymium, according to the accounts I read. I do not have any information on the land use requirements, but surely, if we are incorporating land requirements for mining uranium, we also need to incorporate the land requirements for mining rare earths for wind turbines.

Second, I can envision that different types of land should be treated differently in comparing energy technologies. I'm sure this will prove a controversial statement, as all land has value to someone, but I think a case can be made for comparing the use of similar types of land--say farmland--as long as other impacts, be they to the land, air, or water, are considered somewhere. In that sense, it was not completely wrong to compare the footprints of wind and nuclear power on farmland. What was wrong of me was to leave the reader with the implication that the footprint of the generating facilities was the only footprint these technologies had on land.

Perhaps when I wrote the post I had in the back of my mind the picture that appears at the top of this post, which was someone's mocked up photo of what an area might look like with a nuclear plant vs. wind turbines. This one is particularly egregious, as it shows wind turbines covering only the same acreage that a nuclear plant would occupy, neglecting the fact that those few windmills would produce far, far less power than the nuclear power plant. A different issue, to be sure, but it seemed to me that there might be several layers of misunderstanding in the public's minds--not only does this picture not represent equal levels of power production, the windmills that seem almost to vanish in the distance in the picture really have a bigger footprint than the picture implies. (Something also makes me think that something is wrong with the perspective here, but the other shortcomings of the picture overwhelm the artistic shortcomings.)

In that regard, and in the interest of trying to tell the whole story, a recent report on the work of researchers at Ames Laboratory and the University of Colorado claims some potential benefits of wind power on crops, such as keeping them cooler during the day and warmer during the night due to the air turbulence from the wind turbines. The turbulence could also help dry moisture on the plants, thus reducing the chance of fungal infections, as well as reducing the effects of frost, thus increasing the growing season. Both effects should increase crop production. I note that the article says that the effects haven't been proven yet. If true, they could offset the land use I mentioned in my previous posting. That depends, of course, on whether these early indications are borne out by further research, and what the magnitude of the effect is. This article did not address effects on livestock at all.

The comparisons of energy technologies are complex and multidimensional. I truly doubt that we are going to find a technology that is "best" in every category. In the end, society will have to make choices based on which impacts it is willing to accept to have the benefits of reliable, affordable electricity.

***

Wind Farms:

2010-12-08T07:14:00.000-08:00

The Real "Footprint"

This is one more in a series of pieces I am writing to try to examine non-nuclear technologies under the same microscope usually reserved for nuclear technologies.

I have been puzzled in the past about conflicting claims regarding the "footprint" of wind farms. A recent report and some very astute analyses by some colleagues of mine has opened my eyes. For wind farms, it seems, things are not as they first appear.

The argument made by wind advocates is that wind farms take hardly any land at all. They can be sited in the middle of farmland, and their only footprint is the small base of each tower. Crops or livestock can surround them. That certainly seemed plausible, so I have not fully understood the criticisms that the footprint of a wind farm was really much larger than the area occupied by the towers.

Let me hasten to point out that this post will address only wind farms sited on farmland. It will not address the special environmental and scenic implications of wind turbines on mountain ridges, and it will not address implications of offshore windmills. These have their own issues. I cover here only the "real" land use implications of windmills on farmland.

The report provides some numerical data on the real land use of wind farms. However, it errs in its comparisons to nuclear power, because, as a colleague has pointed out, they fail to factor in the megawatts per unit acre generated by a nuclear power plant compared to that from a windmill. Adjusting for the generation per acre makes nuclear much more land efficient--up to about a factor of 10 or more, depending on which end of the stated range you use for each. (The observation is from Margaret Harding in a communication and to my knowledge is not available on a website.)

She and others have noted other farm-related implications of windmills on farmland:

• The land requirements for rights of way to access the wind turbines.
• The added difficulty of operating large tractors and combines around the bases of turbines (probably resulting in an effective loss of the land immediately surrounding the towers).
• The sensitivity of livestock to the noise and light from wind turbines.
(There are anecdotal reports of reductions in milk production by cows.)
• The difficulty and danger of crop dusting, which is causing crop dusters in some areas to refuse to work around windmills. The net result is either application of pesticides by less efficient (and more petroleum-intensive) methods, or reduced crop production per acre.

Some of these reports are anecdotal, so clearly, this is another case where we need more facts. I doubt that these factors would rule out the use of wind farms on agricultural land. However, the ultimate findings could affect how much we can really expect such wind farms to penetrate the nation's farmland, where they can be sited with least impact, and what side effects we would have to tolerate, and perhaps, how to minimize them.

***

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency:

2010-11-24T23:29:00.000-08:00

At a New Crossroads?

A recent news item has reported that the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) just gained a new member country, Poland, but at the same time, has been informed that one of its earliest and most active member countries, the United Kingdom, intends to leave the agency as a budget-tightening measure within their government. As a former Deputy Director-General of the NEA, I felt that I might be able to shed some light on what these membership changes might mean.

First, the loss of one member and the gain of another is not a zero-sum game. Poland is just starting its nuclear power program while the UK has had a long and active history in nuclear power. The UK has contributed greatly to NEA over the years through its membership in the NEA's standing technical committees and in important positions on the NEA staff. Perhaps most important, the funding for the NEA is provided by its member countries roughly in proportion to the sizes of their economies. Since the UK is a bigger economy than Poland, the financial contribution of Poland will not be equal to that lost from the UK. Rather, the budget for the Agency will have to be reallocated among all the remaining members, resulting in a slightly higher cost for each of the other member countries.

I should emphasize that UK's decision has so far not been formally confirmed. Countries usually have to give international agencies significant notice of intent to withdraw membership, so this announcement could be viewed as a way of keeping options open as the UK budget evolves. The announcement was made verbally by UK representatives at a recent NEA meeting, and NEA was told that a formal letter would follow. So far, the letter has not been received. In the meantime, those from the UK who have been involved with the NEA are trying desperately to find alternatives to continue their membership in the Agency. These measures could include support from a different UK agency or agencies. Other measures are also being discussed.

There have been previous cases where member governments have questioned the value of their NEA memberships or encountered budgetary problems supporting the NEA. In at least one case, the member country that questioned the role of NEA was persuaded of its value to them and retained its support; in another case, the country's budget obligation for the NEA was indeed transferred from one agency to other agencies within the member country. Therefore, it is too soon to write off the UK as a member of NEA.

However, there may be some differences in the environment this time that may make it more difficult for the NEA to survive unscathed. The first issue, obviously, is that we are in the middle of a world-wide economic recession. Several of NEA's member countries, including Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, are in worse financial shape than than is the UK. If they see the UK questioning their membership in the NEA, surely that will raise questions within their capitols. Furthermore, the fact that all the member countries will see a budget increase at a time when even a constant budget may be a strain may set off alarm bells among the remaining members.

Secondly, one of the values of the NEA has always been that it included almost all the major suppliers and users of nuclear power. For many years, Russia was the only major nuclear power country that was not in the NEA. However, with the growth of nuclear power in other countries, especially China, and with a number of new countries poised to begin using nuclear power, NEA will no longer hold that position. While the NEA reaches out to non-member countries by involving them as "observers" on their technical committees, that involvement has generally been limited, and may not be a sufficient solution for the future.

It has always been difficult to explain the different roles played by NEA and IAEA in the nuclear power area. While the two agencies really try hard to exploit the different strengths and advantages they each have, one of the major differences has always been that the NEA is a much smaller organization, but still included the countries operating most of the world's nuclear power plants. As this situation changes, it may be more difficult to convince member governments that both agencies are needed. Since IAEA is the more inclusive organization and has the important non-proliferation role, a choice between the two agencies would always favor IAEA.

In the past, I think having both agencies has been useful. NEA, with its smaller membership, has been able to develop a number of programs that IAEA has adopted and expanded to more countries. I am, of course, hopeful that both agencies will continue to have different and complementary values to their members and to the global nuclear power community. However, I do see significant challenges ahead for the NEA in assuring that outcome.

[For anyone interested in the history of the NEA, I prepared a document, available as a review draft, covering the first 50 years of the agency as background for the celebration of that event several years ago.]

***

The ANS Conference:

2010-11-13T14:35:00.000-08:00

Talking Nuclear Progress

A lot of the nuclear blogging community was at the recent American Nuclear Society conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, and some of my fellow bloggers are both more prolific and faster publishing news than I am, but now that I am back from the meeting and the dust has more or less settled, I thought it might still be useful to summarize my overall impressions of the meeting.

The first and most obvious observation is that this meeting is far larger than meetings have been for many years. The final registration for the meeting was over 2150! It was not many years ago that meetings were half that size. This alone speaks volumes to me. It suggests that there is renewed interest in, and enthusiasm for, nuclear power. This interest and enthusiasm is consistent with the upbeat theme of the meeting, "Nuclear Progress!"

The second observation is that there were more younger people at the meeting than there have been in the past. A number of them participated in sessions I attended, and provided thoughtful contributions. For many years, the number of under-30 members and meeting participants remained very small, so it is refreshing to see more new and youthful faces in the audience.

A third observation is that there is a growing interest in communications, including the use of social media. There were two sessions on communications presented as part of the technical program, one on "pro-nuclear advocacy" and the other on "credibility in a digital age." In addition, there was an early evening event for bloggers and participants in ANS's social media group to get together to exchange views, and a late afternoon session another day to discuss what messages ANS and its members should try to bring to the new Congress.

Several speakers, including Marv Fertel, CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute, and Craig Piercy, ANS's Washington Representative, spoke about the recent national election and the new Congress. Both speakers expressed cautious optimism. While many signs bode well for the nuclear industry, the continuing concern about the Federal budget deficit makes predictions difficult.

Technical sessions covered many of the usual topics, but there is a noticeable interest in topics related to the future of nuclear power, such as "infrastructure development in support of the nuclear renaissance," "nuclear energy growth in emerging markets," and regulatory and other issues related to small modular reactors (for example, emergency planning requirements). In addition, the opening plenary highlighted the significant developments taking place in some of the other major nuclear power countries, including Japan, Russia, France and Canada.

The talk in the halls was also interesting. With the meeting in Nevada and the recent activities in Washington on Yucca Mountain, questions about whether Yucca Mountain is dead and what the Blue Ribbon Commission is going to recommend were on everyone's mind. There is continuing interest and concern about China's very ambitious nuclear power development plans--where will they get sufficient trained staff? how strong is their regulatory oversight? The ANS conference participants didn't seem to be a heavy gambling crowd, and I saw very few people I knew when I walked through the casino, but that didn't stop people from making soft bets on how many new reactors there are likely to be in the next 10-20 years, and where they are likely to be built.

In short, it was an exciting meeting with lots of new developments discussed, and all the participants I spoke to seemed happy to be there. And if they stayed away from the gaming tables, they went home richer instead of poorer.

***

Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference:

2010-11-02T09:39:00.000-07:00

Not Even a Hurricane Could Stop Us

The 17th Paci fic Basin Nuclear Conference (PBNC) took place last week in Cancun, Mexico. I had wondered how successful the conference might be, considering the still fragile state of the world economy, the slowing of some nuclear projects in the United States, and the proximity of the meeting to the upcoming American Nuclear Society meeting. To add to that, as I departed for Mexico, I was keeping a wary eye on Hurricane Richard, which was ominously skirting the area south of Cancun. I was also a little worried that the distractions of the sea and surf might detract from the business of the meeting.

Thus, I was pleased to see a very good turnout for the conference when I arrived in Cancun. While I am sure that some people played hooky at one point or another during the conference to take in a round of golf or a dip in one of the conference hotel's many pools, the meeting provided an excellent forum for an updated discussion of nuclear developments and activities in countries around the Pacific Basin, and occasionally elsewhere. About 300 people from 24 or 25 countries attended the conference.

The Korean industry was out in force, with strong sponsorship of the conference and a coordinated display by five companies in the exhibit hall under the banner "Power of Korean Nuclear Industry." The Korean model did not go unnoticed by some of their competitors, and one of the Japanese plenary speeches referred to the new International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Company (JINED) as creating a "Team Japan" like the "Team Korea" we were seeing at the conference.

Several of the plenary sessions focused on the themes of "the role of nuclear energy in addressing environmental concerns," "drivers of nuclear energy," and "challenges of nuclear energy" and featured the views of the countries of the Pacific Basin and international organizations on these important issues. Other plenaries addressed other important themes, such as "regulation security and safety," "new reactor construction," "radioactive waste," and "communications." Technical sessions provided more detail in these and other areas.

It would be too much to identify all the plenary speakers, but (perhaps because I have been involved with all these organizations) I would like to note that plenary speakers from the United States included Joe Colvin from the American Nuclear Society, Shane Johnson from the Department of Energy, and Margaret Doane from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Speakers from Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, and Taiwan made plenary presentations. In addition to the Pacific Basin countries, one plenary session included a regulatory perspective from South Africa, and Latin America was also represented. One disappointment was the lack of reports from some of the countries considering or starting nuclear programs, such as Vietnam and Thailand.

In response to questions, the conference organizers announced that they would be posting presentation materials from some of the PBNC sessions on the conference website. As of the date of this posting, selected talks from both plenary and technical sessions on Monday through Wednesday were posted on a special link for presentations.

***

Small Modular Reactors:

2010-10-28T14:34:00.000-07:00

Why Size May Make a Difference

A few weeks ago, I published a post that was primarily a report on a meeting of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on small modular reactors (SMRs). As I was completing the post, I came across a publication by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), an openly anti-nuclear organization, that reiterated some of the same points made in the CSIS presentations, and added others. I did not try to do a complete review of the IEER piece, which raised other issues as well, but simply noted that it had just been published and that it seemed to raise some of the same arguments.

My point in summarizing the CSIS meeting was not to endorse those views, but rather to point out that, for the first time, people are beginning to look at SMRs analytically. In some cases, the voices we are hearing are from responsible organizations that are seriously trying to anticipate problems better than we have done as a society in the past and to address them at the outset rather than scrambling to fix them later. In other cases, anti-nuclear groups who have, perhaps, been caught a little by surprise at the traction SMRs have been getting, are now mobilizing to attack this new vision of nuclear power.

Since I only came across the IEER article at the last minute, I mentioned it solely to note that it raised some of the same safeguards and security concerns that were raised during the CSIS meeting. I meant to come back at some point and explore some of the other concerns the IEER raised, particularly about cost and safety. Fortunately, Charles Barton beat me to it, and on his blog, has provided a number of counterarguments to the IEER positions. Since he is more of an expert than I am in this area, I'm quite pleased to have his analysis available to cite. He specifically addresses the IEER arguments on safety, pointing to historical records of safety performance of past and existing small reactors, novel safety measures in some SMR designs, the evolution of safety measures and practices with operating experience, analytical reasons for having or not having containment, and the experience of the airline industry in mass manufacturing and safety. He also takes on the IEER assertions about SMR costs, noting that they have been selective in their arguments, as well as their claims about SMRs and waste, pointing to the benefits of some of the advanced fuel cycles, particularly Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors and Denatured Molten Salt Reactors.

There will surely be much more said about all these issues before a plant is ever built, but it is good to start getting both sides of the arguments out on the table early.

***

Yucca Mountain:

2010-10-21T07:55:00.001-07:00

A View from Some Experts

The long-standing debate over Yucca Mountain has recently taken a new turn, with action by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to shut down its review, and objections by Members of Congress and others to that decision. Articles in the press and elsewhere have detailed most of the issues, including views on the legality of the action and the confrontation it is causing within the Commission.

Among the actions reported, former NRC Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers has written to the Commissioners and the NRC Inspector General on this matter. His action appears to be related to a recent article he co-authored. Whenever issues such as Yucca Mountain are debated, it is a good idea to recall the history of the issue. The article that he co-authored does so. Therefore, I'd like to take this opportunity to step back and report on that article.

Specifically, the fall issue of the National Academy of Sciences publication, Issues in Science and Technology, carries an article on Yucca Mountain that is well worth seeking out in a library, if you do not have a subscription. (Because it is a subscription publication, I can't link to it.) Co-authored by Luther Carter, Lake Barrett, and Ken Rogers, the article lays out systematically what the issues are and what they think needs to be done.

The authors are all very well qualified to write on this subject. Luther Carter is a journalist who has written extensively on the subject of nuclear waste, Lake Barrett formerly headed the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, and as noted above, Ken Rogers is a former Commissioner at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (In the interests of full disclosure, I worked for Ken Rogers for his first term as an NRC Commissioner.)

I will not try to recap all the points made in this article. I will simply note that it covers a number of important points in the long and convoluted history of the Yucca Mountain program, from the early days where three sites were being characterized, to the recent decision by the Administration to terminate the program. It also looks ahead to the decision the NRC needs to make and the role of the Blue Ribbon Commission in addressing waste issues.

The authors have done a considerable service in putting together this history and analysis of the issues and past actions. Despite the fact that many of us have been following this issue for years, pieces of the story have gotten lost over time. For example, most of us know that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 called for the characterization of 3 sites, but that the 1987 revisions to the Act narrowed the scope to just one site, Yucca Mountain. The lore that has built up over this decision is that the State of Nevada was not politically powerful at the time.

This may in fact be true, but the article indicates that decision was also based on the results of the first round of studies, which had identified the Yucca Mountain site as superior to the other two candidates. On this basis, they conclude that "a more tentative or contingent congressional choice of Yucca Mountain would almost certainly have survived an impartial technical review, so in our view the hasty adoption of what soon came to be known as the 'screw Nevada bill' was as unnecessary as it was politically provocative."

The authors conclude by expressing great concern over how "the reputation of the NRC as an independent, trustworthy overseer of the civil nuclear enterprise" may be affected by the way it acts on this matter and expressing the hope that they "reassert the NRC's dignity and independence by upholding their own Yucca Mountain licensing board."

I hope that the points made in this article will be well publicized as the debate proceeds.

***

Nuclear Power Plant Design Contest:

2010-10-13T12:55:00.001-07:00

Can Appearance Help?

Several news items in recent weeks have reported that John Ritch of the World Nuclear Association has organized a d esign contest to come up with a more attractive design for a nuclear power plant. He asserts that "Many plants look little more inspiring than a 100-year-old flour mill. We can and should do better."

He may have a point. I sometimes think I am hearing as many objections to the appearance of the industrial facilities that we depend on as to concerns about health or safety. Certainly, we have seen that people object to windmills marring the unspoiled crests of mountaintops, or the dramatic expanses of ocean. No one likes the look of power lines crossing the landscape. And whenever someone wants to write an article with an anti-nuclear bias, they illustrate it with a photograph of ominous cooling towers casting their shadow over the land, despite the fact that cooling towers are not unique to nuclear power plants.

This concern over appearance is not limited to energy sources. My husband, Mike Marcus, is an expert in wireless telecommunications policy, and he finds that one of the major objections to the cell-phone towers we on which we have come to depend to connect us instantaneously and everywhere in this wireless age is the fact that they are, frankly, ugly projections sticking up in our suburban landscapes. Some have tried to disguise the towers in the form of fake trees, which somehow never seem to match the native flora of the area. Mike has called for a similar contest to design more attractive cell-phone towers.

Beauty, of course, is in the eye of the beholder, and I know as many people who think windmills are beautiful as I know who think they mar the landscape. Nevertheless, most people, given a choice, will pick the unspoiled shoreline over the one with cooling towers and buildings with pipes jutting out. And yes, many will succumb to NIMBYism--these things are OK, but not where I can see them--but most, I think, will agree that, whenever possible, a less intrusive profile is better.

Now, I don't think anyone thinks that appearance is the only issue. People will continue to worry about safety, particularly for nuclear power plants, but also for cell-phone towers, high-power transmission lines, and most of the other infrastructure that supports the services that society wants and needs, but whose presence they don't want to see or acknowledge. So, solving the problem of appearance is not the only need.

Still, I recall an old ad that said, "Good taste costs no more." There is no reason why much of our infrastructure needs to be quite as unattractive as some of it is. If designed right from the beginning, many facilities could be made more attractive for minimal additional cost.

And in the case of nuclear power plants, some of the options on the table for future designs might actually work hand-in-hand with efforts to make the sites more attractive. Plants that can be sited underground and plants that need no cooling towers automatically remove some of the visible evidence of a plant's existence. There is still a need for other infrastructure above ground, but the visible footprint should be smaller and less intrusive.

So I wish John Ritch and the World Nuclear Association well as they engage in this new effort to develop more attractive nuclear power plant designs. For those wishing to enter the contest, the contest rules indicate that the deadline for submissions is December 1.

Finally--a reminder that my new book is out. See my earlier post for details, or click on the link to the right to order.

***

Nuclear Power Milestones:

2010-10-04T16:54:00.001-07:00

The Story of Nuclear Power Technology Development

I have been holding my breath for several weeks now. My first book, Nuclear Firsts: Milestones on the Road to Nuclear Power Development, was due to be published. I have just received the first copies, so I can finally exhale.

While there have been many histories of nuclear power, most focus on the weapons program and the larger-than-life personalities that helped initiate the nuclear age. In approaching the history this way, a lot of nuclear developments and breakthroughs get short shrift. This book tries to tell the history of nuclear power primarily through the stories of the many technological developments.

Writing the book has turned out to be a revelation for me for me in more ways than one. I really thought I knew what most of the "firsts" were, but as I probed, I found more and more firsts. Ultimately, what I thought would be a couple of dozen "firsts" turned into a list of about 80.

Some facilities and events that I have always thought were firsts have proved not to be. There was a demonstration that used a reactor to produce electricity (albeit only a tiny trickle of 1/3 watt) several years before the 4 light bulbs were lit by the EBR-I in 1951. There was a reactor that put power on the grid in the Soviet Union before it happened in the United States in 1955. There were several small reactors connected to the grid in the United States in the year before Shippingport, a "large" reactor for its time, began operation in 1957, as well as another "large" reactor that began operation in the United Kingdom.

I was equally impressed by the number of important dignitaries of their day who presided at key events such as dedications of nuclear facilities. I was able to get photographs showing kings and queens and US Presidents dedicating new nuclear plants, and even a Pope discussing a new nuclear organization with its founders.

I could say much more, but perhaps the rest is best left for readers to discover for themselves. The book can be ordered by clicking on the icon in the column on the right of this page.

For those who have a further interest in history (as I seem to have these days), I have also done some research on the history and accomplishments of the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency, where I used to work. A review draft of my findings is available.

While both the book and the report are correct to the best of my knowledge, in both cases, there are some gaps in the records I was able to find. If anyone has corrections or additions, I will incorporate the them in future versions, if any, of both the book and the report.

***

Small Modular Reactors:

2010-09-29T16:42:00.000-07:00

A Discussion at CSIS

On September 29, I attended a two-part session at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC that addressed several topics related to Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Although there has been a lot of dialogue on SMRs recently, I still thought it might be useful to summarize this meeting, particularly for those outside the Washington, DC area.

Audios of the presentations are available on the CSIS website, so I'll limit my report to a few very selected comments, both from the speakers and the audience, that particularly struck me for one reason or another.

The first part of the meeting featured a presentation by David Solan, Director of the Energy Policy Institute at Boise State University, and Steve Peterson of the University of Idaho on their recent study, "Economic and Employment Impacts of Small Modular Reactors." The study showed the very significant economic and employment impacts that would result from a substantial commitment to SMRs. The study was limited to electricity production, and it did not look at specific SMRs, but rather a "generic" SMR. Several different growth scenarios were studied, and a variety of measures of economic impact (jobs, sales, earnings, etc.) were calculated. Among the results shown were projections of up to 7,000 new jobs and $1.3 billion in sales for the manufacturing and installation of a typical reactor. Unfortunately, the study did not compare any of the results to projections for similar growth of conventional large nuclear power plants or for other technologies, such as solar or wind.

The second part was a panel discussion. The 3 panelists were:

- Edward Arthur, Director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Science and Technology, University of New Mexico
- Thomas TerBush, Nuclear Power Strategy, Communications and Technology Transfer, EPRI
- Sharon Squassoni, Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program.

The 3 panelists covered a variety of topics, including non-electric applications of SMRs, and predictions of what SMR technologies might move the fastest (LWRs due largely to regulatory familiarity with them). Highlights of the panel discussion were several comments, including some from the audience, on how to get a new technology started. In particular, two comments from the audience pointed to past experience, one noting that previously, demonstration plants were built and operated before they were licensed, and the other noting that when DOD develops new ships, they typically sole source the first-of-a-kind (sometimes to several vendors) in order to test and refine the technology before making multiple orders.

Sharon Squassoni noted that IAEA now indicates that 61 countries are considering starting nuclear power programs, although she expressed concern that a number of them are on the "failed state index" that the Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace jointly publish. She expressed further concern about some of the small reactor technologies that may be marketed, particularly the Russian floating reactors, which could pose security challenges, and the Indian pressurized heavy water reactors, which, if spread further, could be detrimental to safeguards. She also questioned whether we want to see repositories in all the potential nuclear countries for the waste they generate.

In answer to a question on whether the US needed to be marketing SMRs to have influence in the international arena, Ms. Squassoni indicated that she felt the US had influence whether or not it marketed a technology. However, her example was reprocessing, where I think many people would disagree. She also cited Title 5 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 as saying that the US should assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources in developing countries.

Of course, this was only one 2-hour session on a topic that has received a lot of attention in many venues lately, so it did not cover all issues. In particular, it did not discuss specific SMR technologies in any detail, and there are significant differences among the technologies with respect to some of the areas raised during this meeting, such as economics, safeguards and security. Still, the selection of topics and speakers made it a significant addition to what will surely be a continuing dialogue on this subject.

Late "Newsbreak": As I was completing this posting, I learned that the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) and Physicians for Social Responsibility have just published a critique of SMRs that raises several of the same points made by Sharon Squassoni in her remarks.

I am somewhat reminded of the comment about paper reactors, but I now conclude that a paper reactor can either be perfect or terrible, depending on the assumptions. Clearly, the numbers used in this study assume the worst case in every case. Nevertheless, the growing concerns about the potential weaknesses of SMRs will have ot be addressed.

***

E. Gail de Planque:

2010-09-20T08:48:00.000-07:00

In Memoriam

I hate that I'm compelled to write another tribute so soon after I posted the one on Jim Ramey. In the case of Jim, I was recognizing someone who was a major figure in the field, but not one I knew personally. In the case of former NRC Commissioner E. Gail de Planque (NRC bio and more recent bio), who passed away on September 8 of complications of Lyme disease, the loss is personal.

Gail and I have been friends, colleagues, and co-conspirators since the mid-1970s. She preceded me in the ANS hierarchy, and helped me immensely in learning my way through it. Sometimes, one cannot be sure of which seemingly unimportant decisions or actions profoundly influence the course of one's career or life, but I am convinced that, more than once, Gail was behind an action that probably strongly influenced my career.

I was new to ANS and had a notion that a study was needed of the status of women in the ANS. I had no idea how to penetrate the ANS management labyrinth, but somehow, got authorization for a study, and in due course, it was distributed (in those days, by mail). To my surprise, I got a call from her. "What was I going to do with the results?" she asked. I hadn't thought that far ahead, and had no ideas. "This is what you should do," she told me. She laid out a plan for a special session, told me what I needed to do to get it approved, suggested speakers, and offered to co-organize it.

The rest, as they say, was history. After pulling that off successfully--with a good deal of help from her--I was asked to serve on a committee. I never knew if she suggested my name to the president at the time, or if (as I sometimes joked) the management saw that I had energy and ideas and thought they'd channel them in a different direction than I was heading. By the time Gail became president of ANS, she gave me my first committee chair position, and that certainly provided a direct stepping-stone to other ANS activities. Ultimately, some years later, I followed her footsteps as ANS president.

In the meantime, I had the opportunity to work with her in a variety of ANS activities. What always impressed me was how universally liked and respected she was, both for her technical capability and for her people skills. In one memorable meeting, she and I were espousing a position that was voted down. I was ready to fold up my tent--"you win some, you lose some"--but she kept arguing the case, and without polarizing the room or creating any ill will, there was another vote, and, lo and behold, our position prevailed!

Ultimately, she was asked to throw her name in the hat for an NRC Commissioner position. Since I was by that point, a long term government employee, she turned to me for information--on the QT--about the implications of her moving from a career position to an appointed one. For once, I was able to help her.

When it came time for her to move to Washington to take up her post, I was about to move to Japan for 6 months, so in a masterpiece of good luck and good timing for both of us, she was able to house sit for me while she house hunted for herself.

But perhaps the most enduring--and amusing--motif of our long friendship was our bemusement over how people continually mixed up the two of us. Over and over again, people would mistake us. At one memorable meeting in the late 1990s, one person asked her how it felt to have lived in Japan (I'm the one who had done that) while I was asked by another person how it felt to be a past Commissioner! As recently as this past November, someone came up behind me at an ANS meeting and said "Hello, Dr. de Planque."

Now, the confusion between us might seem understandable at some level, but when the layers were peeled away, it was still puzzling. Yes, we both used the same given name, and when we were in our twenties, we both had long, dark hair and were shorter than average (although she was taller than I am). Still, as she would always point out, there are lots of Jims and Bobs and Johns, and no one ever mistakes one for another. As we got older, her hair turned prematurely white, so physically, we certainly didn't think we looked alike. However, by then, we had both worked at both the NRC and DOE (although in a different order, a different DOE office, and different positions), had both served as ANS president, and in fact, she had lived in my house and used my phone number for 6 months. (Don't get me started on the confusion that caused after I returned and found myself responding "yes" when someone asked for Gail, only to figure out part way through the conversation that they meant the other Gail.)

While we found it irritating, it was also amusing--and for me, rather flattering. So, like everyone else with whom she worked, I am terribly saddened at this loss and will miss her a great deal. But perhaps most of all, I will miss those cases of mistaken identity and the chance for us to caucus, like excited schoolgirls and bemoan the fact that no one could tell us apart.

Note added September 30: Since the publication of this posting, obituaries have appeared in both the New York Times and the Washington Post providing additional details about Gail de Planque's life and information about a planned memorial service. The links to the two notices are: Times obituary and Post obituary.

***

Women in Nuclear:

2010-09-15T07:24:00.001-07:00

The Changing Landscape

This posting deviates from the usual discussions of technical and policy issues. As someone who started in the nuclear field when the number of women in the field were few and far between, I was delighted to read a recent article in the Boston Globe about women in high level nuclear positions. The article focuses most on nuclear security positions, but the trend is evident elsewhere as well.

One of my few claims to fame is that I was (to my knowledge) the first woman in the United States to earn a doctorate in nuclear engineering. Someone else followed me a short time later. Today, I have lots of company. When I started at MIT as an undergraduate, the entire freshman class (all fields) was only about 5% women. Today, the freshman class is about 45% women. I won't even get started on the remarks thrown at me in the course of my career. One of these days, I may write a book about them.

In the mid-1970s, I did a survey of women in nuclear engineering (published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1975, but not available electronically). I truly thought that the field that had women making key contributions from the earliest days (think Marie Curie and Lise Meitner) would have been more inclusive. It wasn't. I still sometimes find myself the only woman in the room at meetings of senior level people and in specialized groups. At such times, I have fleeting thoughts that things have not yet changed enough. However, in most widely attended conferences and other gatherings today, the demographics look a lot different.

I think that having more women in the nuclear field bodes well for the field in more ways than one. Clearly, it is always good to have a larger pool of talented people from which to draw, and our pool has enlarged now that more women--and minorities--are entering the field.

But the nuclear field, in particular, has suffered from the fact that different segments of society have far different views of nuclear power, and in particular, women have consistently been less favorable toward nuclear power than have men. I can't help but think that having more women in the profession speaking at public meetings, having more women visibly working in the field, and having more opportunities in the field for young women starting their careers may help change this equation.

Of course, there are still hurdles. Another piece of news in the last few days, that women earned more PhDs last year than men, sounded like good news, but really contained a mixed message, as 80% of the engineering doctorates still went to men. Therefore, I was glad to learn that, this past spring, the American Nuclear Society's Northeastern New York Section participated in an annual event at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute to encourage high school girls to pursue careers in technical fields.

I look forward to the day when the equal participation of men and women in technical fields will be so normal that no one will even write about it any more.

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James T. Ramey:

2010-09-07T13:17:00.001-07:00

Remembering A Nuclear Pioneer

Nearly a week ago, the news carried an obituary for one of the early commissioners of the Atomic Energy Commission, James T. Ramey. I have been surprised not to have seen more tributes to his contributions than I have so far. Perhaps I can partially make up for that now.

Jim Ramey (second from the right in the photograph above) served on the AEC for more than a decade, from 1962 to 1973, during a period when nuclear power enjoyed great popularity and there were many plans for new plants. Unfortunately, I never had the opportunity to know Ramey personally, as I was just beginning my career as he ended his term on the AEC, and was not yet hobnobbing with the giants of the industry. Therefore, I can't offer any personal anecdotes or reminiscences in this posting.

Nevertheless, he was one of the people I kept hearing about and hoping I would meet someday. I never did have that opportunity, but when I saw the news of his death, I had an opportunity to learn more about him. In addition to the reports in the obituaries, his passing spurred me to do a little of my own research on him, and what I've learned from all the sources combined is impressive.

I won't repeat the stories about his background covered in the link to this posting, which are impressive in their own right. However, I think the best tribute I've seen is contained in one of J. Samuel Walker's comprehensive books on the history of nuclear regulation in the United States. In particular, his book, Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-1971, describes Jim Ramey as follows:

"Ramey's experience with atomic programs, along with his knowledge, energy, and commitment, made him an active and influential participant in a broad range of AEC activities. From the time he joined the Commission, he took greater sustained interest in regulatory affairs than any other commissioner. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when opposition to nuclear power was becoming increasingly visible, he did more than any of his colleagues to reach out to nuclear critics in an effort to address their concerns and find common ground. His attentiveness to regulatory issues did not mean that he had curbed his enthusiasm for rapid nuclear development; one industry official described him in 1966 as 'industry's best friend on the Commission.' Rather, it suggested that he recognized more clearly than his fellow commissioners the intimate and inseparable relationship between safety questions and industry growth. He realized that a major nuclear accident would be a severe setback to nuclear progress, but he also worried that excessive regulation or public apprehension would have a similar effect. He guarded against actions that would impose what he viewed as unnecessary burdens on the industry or raise public fears."

Having served as a senior staff member at the NRC many years later, including for 5 years as an assistant to Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers, I can only say that Jim Ramey had great foresight. The same issues that he understood and tackled, apparently before others did, are issues that continue to be important today.

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Comparative Energy Risks:

2010-09-03T11:01:00.000-07:00

Risks from Severe Accidents

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has just published a new study entitled "Comparing Nuclear Accident Risks with Those from Other Energy Sources." The full report can be downloaded from the NEA's list of recent publications. It provides a very useful summary of trends in performance indicators and in the predicted severe accident risk from nuclear power operations. However, the most interesting section for most people will be the comparative analysis of the deaths from severe accident risks for different energy technologies.

The NEA report draws on a collection of data from the Paul Scherrer Institute, a research center with in Switzerland that has a strong background in the energy sciences.

The key comparative information is contained in the table and figures on pages 35 and 36. It should be noted that the table (shown below) deals only with immediate fatalities. For nuclear power, of course, immediate fatalities do not provide a complete picture of the accident consequences. The NEA report addresses this issue in the narrative analysis on the subsequent pages, using some conservative estimates for the number of potential latent fatalities. In the narrative analysis, the NEA report also attempts to discuss latent effects of other energy sources, such as effects due to fine particulate emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plants.
While it would have been nice to see some of the latent fatality data incorporated into the table as well, I do recognize the difficulties. The report does try to make some of these comparisons in the figures, as well as in the discussion. However, I am quite sure that many people won't read beyond the table.

Another notable observation from the data is the far different safety performance between OECD countries and non-OECD countries for most of the energy technologies. Although I am sure a country-by-country comparison would show a more complex picture (i.e., some of the non-OECD countries may have better safety statistics than some OECD countries), the data clearly show that for coal, oil, and hydropower, the performance of the non-OECD countries as a group seriously lags that of the OECD countries as a group. In the case of coal, they show that China has an even more dismal record than the non-OECD countries as a group.

With only one "severe" nuclear accident (the definition of a severe accident for this report is one with more than 5 fatalities) in the mix, one cannot make any direct comparisons. However, for me, it reinforces a concern that the entry of new countries into the sphere of nuclear power operators is not an unmixed blessing. As noted above, there are surely some non-OECD countries with high standards and good safety records in other areas, and these countries can undoubtedly develop a nuclear safety program to the high standards necessary for this technology. But there are other countries where the situation is very different. The supplier countries, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, need to find a way to assure that the kinds of differences we see between OECD and non-OECD countries for coal, oil and hydro do not emerge for nuclear.

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Responding to Nuclear Myths:

2010-08-27T08:26:00.001-07:00

John Ritch Takes on the "Red Herrings"

Nuclear Energy Insider recently published an excellent synopsis of a speech given by John Ritch that I thought merited mention here. John, the Director General of the World Nuclear Association, spoke at the graduation ceremony of the Sixth Annual Summer Institute of the World Nuclear University on August 14 in Oxford, England.

John, who has had a distinguished career in Washington, DC and as the US ambassador to the United Nations organizations in Vienna, Austria--among them, the International Atomic Energy Agency--is an outstanding speaker, so it is no surprise that the excerpts of his speech published in the Nuclear Energy Insider hit the key issues head-on.

John terms the issues "red herrings." For readers who may not be familiar with idiomatic American speech, a red herring is a diversionary issue. John comments that "it sometimes seems that nuclear professionals are condemned to swim in a sea of these fish."

In his speech, John identifies 6 such issues:

1. Proliferation: He makes several points about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the role he sees that it has had in maintaining a generally stable nuclear weapons situation. He acknowledges the remaining issues, but the key point he makes, in my opinion, is that "these issues would exist with or without the global renaissance in peaceful nuclear power."

2. Operational Safety: Here, John cites the statistics, highlighting the 14,100+ years of reactor operating experience in the world today.

3. Affordability: John takes on the claim the claims that nuclear power is heavily subsidized by the government, noting that research support is not an operational subsidy, and pointing out that the fee required from operators for the loan guarantees actually bring revenues into the government. He acknowledges, however, that industry faces a challenge to reduce the capital costs of new nuclear power.

4. Waste: After noting the small volume of nuclear waste, he points out that this is a government problem, and that several governments--he mentions Finland, Sweden and Russia, among others--have made strides in addressing the issue.

5. Terrorism: He feels concerns have been exaggerated, and that any radiological device is likely to come from a source such as a hospital rather than from a nuclear power facility.

6. New Red Herrings: He cites 3--shortages of fuel, people, and key equipment. (In my view, this really makes 8 red herrings--and I could probably add a few more that I know of--but this is a very slight quibble.) John asserts that all 3 are not intractable problems--a combination of new ore discoveries and mining techniques, reprocessing, breeders reactors and the thorium fuel cycle will assure ample and affordable fuel supplies for a long time; and supply and demand will assure that the people and the manufacturing facilities will grow to meet the emerging needs.

The above provides only excerpts of the excerpts from the Nuclear Energy Insider, so John undoubtedly fleshed out some of these areas more than I am able to do here. I myself would have liked to see what else he had to say in several of these areas, particularly on terrorism. However, even in abbreviated form, his speech provides a number of points that are useful to keep in mind when you find yourself swimming in a sea of red herrings.

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